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Abstract 
 
 Despite the vast research on the social bias in decision-making, relatively little is 
known about biases in voting behaviour. The main aim of this research was to explore 
alternative indirect methods to observe biases in decision-making and voting behaviour.  A 
proximity bias was first observed in the rather unusual setting of the Weakest Link TV 
game show, when contestants avoided casting negative votes against their closest 
neighbours. This proximity bias was most profound for the contestant closest to the voter. 
Two field experiments were designed to test whether this Neighbour Effect occurred in 
different social contexts, among the first-year undergraduate students. The first study asked 
first-year undergraduate students in a lecture (n=449) to vote for another person seated in 
the same row.  The same Neighbour Effect occurred when the vote carried a nasty 
(negative) outcome for the recipient however, when the vote valence changed to a nice 
(positive) outcome the Neighbour Effect disappeared.  In negative voting, the result of the 
field experiment confirmed the original observation in the Weakest Link.  However, a 
reverse polarity voting pattern was also found in the positive voting.  This suggests 
participants significantly favoured their closest neighbour(s).  The second field experiment 
used Prisoner’s Dilemma with undergraduates in a lecture theatre (n= 229) to test the 
Neighbour Effect.  The undergraduates played the game with another player seated in the 
same row and in the same block in a lecture theatre.  The results showed a neighbour effect 
because the players were significantly more likely to cooperate with a neighbour that a 
non-neighbour.  To conclude the findings from this study suggested that the Neighbour 
Effect is a robust bias in strategic decision-making and voting. 
KEYWORDS: Decision-making, Neighbour Effect, Vote Valence, Voting, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma 
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1 
Thesis Organization 
 
The overall layout for the thesis is shown in Figure 1 below.  It illustrates the thesis 
organization, in four main parts that follow the typical structure for an empirically based 
scientific report:  Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion. 
 
The subject matter of the thesis utilises a field of enquiry that has previously 
received relatively little attention in the past in the field of Psychology.  The Introduction 
therefore presents a general background and literature review focusing on an evaluation of 
different methods used to assess social interactions from different disciplines to understand 
social behaviour.  The second chapter in the Introduction provides a more detailed 
evaluation of studies that have made use of the Weakest Link (WL) TV game-show.  It 
presents the details of the observational field studies used to assess the voting behaviour of 
the contestants in the UK version of the TV game-show the WL. 
 
The Methods also detail the experimental work used to test the findings from the 
observational field studies.  The Results are in two main parts detailing the findings using 
the two main methods.  The first part presents the findings from the observational field 
studies in three sections.  Similarly, the second part of the Results shows the findings of 
the experimental work in two sections.  Finally, the Discussion considers the results in the 
context of relevant previously published materials.  The contents of the chapters are 
presented in more detail below. 
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Introduction Chapter deals with the problem of limitation of understanding social 
behaviour and shows how the alternative approach has been developed and presented in 
two parts.  The first part (I1) presents the dilemma in experimental Social Psychology and 
critique of the infamous classic social experiment by Milgram (1963).  It reviews 
approaches used in two different disciplines where the similarities and the differences in 
methodological approaches were clarified.  In Social Psychology, it focuses on 
experimental procedures, however in Economics, it took a stand to understand the 
behaviour in a natural setting as in a form of game theory.  Hence, this chapter elaborates 
on how the two distinctive disciplines can explain social behaviour.  The second part (I2) 
presents a critical evaluation of studies that have employed observations of the WL game-
show.  Finally, the rationale behind the studies, together with aims and objectives of this 
thesis are presented. 
 
Methods Chapter describes the methods used in this thesis.  The first method 
(M1.2) focused on an unorthodox approached in Social Psychology, which is an 
observation of a TV game-show.  The second method (M1.4), emphasises the field 
experiment studies used to test the findings found from the initial study.  The pilot studies 
(M1.3) were briefly discussed. 
 
Results Chapter presents the results in the form of three studies.  R1 presented the 
demonstration and replication of the original observation of the contestants’ voting 
behaviour on the WL.  R2 and R3 are presented two main large scale lecture studies that 
were used to test the findings from the observations. 
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Discussion Chapter discusses the findings in general in response to the aim of the 
research.  It gives the implications which are considered to be significant and relevant for 
academia and society in general. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The starting point for this research was a simple observation based on a popular TV 
game-show, The Weakest Link (WL).  Contestants on the show were placed in a unique 
social dilemma by being required to name one of their fellow contestants as the worst 
performer, the so-called “weakest link”.  This thesis is concerned with the endogenous and 
exogenous factors in voting behaviour. 
 
The Introduction is presented in two main parts.  The first part, I1 evaluates the 
general methods in Social Psychology and puts the WL game-show in the context of 
academic research making the case for considering the format of TV game-shows as an 
important resource methodology for testing hypotheses in Psychology, Economics and 
Social Science.  The argument is made that the decisions made by the contestants on the 
TV game-show can be operationally defined as a basis to study how people decide to do 
something “bad” or “nasty” to another person.  This allusion is considered within the 
context of Milgram’s (1963) famous study on obedience and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. 
 
The second part, I2 considers how the WL game-show has been used to test 
theories of discrimination, strategic game playing and proximity bias in decision-making.  
The chapter finishes with a statement of the research goals.   
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Chapter I1:   
Methods used to study “Nice” and “Nasty” Behaviour 
 
“One of the worst thing in life is not how nasty the nasty people are.  You know 
that already.  It is the how nasty the nice people can be” (Powell, 1962, p. 246). 
 
I1.1 Chapter Outline 
 
This first chapter makes the case that the voting behaviour of contestants on the 
WL TV game-show can be used as a way to study of how people choose whom to perform 
a “nasty” or “bad” act on.  
 
The chapter is structured by reviewing the general methods used in Social 
Psychology and puts WL in the context of an alternative research methodology.  
Milgram’s (1963) classic work on obedience is reviewed as is the Game Theoretic 
approach using the example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).  Comparisons are made 
between Milgram’s work, PD and WL using strategic features such as “nice” and “nasty” 
strategies, cooperation and conflict/defection. 
  
I1.1 Chapter Outline 
I1.2 Methods in Social Psychology 
I1.3 Why We do Nasty Things to Other People: A Review of Milgram (1963) Experiment. 
I1.4 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
I1.5 Chapter Summary  
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I1.2 Methods in Social Psychology  
 
The dilemma of Social Psychology.  The social psychologist seeking to examine 
how people make social choices faces a conundrum similar to that of the cognitive 
psychologist endeavouring to understand human consciousness.  Both psychologists spend 
their academic and personal lives seemingly completely immersed by their subject matter, 
yet once subjected to scientific scrutiny the essence of their specialism escapes simple 
description remaining tantalizing and elusive.  One reason for this is that despite the fact 
we are completely enveloped by our social milieu and conscious experience, the milieus 
and conscious states are dynamic and multifaceted.  Another reason is that the individual 
conscious social actor is not always rational or fully aware of the factors that affect their 
social experience.  Humans are notoriously prone to a wide range of biases both in their 
decision-making and their social judgments regarding others and themselves (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975).  Furthermore, take the myriad decisions 
people routinely make that can range in importance from the life changing and profound, 
choosing whether or not to have a child with a partner, through to the trivial, for example, 
what to watch on TV tonight. 
 
Given the complexity of the subject matter it is not surprising that several methods 
have been adopted to study human social behaviour and social cognition which can be 
subdivided broadly into the more quantitative experimental social psychological approach 
based on logical positivism and the more qualitative constructive approach founded on 
discourse and narrative accounts (Bryman, 1984).  The former is open to criticism because 
the behaviour of participants knowingly taking part in an experiment is not the same as 
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their social decisions made in everyday life.  Social behaviour by its very nature is 
sensitive to the context in which it occurs and so the psychology laboratory becomes a new 
kind of social environment in its own right.  By directly looking at social behaviour, the 
social psychologist faces the charge of changing that behaviour.  Equally, qualitative 
methods can be used to generate richer accounts of social interactions yet face the critism 
of lacking the methodological rigor and control lauded by the experimentalist.  Adopting 
either research strategy, of course, affords benefits and insights but these come at some 
cost.  Taking a nomothetic approach to identify axiomatic laws for human social behaviour 
loses the experience of the individual agent while the converse is also true because an 
idiographic approach can provide a detailed understanding of an individual agent but one 
which may not be applicable to the population as a whole. 
 
The trade-off between using nomothetic and idiographic methods to understand 
how an individual makes a choice was cleverly captured by Sherlock Holmes in ‘The Sign 
of The Four’:  
 
“…He remarks that, while the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the 
aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty.  You can, for example, never foretell what 
any one man will do, but you can say with precision what an average number will be up to.  
Individuals vary, but percentages remain constant.  So, says the statistician” (Doyle, 1890, 
p. 169). 
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An alternative methodology:  How watching TV game-shows can tell us about 
human nature?  An alternative methodology to those alluded to above is used in the first 
part of this thesis, a field observation of contestants on a TV game-show.  TV game-shows 
have long been used for material by Economics researchers, although their use in 
Psychology has been more sparing. 
 
Metrick (1995) argued that TV game-shows provide a suitable empirical resource 
to analyse behaviour, as many of the shows are structured as well-defined decision 
problems.  The TV game-show in question is the WL (i.e., see Methods section M1.2, p. 
60) for a detailed breakdown of the rules of the game).  This game-show involves several 
interesting topics such as voting consideration, discrimination, strategy optimization and 
the existence of Nash equilibria.  The successive elimination of the “weakest link” by vote 
became the distinctive feature of the show and gave rise to its distinctive name.  It is of 
interest because each of the nine contestants that took part in an episode (i.e., in the UK 
version) faced a dilemma because they had to make a fixed judgment about one of their 
fellow contestants.  It became relatively straight forward thereafter to observe and measure 
their social judgments in groups that would otherwise not be observable in more 
naturalistic settings and that would be almost impossible to replicate in the laboratory.  The 
feature of the show that was of particular relevance for the work in this thesis occurred 
when the contestants had to pick a fellow contestant to be eliminated from the show as the 
worst performer in the group following a round of quiz questions. 
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Nasty voting.  The judgment required from the participants was also particularly 
interesting, because, following a first three-minute round of general knowledge questions, 
they each had to nominate, openly, which of their fellow contestants was the worst 
performer, the so-called weakest link.  It is fairly uncommon to be able to find and 
measure instances of disapproval voting such as this.  Another way of interpreting the 
decision each contestant had to make is that it was a bad or nasty judgment to bestow on 
another contestant.  Ordinarily in social situations people are more likely to follow the 
conventions, manners and social norms of their culture by being predisposed to be openly 
pro-social.  Here contestants publicly denounced one of their number as the weakest link.  
For this thesis, the vote each contestant made was operationalized as an action by doing a 
“negative”, “bad” or “nasty” thing to another person.  The tag of nasty is used as a way of 
contrasting it with the nice strategies referred to later in the thesis with respect to game 
theory.  Ball (2004), noted that one set of strategies used in the PD (see later for fuller 
discussion) were considered nice if they led to cooperation with an opponent and suggested 
that the alternative strategies could be tagged as nasty. 
 
Another reason for considering the vote as nasty is because the contestant that 
subsequently received most nominations was eliminated from the game.  The remaining 
eight contestants then proceeded to another round of general knowledge questions.  The 
assumption is made that a rational player would avoid elimination and so recognize that 
casting a vote for another player is nasty because it increases their probability of being 
eliminated from the game.  
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Methodological advantages of using WL.  Analysing the voting patterns of 
contestants on the WL game-show therefore provided a means to study how people made 
nasty decisions.  The format of the TV game-show also conferred several advantages 
methodologically. 
 
1. Participants, or contestants, believe they are playing a game on TV game-show rather 
than being studied regarded their decision-making in a psychological laboratory.  Their 
behaviour is likely to be more natural than if it occurred in a laboratory. 
 
2. Participant/experimenter effects.  Both participants and experimenters are prone to bias 
in experimental situations.  Such biases can be either or both conscious or unconscious.  
Participants are vulnerable to using implicit social cognition to interpret the aims of an 
experiment and seek to conform to, or contradict, the perceived aims.  Experimenters, 
similarly, are prone to bias to confirm hypotheses.  As participants are contestants on a 
TV game-show they are naive to the aims and purpose of the research.  Experimenters 
were removed from the design, participant recruitment and execution of the TV game-
show so had no influence on the procedure and were unable to introduce unintended 
systematic bias into the procedure.  
 
3. Randomisation.  Double-blind procedure.  The research protocol is effectively double-
blind as participants and researchers were naive to the research aims and participant 
allocation respectively.  Independent observers were used to code data. 
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4. Clearly defined variables.  The dependent variable in the TV game-show was the vote 
choice made by each contestant.  Independent variables included the relative positions 
of the candidates and their demographic background (e.g., gender). 
 
5. Ethics.  Studying the responses made by contestants on TV game-shows are free from 
the kinds of ethical concerns that would make their replication difficult to achieve in 
the psychology laboratory.  The threshold for what TV production companies would 
consider acceptable is very different to the code of ethics set out by the British 
Psychological Society (Broadcasting Act 1996). 
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I1.3  Why We do Nasty Things to Other People? A Review of Milgram 
(1963) Experiment.  
 
“… (it is) a social fact; the individual who is commanded by a legitimate authority 
ordinarily obeys.  Obedience comes easily and often.  It is a ubiquitous and indispensable 
feature of social life” (Milgram, 1963, p. 372). 
 
A series of now classic, seminal social psychology experiments still resonate in 
modern psychology largely because the behaviour of the participants was so unexpected.  
One of the most controversial demonstrated that ordinary participants under laboratory 
conditions could be cajoled into delivering what they believed to be extreme and lethal 
electric shocks to another person (Milgram, 1963).  Participants were led to believe that 
they were volunteering to take part in a study investigating the effect of punishment on 
learning.  They were allocated the role of a teacher in a mock learning task and 
administered a “punishment” by delivering electric shocks to an errant learner.  The 
learning task, as it turned out, was a sham, a carefully orchestrated hoax designed to be 
plausible to the unsuspecting participant.  The learner, of course, was Milgram’s stooge, 
an actor following a pre-set script, fully briefed and aware of the proceedings and aware of 
the fact that no electric shocks were given.  The real purpose of the study was to measure 
the maximum electric shock that the participant was prepared to go to.  Shock magnitude 
began at 15v and increased by increments of 15v up to a maximum of 450v.  The 
participants bought into the conceit and believed that they were administering real electric 
shocks to a real learner.  Milgram reported that the participants frequently displayed 
extreme agitation in the face of having to inflict pain and harm to the learner.  
Nevertheless, in the original study, 24 of the 40 participants went up to the maximum 
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450v.  The remaining 16 terminated the study by refusing to go to the maximum, but they 
still went up to at least 300v, sufficient to be lethal or at least cause serious discomfort.  
The experiment has been repeated and replicated using different groups (i.e., up to 780 
participants) Milgram (1963, 1964, 1965).  The participants reported that they were under 
extreme emotional stress after the experiment, even though majority of the participants 
also reported that they appreciated being part of the experiment, “…84% of the subjects 
stated they were glad to have been in the experiment…” (Milgram, 1964, p. 849).  Even 
though Milgram’s study received widespread criticism on the ethical consideration towards 
his participants (Baumrind, 1964), the findings still resonate throughout Psychology, not 
least because it possibly revealed an inconvenient truth about human nature. 
 
The impact of Milgram’s study.  There are many ramifications of Milgram’s 
(1963) famous study but it remains the case that seemingly normal people could be placed 
into a situation that allowed them to do something nasty to another person.  In this case, the 
nasty behaviour was delivering a very nasty electric shock.  Moreover, Milgram was able 
to entice this behaviour out of the participants in a very short period of time, usually less 
than 50 minutes.  If nasty behaviour can be so readily elicited in normal, nice people, by 
Milgram under the subterfuge of a psychology experiment, then those powers intent on 
engineering systematic harm and genocide on entire populations could similarly recruit 
obedient agents to carry out their bidding. 
 
Milgram (1963) made reference to the need for obedience to enable the mass 
killings in death camps in Europe that occurred on an industrial scale around the time of 
the Second World War.  Similarly, Arendt’s (1964) record of Eichmann’s trial in 
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Jerusalem, detailed how Eichmann constructed, maintained and managed a ruthlessly 
efficient system to enable the mass slaughter that was perpetrated.  This smooth operation 
required the complicity of hundreds of thousands of people to make it work.  Eichmann, 
rejected the charge of murder levelled against him maintaining that he had never killed a 
human being in his life.  If anything, he should only be accused of “aiding and abetting” 
(Arendt, p. 22) as the charges of murder made against him were acts of state and not 
crimes that can be attributed to an individual. According to his lawyer “it had been his duty 
to obey” (Arendt, p. 22 Arendt).  Arendt subtitled her work ‘A report on the banality of 
evil’ to reflect the calm, detached and routine fashion by which Eichmann engineered the 
mass killings.  Milgram’s study can be used as a demonstration that people can be cajoled 
easily to carry out “nasty” acts. 
 
More recent texts suggest that Arendt’s account missed out on Eichmann’s true 
motives (Stangneth, 2014).  Eichmann simply attempted to promote the idea that he did not 
fit the profile of a mass murderer but did fit the profile of an obedient and efficient 
administrator.  Recently reviewed documents of his time in Argentina, prior to his trial in 
Jerusalem, show a more calculating architect of the holocaust fully endorsing its goals.   
 
Milgram’s works and its implications not only caused surprise in the academic 
world, but provoked the development of a code of ethics for the treatment of human 
participants in psychological research.  It raised concerns about the conflicting interests 
between researchers and participants.  “The game is defined by the experimenter and he 
makes the rules” (Baumrind, 1964, p. 421).  Baumrind stated that Milgram created 
unacceptable levels of stress towards his participants.  Furthermore, Perry (2012) 
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suggested that Milgram’s participants were not properly debriefed, something Milgram 
persistently refused to acknowledge.  
 
The recorded interviews, highlighted by Perry (2012), which followed the 
experiment suggested that the participants were frequently left with conflicted feelings and 
had expressed their discomfort about their participation.  However, conversely, Brannigan 
(2013) suggested that the work carried out by Perry was not sufficient to make out that any 
of the former participants had indeed been mistreated, so this critique of Milgram’s 
experiment was unwarranted.  Nevertheless, partly as a result of the impact Milgram’s 
study had on its participants, studies thereafter have had to adhere to explicit ethical 
guidelines as laid down by the relevant professional bodies (e.g. American Psychological 
Association and British Psychological Society). 
 
Critique of Milgram’s controversial experiment.  Despite its critics, the 
experiment inspired many researchers to replicate the methodology in a variety of 
experiments (Burger, 2009; Kilham & Mann, 1974; Meeus & Raaijmakers,1995; Sheridan 
& King, 1972; Slater, Antley, Davison, Swapp, Guger, Barker, . . . Sanchez-Vives, 2006).  
The infamous experiment was also recognized world-wide in the form of documentaries 
such as Curiosity: How Evil are you? by Eyres, Bowie, Smithson, Winslow and Day 
(2011), The Heist by Mills (2006) and The Milgram Re-enactment by Dickinson (2002).  It 
has also been recognized in movies such as Compliance by Zobel, Lin, Sena, Muskat and 
Davidson (2012), The Tenth Level by Bellak (1976), Experimenter by Abeckaser, 
Golombek, Melita, Robbins, Schoof and Singer (2015) and a game-show (e.g., Le Jeu de la 
Mort, 2010).  Milgram’s study was not only relevant to understand the notorious conflicts 
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that surfaced during the post-world wars such as; Cold war, Vietnam war, Korean war, 
Gulf war, Iraq war or Cuban revolution, it was an emerging research area particularly to 
understand the extent to which people would go.   
 
Validity and Reliability.  Milgram (1963,1965, 1974) suggested the existence of an 
agentic state in which the participants were made to believe that they were not responsible 
for any action carried out throughout the experiments.  They believed that they were acting 
as an instrument to penalize the learner and acted the role accordingly, since the 
responsibility lay with the experimenter themselves.  This disturbing finding showed a 
nasty part of the human unconscious state of mind where they deliberately agreed to 
administer harm, despite going against their conscious, rational conscience. 
 
Brown (1986) stated that the disagreements among researchers revealed the 
opposite assumption of how a rational individual should behave.  Brown therefore 
regarded the unexpected findings from Milgram’s experiment as the most important 
psychological research.  Also, Blass (1991, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2009) based a body of 
work on Milgram’s experiment and stated that “…it has become one of the best-known 
works of social psychology in the world, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that 
Milgram’s (1974) book has been translated into 11 different languages” (Blass & Schmitt, 
2001, p. 115).  
 
Milgram also argued that the situation was the more important determinant of 
social behaviour than the individual’s personality.  He repeated the experiments with 
various other conditions and found the level of obedience changed with the level of 
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physical and emotional attachment.  When a condition where the teacher and learner were 
related, either romantically or by family, obedience dropped to the lowest obedience 
recorded (defiance was 85%) (Perry, 2012).  However, Baumrind (1964) contested that the 
context of the laboratory setting was ambiguous for the participants.  It was such an 
unfamiliar environment for the participants that they became even more compliant with 
authority figures by obeying, because of their uncertainty about how to behave in that 
situation.  Blass (1991, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2009) also suggested that the key factor in 
Milgram’s paradigm was the odd situation that the participant was suddenly placed in, 
such that strong characters in other social domains became uncertain and indecisive in the 
experiment. 
 
Observations from experimental game literature also show that the status of the 
individual “punisher” is an important factor in how participants judge the success and 
appropriateness of a punishment meted out.  For example, when participants were asked to 
judge the outcome of vignettes where social transgressors (Gordon, Madden & Lea, 2014; 
Gordon & Lea, 2016) were asked to rectify their behaviour by a third-party-punisher, they 
judged the likelihood of the transgressor remedying the transgression according to the 
perceived status of the transgressor and the third-party-punisher.  High status third-party-
punishers were predicted to cause the social transgressor to change their behaviour more 
than the lower status third-party-punishers.  This could be interpreted in terms of the 
cost/benefit analysis of status and punishment from an evolutionary perspective. 
 
Aside than the status of the individual “punisher”, from the experimental studies, it 
showed that, the success of the “intervention” (i.e., to punish the aggressor) by the 
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dominant “punisher” (high-status) was not affected by the heterogeneity of the punishment 
or threat, either as aggressive (physical violence) or ostracism (non-aggressive) ways.  As 
such, it suggested that it affects the “cost” of the punishment in which, the dominant 
“punisher” could ride on the benefit of the reputational gains, where the attempt of 
retaliation was lesser.  Hence, these experimental studies concur with Milgram’s claims 
that the status of the individuals in the obedience to authority scenario was one of the 
factors that could regulate the effect of retaliation or cooperation. 
 
In the following section the Prisoner’s dilemma game is described as a useful 
method to explore strategic behaviour. 
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I1.4  The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 This is a standard method to test a situation when two players each have two 
options where the outcome depends on the choices made by the other.  Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) is one of the best-known game strategies in social science.  
 
  II   confess not confess 
I confess (-1, -1) PP  (1, -2) TS 
  Not confess  (-2, 1) ST  (0, 0) RR 
 
Figure 2.  The original Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff table presented for two-person game 
(non zero-sum game).  The pay-off matrix is reprinted from “The Mathematics of Tucker: 
A Sampler” A. W. Tucker, 1983, The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal, 14 (3), 228. 
Copyright (1983) by Mathematical Association of America. P is punishment T is 
temptation, S is sucker and R is reward. 
 
It was originally framed by Merill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 as part of 
RAND Corporation project to investigate a game theory, where it was later formalised by 
Albert William Tucker in 1983 (Poundstone, 1992), in which he expressed the situations in 
a simple pay-off table.  As Figure 2 shows a simplified dilemma faced by two prisoners in 
which they were given options either to confess or not confess, where it is also considered 
in terms of cooperate and defect. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
21 
In this scenario, the prisoners were told; 
 
“1. If one confesses and the other does not, the former will be given a reward of one 
unit and the latter will be fined two units, 
 2.  If both confess, each will be fined one unit, 
 3. If neither confesses, both will go clear” (Tucker, 1983, p. 228). 
 
 Given these options, the prisoners had to decide whether to cooperate with their 
fellow prisoner, by not confessing, or defect with the other prisoner by confessing.  
However, neither of them knows what the other decided, which brings them to face with 
the dilemma of whether it is best to cooperate or defect. 
 
Breaking the PD down it can be seen that the choices that the prisoners make will 
have a profound impact on the relative penalties that they could receive.  For instance, if 
both prisoners, I and II, confessed (defected), both would be punished (P) by being fined 
one unit (NW corner in Figure 2).  Whereas, if both cooperated, by not confessing, they 
would be rewarded (R) by escaping any fine (SE corner).  The other possibility occurred 
when they differed in their choice to cooperate and defect.  When one of the prisoners was 
the ‘sucker’ (S) by cooperating whilst the other succumbed to ‘temptation’ by defecting 
(T), the co-operator suffered the greatest penalty by being fined two units but the defector 
gained one unit (SW & NE corners).  The PD is defined by the respective pay-offs such 
that T > R > P > S. 
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From a strategic point of view, it was always in the best interests of each player to 
defect by confessing.  This is evident because whichever strategy the other prisoner plays 
the best outcome comes from defecting.  Consider prisoner I, when II cooperated, I 
received one unit from defecting (confessing) but only got zero from cooperating (not 
confessing).  When II defected by confessing, I’s best strategy was still to defect by 
confessing giving a penalty of -1.  Cooperating led to a greater penalty of -2.  Therefore, 
PD elegantly shows that when each individual pursued their own self-interest (defecting), 
the outcome is worse than when both cooperated.  Technically, the rational player should 
always pick defection in PD because the rational individual seeks to maximise their utility.  
The unique features of PD, and its variants, that makes it so interesting from a research 
perspective is that the game has a unique solution by each player playing defect, whatever 
the other player does.  However, the Pareto optimal solution for the game is for both 
players to play the opposite strategy as it was impossible to play without making the other 
player worse off, while the other better off.  PD presents the dilemma in another sense as 
whether to play for one’s self interest or whether to go for the overall best solution for all 
concerned.  The dominant strategy of defection will be preferred to cooperation.  However, 
the catch is, if both decided to cooperate by not confessing, it yielded the best outcome for 
both. 
 
Notice that PD is a non-zero sum, non-cooperative game.  It can be contrasted with 
pure competition zero sum games where there is always one winner and one loser.  The 
pure strategy unique solution to the PD is referred to as the Nash equilibrium.  It is the sole 
solution to the game.  The Nash equilibrium can be defined as, “…an action profile a with 
the property that no player i can do better by choosing an action different from ai, given 
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that every other player j adheres to aj”. (Osborne, 2009, p. 22).  Stated informally, this 
means that in the case of the example above with the two-player PD in Figure 2, prisoner I 
choosing Defect (confessing) is a Nash Equilibrium because opting for the other 
alternative, Cooperate (not confessing) always gives a worse outcome. This is irrespective 
of which strategy prisoner II plays. The same argument applies to prisoner II, meaning that 
the sole pure strategy solution for the game is for both prisoners (players) to play the 
dominant strategy, Defect, by confessing.  What makes the PD such an important 
experimental tool is that it seems counterintuitive because the strategy that gives the best 
overall outcome for both players is the Pareto optimal solution where they both cooperate 
(not confess). 
 
 
Advantages of using Prisoner’s Dilemma as a method.  PD game is widely used in 
Game Theory as it provides a good framework on how to strike a balance between 
cooperation and competition, which is a very useful tool to analyse strategic decision-
making.  PD has become a reputable tool for economics and business research especially 
on strategizing their products.  For instance, in the low-cost airline industry in Europe, 
Ryanair and EasyJet are both airlines selling similar products.  Each must decide on the 
pricing strategy.  Either one can exploit the market by selling their air fares as low as 
possible or as high as possible or else either stay clear from the rivalry by flying into 
different routes and share the profits from the same pool of customers. 
 
The challenge in this game is for each player to make choices without knowing what 
the other has decided.  Given the uncertainty and the payoff structures, Nash equilibrium is 
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the decision point, where it is possible for the player to response following to the opponent 
choices, despite that it might not be the optimal outcome for both.  Yet, it is the most 
advantageous decision the players can make when neither one of them knows what the others 
will decide (Gottman, 2011). 
 
Another key strength of the Nash equilibrium is the simplicity of the concept with 
power to analyse real world events.  For instance, in the Cold War, the relationship 
between the U.S and the USSR were deemed to show the real-world application of the 
Nash equilibrium (Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996).  Both became locked into an 
equilibrium whereby each side was aware and knew each other’s positions but held to the 
strategy.  One of the benefits, to consider the Nash equilibrium is, it creates a basis on how 
to analyse the role of reward or pay-offs in a social interaction, which can change the order 
of Pareto optimality.  Pareto optimality is best explained by scarcity.  Imagine that, there is 
a short supply of Jelly Babies and the only store that still selling it, start charging 
customers with a ridiculously high price.  Encountering this kind of dilemma in every day 
lives makes a study of game theory fascinating, especially as it can be applied to real-life 
events. 
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I1.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter offered a general overview of methods in Social Psychology by way 
of considering how to understand and operationalize the voting dilemma faced by 
contestants on the WL game-show.  The WL is advanced as an important indirect method 
for studying how individuals make choices regarding whom to choose in a forced-choice 
setting, from a menu of eight choices (i.e., the other eight contestants).  The main reasons 
that make WL interesting are that, it is fairly easy to see by breaking the game down that it 
shares some of the common aspects with PD, that are also shared with Milgram’s 
obedience paradigm.  WL, Milgram’s obedience studies and PD all share common 
features: A choice dilemma, cooperation/defection and uncertainty.  Each approach offers 
its own unique perspective on these features.  
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm:  Choice dilemma, cooperation/defection and 
uncertainty.  PD was described above in terms of its qualities to distinguish between the 
uncertainty of making payoff-dominated or risk-dominated choice strategies above.  PD 
provides possibly the neatest encapsulation of the choice dilemma, cooperation versus 
defection and uncertainty.  Not only is it a very straight forward dilemma to understand but 
it is based on a mathematical theory.  Game theory can be applied to a wide range of 
situations and is widely used throughout academia. 
 
Milgram’s paradigm:  Choice dilemma, cooperation/defection and uncertainty.  
The choice dilemma faced by participants in Milgram’s paradigm became a decision on 
whether to administer an electric shock.  Once this choice had been made the choice 
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dilemma was repeated again and again until the participant either chose not to administer 
the electric shock or the shock intensity reached its maximum level.  In this fashion, the 
choice became more of a dilemma as the intensity of the shocks increased.  The participant 
was in some ways lured into the choice dilemma, because following a convivial meet and 
greet with the learner and experimenter and having sampled a test shock, the participant 
then began to instigate the shock sequence most likely unaware of the escalation in 
intensity and potential ramifications of administering very severe shocks.  It would be 
interesting to know if participants had begun at the highest level of shock and worked 
down to administer as the first shock. 
 
Participants in Milgram’s paradigm also face the dilemma of cooperation and 
defection.  With each electric shock, they administer they cooperate with the experimenter 
and defect from the learner.  One way of thinking about the choice dilemma is where the 
tipping point is between cooperating with the teacher and cooperating with the learner.  
The dependent variable Milgram used was effectively when this switch occurred. 
 
As the intensity levels of the electric shocks increased it is reasonable to assume 
that the uncertainty participants experienced as they moved to the next level increased.  As 
the uncertainty increased participants experienced stress and agitation regarding their 
choice dilemma.  The uncertainty grew as the participants continued.  Participants 
eventually handled this uncertainty once it hit some trigger point.  At the trigger point the 
participants faced another dilemma of whether to refuse to continue to administer the 
shocks or accept blithely that they would just continue to the maximum and absolve 
responsibility to the experimenter.  
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WL paradigm:  Choice dilemma, cooperation/defection and uncertainty.  This 
chapter argued that the WL TV game-show provides an alternative method on how social 
interactions can be observed.  This particular TV game-show is unique because it seems to 
encourage cooperation and defection.  Cooperation and coalition were required by 
contestants working together to build a temporary pot of money for the benefit of all the 
contestants (i.e., refer to M1.2, p. 60 for the WL game-show format).  However, the game 
is structured with a ruthless twist because there can only be a single winner that receives 
the payoff of the accumulated prize fund at the end of the game.  The other contestants are 
equal “losers” in the context of WL because they each gain nothing.   
 
Contestants defect too, by voting for another contestant to be eliminated from the 
show in each round as the weakest link.  The contestants therefore have to navigate a 
complex fast-paced scenario of answering quick-fire questions, banking and then voting 
for a peer to be eliminated as the weakest link. 
 
Fevrier and Linemmer (2006) see the WL in terms of Game Theory and suggest 
that the strategies involved switch between being payoff dominated and risk dominated.  In 
the early, less risky, rounds of WL the payoff incentives dominate when the best strategy is 
to vote off the weakest players.  The final voting round with the three remaining 
contestants is different though, particularly when there is a single player that is clearly 
superior.  The two weaker players then have an opportunity to “gang-up” to eliminate the 
strongest player.  This is similar to the Stag-Hunt game, where two hunters have to each 
decide whether to risk joining forces to catch a stag or work alone to catch a guaranteed 
hare (Osborne, 2009).  The stag can only be caught if both hunters work together, but the 
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hare can be caught by an individual.  Hunting the hare carries no risk but hunting the stag 
requires coordination but gives a better payoff.  In terms of WL, the strongest player is 
indifferent between the two weak players and votes with a probability of 50-50.  It then 
leaves the two weak players in a stag-hunt game.  They can be coordinated and catch the 
stag (i.e., strong player) or be risk averse and vote for the other weak player: if the other 
player subsequently voted against the strongest player then they would be most likely to be 
voted off as the “strongest link” who decides whom to be eliminated in the event of a tie. 
 
Fevrier and Linemmer (2006) observed 36 episodes of the WL aired in France.  
Empirically it appeared that the contestants coordinated on the Nash equilibrium where the 
strongest-link was not voted out.  Interestingly, they found that the strongest link was 
never eliminated in the first two voting rounds and rarely after that until the final voting 
round where 5 (14%) were eliminated.  The weakest links were eliminated, as their 
performance would predict, much more frequently with a ratio of about 50% in each 
round.  It still remains the case though, that in about half of the voting rounds the voted 
weakest was not the actual weakest link (i.e., at least as measured by Fevrier and 
Linemmer).  This suggests either that it was not always very clear who the weakest link 
was or that the contestants voting was subject to some form of bias.   
 
From a strategic point of view, the contestants’ optimal strategy was to cooperate in 
the early rounds to accumulate a large cash prize.  In the later rounds, there is some 
incentive for cooperation to reduce and a switch to an incentive to defect.  However, 
Fevrier and Linemmer (2006) found no empirical evidence for this.  The final Head-to-
Head round involved the last two remaining contestants in a pure zero-sum game.   
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Social context of data collection.  The WL contestants, although performing in a 
contrived artificial environment, were all very well informed about the rules of the game 
and what to expect on the day that they turned up to be a contestant, after all, the 
contestants made the effort by requesting to take part in the TV show’s recording.  
Therefore, the format of the show and its rules and layout were all very familiar to the 
contestants.  Indeed, considering the WL contestants as participants in a Psychology study 
they compare very well to the participants turning up to take part in Milgram’s paradigm or 
players recruited to play PD.  In these cases, it is generally the case that the participants 
will not have the familiarity with Milgram’s social context or will typically be unfamiliar 
with PD and its nuances.  Therefore, as naive participants to an unfamiliar testing venue 
without preconceived notions of what to expect, participants’ performance will be affected 
by the novelty of the situation as an extraneous variable on top of the effects attributable to 
the carefully crafted experimental variables.  
 
WL contestants will also be expected to invest their full attention to the game task 
at hand as they will be appearing on national TV as well as in front of a TV audience.  The 
stakes are high and not just in monetary terms of the prize.  Clearly, they wish to avoid 
making a fool of themselves in front of friends, family and the nation.  Further, the 
prospect of winning a considerable prize pot is an added incentive.  Participants in 
laboratory studies run by university researchers cannot hope to elicit the same level of 
attention and commitment from their participants. 
 
The next part in the introduction I2, offers an evaluation of the key studies relevant 
to the thesis based on the WL game-show. 
  
 
 
                                                          
30 
Chapter I2: 
Evaluation of The Weakest Link TV Game-show  
 
“In addition, this game-show [WL] provides an ideal laboratory to study human 
decision-making.  The rules are well-deﬁned and the stakes are high, something that is not 
easy to replicate elsewhere” (Barmish & Boston, 2009, p. 3). 
 
I2.1 Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter offers a critical evaluation of literature pertinent to considering the 
voting decisions made by contestants in the WL game-show setting.  The argument is 
made that the WL game-show format offers an excellent resource for studying behaviour.  
The remainder of this section provides a detailed critical evaluation of the use of analysing 
TV game-shows as a methodology, with a particular emphasis on weakest link.  The WL 
TV game-show has been used to study a diverse range of issues including 
discrimination/prejudice, strategic game playing and proximity.  These are considered in 
turn.  The chapter finishes with a consideration of the research aims and objectives. 
 
I2.1 Chapter Outline 
I2.2 Using the Weakest Link game-show to test for discrimination, strategy and proximity. 
I2.3 Evaluation of the Weakest Link Game-show Studies 
I2.4 Research aims and objectives. 
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I2.2 Using the Weakest Link Game-show to Test for Discrimination, 
Strategy and Proximity. 
 
The opening of chapter I1 alluded to the seeming contradiction that despite being 
almost constantly embedded within wide ranging social milieus, researchers still find the 
phenomena of social psychology difficult to pin down and study.  This is because human 
social life is self-evidently very complex and is not experienced by an individual in neatly 
packaged observable units.  The real challenge for many social psychologists then is to 
somehow operationalize aspects of social behaviour so that they can be more neatly 
defined, measured and controlled for.  Otherwise, it is rarely the case that human social 
behaviour is presented in such a fixed methodical fashion available for precise scrutiny by 
an analyst.  One such rare exception, however, is the case of the TV game-show, for in this 
arena people behave according to clear observable rules in a way that is open to outside 
public surveillance.  The WL TV game-show has proven to be one of the most popular 
amongst researchers for the reasons outlined explained below. 
 
What WL can tell us about prejudice and discrimination?  The experimental 
study of prejudice and discrimination is problematic for a number of, mostly obvious, 
reasons.  One of the most notable ways in which the study of the WL has had greatest 
impact is with respect to testing between theories of discrimination.  This section reviews 
the predominant studies that used WL to explore discrimination.  First the academic study 
of discrimination is presented in terms of theories derived from the fields of Psychology 
and Economics, definitions of discrimination and problems measuring it.  
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Discrimination/prejudice from a social psychology perspective.  “This review 
argues that research on implicit prejudice, largely developed by Psychologists, provides an 
important new understanding of the basis of discrimination and should be incorporated in 
sociological accounts” (Quillan, 2006, p. 299). 
 
There exists an enormous literature on racial and gender discrimination.  However, 
measuring discrimination is a particularly challenging empirical task not least because any 
form of active discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, nationality or religion is 
almost universally eschewed (Levitt, 2004; Quillan, 2006).  Discriminatory behaviour is 
outlawed in most international, national and corporate policies.  The stigma associated 
with discrimination poses a particular problem as individuals will naturally avoid labelling 
themselves as bigots in any kind of conscious self-report study or experimental 
manipulation of variables associated with gender or race. 
 
One contradiction is that, there is a near unanimous acceptance that discrimination 
should not be tolerated (Quillan, 2006).  However, prejudice and discrimination remain 
strong.  There are some ways to capture this emotion both at an explicit level but also at 
the implicit level.  Some studies test for the existence of discrimination, others test for 
what kind of discrimination is evident. 
  
Whereas prejudice is a negative attitude about members of a group, discrimination 
is displayed as a negative act directed towards the members of a group.  Discrimination 
usually develops from prejudice and is associated with negative views and behaviours.  A 
major development in social psychology occurred with models of Implicit Social 
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Cognition.  These models showed that the attitudes and stereotypes that people adhere to 
need not be conscious and reasoned.  Instead, attitude, stereotypes and discrimination were 
potentially more likely to be unconscious and implicit.  Greenwald and Banaji (1995) 
provided useful operational accounts for implicit attitudes and stereotypes.   
 
“Implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces 
of past experience that mediate favourable or unfavourable feeling, thought, or action 
toward social objects...Implicit stereotypes are the introspectively unidentified (or 
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to 
members of a social category” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, pp. 8 & 15). 
 
Therefore, discrimination, from a psychological perspective at least can be both 
explicit but potentially more often implicit.  In explicit prejudice a person is fully aware 
and conscious of their prejudice and the discrimination that follows is overt, direct and 
explicit.  Even when a person is explicitly prejudiced, they might not necessarily go on to 
enact their unjustified attitudes in the form of discrimination.  However, it can also be the 
case that other persons are unaware of their own bias and unconscious of the 
discriminatory behaviour it leads to.  For these individuals the prejudice and discrimination 
is both automatic and implicit.   
 
A meta-analysis of studies investigating the link between prejudice and explicit 
discrimination (e.g., Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann & Banaji, 2009) found a reliable if 
weak relationship.  The weak relationship is understandable given the social desirability of 
not wishing to appear discriminatory.  Studies of implicit prejudice are potentially more 
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revealing because they get around the problem of participants recognising and conforming 
to socially desirable responses.  In a meta-analysis of implicit prejudice/stereotypes and 
their link with discrimination a weak to modest reliable relationship existed but one that 
was stronger than that found for explicit measures (Greenwald et al, 2009).  
 
Many methods have been used to demonstrate implicit social cognition.  These 
range from mere exposure, Implicit Activation Tests (IAT), stem completion tests and 
have been used in fields as diverse as attitude formation and memory function.  Many 
social psychology phenomena are associated with Implicit Social Cognition: halo effect, 
attribution theory, fundamental, disposition, situational attribution effects, self-esteem, 
attitude formation, stereotyping (i.e., including gender and race). 
 
Implicit race and gender stereotypes.  Many studies have shown that there are 
likely to be deeply held automatic, unconscious stereotypes of race and gender.  Although 
Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) found there were no differences in reaction times when 
white respondents had to judge if lists of negative traits were related more to whites and/or 
blacks, when the word lists were positive (e.g., White clever vs. Black clever), white 
respondents were quicker linking them to white targets than black targets.  The implication 
behind these indirect measures of implicit social cognition is that the connections are 
formed more quickly between concepts that have already been formed.  Therefore, the 
prejudice was pre-formed. 
 
White participants, surreptitiously primed with terms that were mostly 
stereotypically associated with African-Americans, were affected on their judgements on 
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subsequent tasks (Devine, 1989).  Judgments made in a seemingly race neutral setting still 
attributed male targets as significantly more aggressive than controls exposed to non-
stereotypical terms.  In a similar fashion to Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983), this result 
highlights the importance of implicit social cognition and the role of automatic cognitive 
processes underlying stereotyping and prejudice in implicit racism.  
 
Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) developed a theory of aversive racism based on 
dissonance occurring between the feelings of many white Americans with liberal views yet 
still harbouring negative stereotypes and attitudes about Blacks.  An unusual conflict 
emerges where the individual at once conforms to the anti-racist political agenda but still 
holds negative attitudes towards blacks.  Such automatic application of stereotypes forms 
the foundation for implicit prejudice.  Word, Zanna and Cooper (1974) found that white 
interviewers discriminated against black applicants for a job more than white interviewees.  
Further, when these kinds of discriminatory non-verbal cues were later actively introduced 
into the interviewer’s repertoire it was found that white interviewees performed worse.  
 
Implicit Gender Stereotyping occurs in a similar way to race stereotyping.  Another 
system justification theory of discrimination (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004) suggests that 
discrimination is justified based on the status quo.  It is the way of the world that those in 
the in-group benefit from the advantages they enjoy and the out-group members are in that 
position for a reason.  This can work both ways with the out-group almost falling into the 
trap of going along with the system justification theory.  One possible example is the bias 
shown in self estimations of IQ.  Women typically judged their own IQs significantly 
lower relative to males across many variants of participant groups.  This effect might be in 
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part a result of male hubris and female humility or even one where the system justification 
theory maintains gendered stereotypes relating intelligence as a stereotypically male trait 
(for review see Furnham, Kidwai & Thomas, 2001).  It is not surprising in view of this 
kind of research that long standing discrimination occur in grading essays higher with male 
as opposed to female names (Goldberg, 1968).  This serves to highlight the implications 
for this kind of subtle bias can have by becoming widely held stereotypes held throughout 
a culture operating again as an unconscious automatic bias.  This reinforces again the 
importance of anonymous marking in examinations.  Meta-analysis of similar studies 
support Goldberg's finding (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994). 
 
The cognitive process that underpin implicit social cognition can be allied with the 
fast and slow systems reviewed by Kahneman (2011).  The System 1.  Thinking is fast, 
parallel, automatic and unconscious akin to the implicit prejudice and discrimination.  The 
explicit prejudice and exhibition of discrimination fits with the System 2 way of thinking, 
slow and deliberate but conscious and overt.   
 
Expressions of discrimination – institutional/systemic prejudice/discrimination.  
Expressions of discrimination can occur in a variety of forms including hostility (i.e., 
verbal and non-verbal), aggression, avoidance and the denial of opportunities and equality.  
Even organizations or other formal groups can become prejudiced and display 
discriminatory practices.  Institutional or systemic discrimination occurs when the policies 
or practices of social bodies leads wittingly or otherwise to negative consequences for 
members of certain groups.  Ethnic minorities face worse health, school performance and 
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stiffer sentences.  The “ethnic penalty” refers to the disadvantage incurred by ethnic 
minorities in the job market (Heath and McMahon, 2005).  
 
An example of institutional racism.  One fairly recent high profile example in the 
UK arose from the MacPherson report published on 24 February 1999, on the inquiry by 
the Metropolitan Police Service into the murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence.  
The report concluded that the police investigation was “marred by a combination of 
professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior 
officers” (Home Office, 1999, para 46.1) and went on ‘...institutional racism affects the 
MPS (Metropolitan Police Service), and police services elsewhere.’ (ibid, para 46.27).  The 
report made 70 recommendations designed to achieve ‘the elimination of racist prejudice 
and disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing.’ (ibid, 
recommendation 2). 
 
Definitions of discrimination.  One of the most contentious aspects of the 
Macpherson report was its branding of the Metropolitan Police Service as institutionally 
racist, something the then Chief Constable refuted.  More recently, Sir Bernard Hogan-
Howe has nevertheless conceded that, “If other people think we are institutionally racist, 
then we are.  It is no good me saying we are not and saying you must believe me.  [That 
would be] a nonsense, if they believe that” (The Guardian, 5th June 2015).  Macpherson 
carefully defined institutional racism in his report as something that leads to 
discrimination: 
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The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin.  It can be seen or 
detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through 
unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage 
minority ethnic people.  (Home Office, 1999, para 6.34). 
 
Another useful description of discrimination is presented more generally as 
“...behaviour directed towards category members that is consequential for their outcomes 
and that is directed towards them not because of any particular deservingness or 
reciprocity, but simply because they happen to be members of that category” (Correll, 
Judd, Park & Wittenbrink, 2010, p. 46).  Taken together, these formulations of 
discrimination include a prejudice that can be unwitting or implicit and a behaviour that 
has perceived negative connotations.  Furthermore, these can exist at the level of the 
individual and the corporation.  Given that an integral feature of the WL game-show 
involves the contestants voting for one another and that the vote can be considered as 
doing something bad or nasty, then it becomes easy to see that analysing how contestants 
distribute their votes could be used to find bias and test if contestants potentially harbour 
prejudice and demonstrate discrimination (as endogenous or endogenous factors).  This 
could be done by simply counting whether the vote frequencies against various groups or 
minorities departed significantly from chance expectations. 
 
Discrimination/prejudice-from a behavioural economics/economics perspective.  
The psychological theories of discrimination described above are largely concerned with 
how a social actor comes to form prejudiced views and acts in such a way to disadvantage 
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a target group or its members.  These accounts focus on the formation of attitudes, displays 
of behaviour and cognitive processes underpinning explicit and implicit discrimination.  
Theories derived from the field of economics consider the economic actor and arrive at 
two main accounts for discrimination, one taste based and the other information based.  
Whereas the psychological theories seem to fit more with the fast intuitive System 1 
thinking, the economic perspective possibly takes the more rational, deliberate, utilitarian 
System 2 way of thinking. 
 
Taste based models of discrimination (Endogenous factor).  Becker (1957) 
suggested that the source of discrimination lay with the discriminator and their active 
considered choice to target a specific group.  This taste-based, or preference-based 
discrimination occurs “...because people simply do not like members of certain groups” 
(Antonovics, Arcidiacono & Walsh, 2005, p. 919).  If members of group A have a taste-
based dislike for B, then they should exhibit that discrimination throughout all voting 
rounds according to Levitt (2004) although Antonovics et al. (2005) explain that the 
discrimination will wane in later rounds as the likelihood increases that remaining players 
will be the ultimate victor.  Then it is less likely that they will maintain prejudiced taste-
based negative voting that could potentially jeopardies their own future chance of success. 
 
Information based models of discrimination (Exogenous factor).  Information based 
models suggest that the source of discrimination lies in mistaken negative beliefs attributed 
to groups and their members.  Whereas taste-based models incorporate some form of 
“dislike” or “animus” towards the out group, under the information-based model there is 
no emotional force required for the discrimination to occur.  In information-based or 
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statistical-based discrimination occurs because “...people use group identity as a proxy for 
unobserved ability” (Antonovics et al., 2005, p. 919). 
 
Statistical discrimination as the exogenous factor can take two forms using correct 
priors (Antonovics et al., 2005).  One form predicts that one group, say A, perform 
consistently worse than another group, B.  In the context of WL this would be by doing 
something like answering questions inaccurately.  Another type of statistical discrimination 
is that information regarding the ability of one group is clearer than for the other group.  
This implies that in-group performance is weighted more heavily than out-group 
performance.  Hence, poor performance is weighted more heavily when it is by a member 
of one’s own group.   
 
If group based discrimination occurs, it should be evident in the pattern of voting.  
Antonovics et al. (2005) explained it in hypothetical terms for groups A and B, under two 
different scenarios, one where the ability level between the groups differed and another 
where the quality of information between the groups differed.  In the former, where A 
plays the game better than B, if all players are capable of interpreting this then it should be 
the case that all contestants will vote against members of B.  This shows as a statistical 
based discrimination where both groups discriminate against B.  However, when A and B 
play the game equally well, but members of A have less accurate information about the 
skill level of B, then A will be more likely to vote against other members of A because skill 
level is equal but there is imbalanced information signalled about the two groups.  
Conversely, if voting in WL was for the best player, the strongest link, then the predicted 
pattern would shift and A would be more likely to vote for A under the same 
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circumstances.  Another possibility is that A discriminates against B based on mistaken 
prior information.  Then A target B until the prior is corrected.  
 
What studying WL tells us about discrimination?  Two studies dominate the 
literature on the use of WL to test theories of discrimination in the economic literature, 
both of which used contestants voting patterns to measure the extent of discrimination and 
its type, taste based vs information based (Antonovics, et al., 2005; Levitt, 2004).  These 
are reviewed in turn. 
 
Levitt (2004).  Levitt observed the pattern of voting in all the voting rounds in 161 
episodes of the U.S version of WL TV game-show (25 prime-time and 136 daytime shows; 
N = 1,016 contestants) to test two ideas (a) the extent of discrimination and (b) to 
distinguish between taste-based and information-based discrimination.  The prime-time 
show comprised six voting rounds and the daily show had four.  A regression model was 
used with the votes received by a contestant as the dependent variable and independent 
variables of contestant demographics (i.e., race, age, gender, educational level, region of 
residence), and performance regarding answering questions et cetera.  Early, middle and 
late voting rounds were analysed separately.  
 
The premise behind measuring the first aim, (a) the extent of discrimination, was 
fairly straightforward.  A vote in the context of WL was defined as a bad thing.  It follows 
therefore that if contestants harboured prejudice against a group, so that it spilt over into 
active discrimination against its members, then in the context of WL that group would be 
expected to receive significantly more votes.  To fit with the definitions above 
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discrimination is considered as an unjustified negative act (i.e., weakest link vote) aimed at 
the members of a group based purely on their being perceived as part of that group.  In 
other respects, they are undeserving of the negative act.  Levitt (2004) recorded the age, 
gender, race, education, employment status for each contestant.  With regard to gender, 
there was little difference between votes received by males and females with female 
receiving slightly fewer votes.  On closer analysis however, there was evidence of in-group 
favouritism with females more likely to vote for males and males more likely to vote for 
females.  With respect to race, blacks received slightly more votes in the early rounds than 
whites but they received slightly fewer votes in later rounds than whites.  Therefore, there 
was no evidence of gender or racial discrimination (black or white) in the study. 
 
To test the second aim (b) to distinguish between taste-based and information-
based models of discrimination, Levitt (2004) adopted the reasoning that contestants 
should adopt a switch in voting strategy as the game develops.  In the first voting round, all 
the contestants are required to cast a vote and there are many contestants to choose from, 
but following successive eliminations the final voting round only had the last three 
remaining contestants.  In the early rounds, it makes strategic sense to vote off the 
“weakest” contestants to help generate a larger pot of money, but in the final voting round 
it is strategically beneficial to vote off the perceived “strongest” player to ensure that in the 
final Head-to-Head the contestant is facing the weaker of the two potential opponents.  
Strategic considerations aside, if contestants are prejudiced and engaging in taste-based 
discrimination against a group’s members then that group should expect to receive more 
votes across all the voting rounds.  However, if the discrimination is information based, the 
group should expect to receive significantly more votes in the early rounds but 
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significantly fewer votes in the later rounds.  This is because taste-based discrimination is 
targeted at the group and its members which includes animus on the part of the 
discriminator towards the group.  Information-based discrimination is different and more 
mercenary, here the discriminator discriminates on the basis of a negative stereotype about 
a group and its members.  For example, a group might be targeted based on perceived low 
skill levels, then the members of this group will receive significantly more votes in the 
early rounds but significantly fewer at the end.  Levitt’s appeal for using WL is based on 
this unique feature of the game-show.  It is rare that such distinctions can be made between 
the predictions from these different forms of discrimination using other empirical methods 
or data in real markets.  Levitt found that whereas there was no evidence for female/male, 
and black/white discrimination, but there was evidence for taste-based ageism and 
information-based discrimination targeted towards Hispanic contestants.  Contestants over 
the age of 50 years old received significantly more votes across all voting rounds and 
Hispanics received significantly more votes in the early rounds and significantly fewer 
votes in the final rounds. 
 
Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2005).  Antonovics, et al., 2005 also observed 
all the voting rounds in the U.S version of WL TV game-show (103 episodes; 28 weekly 
and 75 daily shows; N = 682), with a similar aim to Levitt (2004) of testing between taste- 
and information-based theories of discrimination, that they refer to as preference and 
statistical-based discrimination.  Three demographic groups were studied: men, women 
and whites.  Their voting behaviour was measured as a fraction termed the Group Bias 
Statistic (GBS).  The numerator captured the voting of an individual, i, by assigning the 
value of 1, if voting for a person of the same group in the same round (0 if voting for 
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someone in another group).  The denominator was given by the ratio  𝐺−1
𝑁−1
 , where G is the 
number of i’s type in the round and N is the total number of contestants in the round.  
Consider, an example of how GBS might work by taking i to be a female contestant voting 
in a round made up of 5 women and 4 men, (giving G=5; N=9) then, when i voted for 
another woman GBS = 2, otherwise, if i votes for the out-group male, GBS = 0.  If the 
voting is biased regarding gender such that all of the women in that round each voted for 
another woman then their combined GBS would sum to 10 (5*2), with a mean of 2, but if 
they all voted for men then the GBS sums to zero, giving a mean of zero.  Over the course 
of many rounds, if there is no bias between voting for the in-group women, or the out-
group men, then the GBS has a mean of 1, indicating no discrimination.  A value greater 
than one indicates discrimination against one’s own group, the in-group, and a value less 
than one points to discrimination against the out-group. 
 
The main finding was a significant discrimination by females voting for male 
contestants as the weakest link significantly more than other females.  Importantly, there 
were no significant race or gender differences between the contestants’ ability to answer 
the questions, so it seems likely that women had a preference-based discrimination against 
men.  The GBS of 0.739 and 0.783 were found for the first-round of voting by females on 
males in the daily WL, and weekly prime-time WL shows respectively.  Both were 
significantly less than the predicted no discrimination measure of 1.  A significant GBS of 
0.783 was also found for second-round voting in the daily show.  Antonovics et al. (2005) 
argue that finding evidence of discrimination is stronger when it appears in earlier, rather 
than the later voting rounds, because there is a greater pool of voters, with no history of 
prior voting untainted by performance in the previous rounds.  Males showed significant 
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discrimination against women in the third voting rounds of both the daily and weekly 
shows, although it is unlikely that these observations have any deeper ramifications as 
there is little strategic reason why discrimination should be restricted to third round voting.  
One possible reason for males’ round three voting discrimination against females is a 
reaction to the recognition that they (i.e., males) have mainly been targeted by women in 
the first two voting rounds. 
 
Estimated conditional logits, by show and round, were also used to support the 
findings above.  Estimations were based using the chance of a voter picking another 
contestant as the weakest link based on their characteristics.  The conditional logit allowed 
for the considerations of interactions between contestants’ characteristics.  The main 
analysis was mostly relevant for the first and second voting rounds, for reasons already 
stated above.  A large effect was found as women were again shown to be more likely to 
cast votes against men rather than other women, an effect that was immediately lost after 
the first-round.  When women voted in the first-round, a particular male had a 23.3% 
likelihood of being the recipient of a vote relative to 15.1% for a female recipient. 
 
Antonovics et al. (2005) entertain three possible explanations for why women vote 
against men.  One is that strategic alliances could be formed where the members collude in 
a joint venture to target another group.  This could be explicit and agreed upon or implicit 
and tacit.  In either case, it should be possible to explore collusion through contestants’ 
voting patterns.  Explicit collusion by women targeting males was discounted because the 
total votes cast by other women had no more predictive power than the total votes cast by 
men in accounting for females voting in the first-round.  Implicit collusion was also 
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discounted because if it were occurring then after the first-round it should become even 
more prominent in the second and third rounds, and so on until all males had been 
eliminated.  This was not the case. 
 
Statistical-based discrimination was also ruled out because an analysis of game 
performance shows negligible differences between the three groups for answering 
questions correctly in the first-round: male 67.7, female 66.8%, black 63.9%, white 67.5%.  
There was no indication of statistical discrimination regarding ethnicity or gender.  
Furthermore, if there were some other aspect of poor performance not captured by question 
accuracy, (e.g., hesitancy, lack of confidence) then males would also be expected to vote 
against males.  This result is important because although there might be the basis for 
statistical-based discrimination in the labour market relating to women it is unlikely to be 
present in WL.  The only remaining explanation was that women preferred playing the 
game with other women. 
 
What studying Weakest Link game-show tells us about strategic game 
playing?  The WL involves interesting questions of strategy, both in when to bank and 
whom to vote oﬀ, that have attracted interest from various disciplines.  The review of the 
studies above based on discrimination relied mainly on the aspect of the WL game-show 
that made use of the voting decisions made by contestants at the end of each round.  
However, another class of studies exist that use the WL game-show as a means to 
investigate strategic aspects of game playing from a Game Theory perspective.  
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It has not escaped the notice of researchers that TV quiz shows like WL make ideal 
observational field experiments because they comprise the key ingredients of game theory: 
a finite group of players must select from a fixed set of actions to play for well-defined 
payoffs.  For example, WL has been used to assess the optimal banking strategy in 
economic decision-making (Haan, Los & Riyanto, 2011), the trade-off between risk and 
return strategies in game playing (Barmish & Boston, 2009) and the optimal voting 
strategy to adopt (Février & Linnemer, 2006).  Perhaps the most relevant for this thesis 
relates to the role of strategy in mixed-gender group interactions as endogenous and 
exogenous factors for the voting bias (Valenzuela & Raghubir, 2007). 
 
Valenzuela and Raghubir (2007) observed 20 episodes of the U.S version of WL 
finding that, there seems to be a skewed gender effect different to those above in that 
females were frequently finalists but tended to lose in the final.  They tested the hypothesis 
that female contestants are favoured, by not being voted off in the early rounds, but then 
targeted in the later rounds.  They tested this with a simulation of WL, predicting that 
women would be more likely to be retained in the group than men but they would be no 
more likely to be the eventual winner than a man.  They observed the performance of 
contestants and computed the measure weakest link as well as recording the actual weakest 
link as voted by the contestants, noting that in 67 out of 120 rounds the actual weakest link 
was not what they had computed as the measure weakest link.  Furthermore, in the rounds 
when the contestant voted weakest link was not the measure weakest link, the measure 
weakest link’ was female significantly more often than male (64.18% to 35.82%).  Voting 
the weakest link was not therefore gender neutral.  Their results mirrored in part the 
observations of Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005) above.   
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Haan et al. (2011) analysed the banking strategies of contestants and found that the 
contestants were not efficient and used non-optimal strategies to make their banking 
decisions.  Effectively, they used a bounded rationality model to address the issue of when 
it is the best time (after a sequence of how many questions) for a contestant to bank the 
money.  Following this they found that contestants banked too early and were therefore not 
rational.  Barmish and Boston, (2009) took this question further and modelled game 
playing by comparing theoretically derived gaming strategies with those actually used by 
the contestants.  They suggested that strategies were not simply based on maximising the 
payoffs in the game, by developing the most efficient ‘banking’ strategy, but were also 
mitigated by taking into account risk in banking and voting considerations.  Once they 
modelled behaviour taking into account the dual concerns of risk-return, then the models 
fit the contestants game playing in a rational and efficient manner. 
 
As such, in making a voting choice, contestants might be expected to avoid conflict 
or risk as proposed in prospect theory whereby, choices were made based on the 
probabilistic alternative where the individual made the decision based on known outcomes 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  According to Hertwig (2012), it was found that a 
description-experience gap would lead to different choices particularly in rare and high 
consequence events.  In addition, the nature, degree and perceived risk are also the vital 
elements in preference formation with or without prior knowledge which affect the 
decision-making process (Pras & Summers, 1978; Sharifpour & Walters, 2014; Simcock, 
Sudbury & Wright, 2006). 
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What studying WL tells us about the effects of proximity?  Proximity, the Law 
of Attraction.  Individuals form quick temporary interpersonal relationships towards others 
that are close to them simply on the basis of their physical proximity.  If continued, this 
proximity can lead to stable friendship networks.  This proximity principle was first 
illustrated by Newcomb (1956) in his observations of shared accommodation among 
transferred students, who were initially strangers but developed friendships due to their 
closeness and continuous interaction.  In addition, Hall (1963) developed the area of 
proxemics and suggested that, the interpersonal distances between individuals can be 
described by different zones of acceptability based on the relationship with the individual 
(i.e., intimate, personal, social and public).  The interaction is based on each individual as 
the nucleus of the interaction and different implicit zones of acceptable space are built 
around them.  These socially acceptable physical zones vary dramatically according to 
different cultural norms and custom. 
 
In the WL game-show, contestants interact in a carefully constructed spatial 
configuration where the spatial relationships between contestants are clearly defined.  
Thus, the proximity of neighbours can develop a special camaraderie among contestants.  
Matthews and Matlock (2011) suggested that there was a relationship between social 
distance and physical distance.  In their exploratory studies, they explored an association 
between how individuals conceptualized relationship and space.  They illustrated it in a 
form of narrative on how do people associate their thoughts and relationship. 
 
Conversely, Trope and Liberman (2010) provided a different way of understanding 
social proximity.  They suggested a Construal Level theory (CLT).  This CLT used 
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different psychological constructions of distance based on either spatial, temporal or 
hypothetical proximity.  More proximal events become therefore more concrete whilst the 
more distant are considered weaker and more abstracter.  CLT can be divided into two 
different levels: high-level occurs when there was a significant psychological distance and 
the perceived information was comprehensive (abstract), low-level thinking was perceived 
to be detailed-specific (concrete) when there was close proximate interaction. 
  
Proximity and doing bad things: Milgram (1963) and Goddard, Ashley, Fuller & 
Hudson (2011).  The spatial relationships between actors in social situations can have a 
profound impact on their subsequent social behaviour.  For instance, there is a clear link 
between the proximity of the learner, teacher and authoritarian experimenter in Milgram’s 
(1963) classic obedience paradigm, and the level of obedience elicited in the teacher.  
Initially, obedience was at its greatest when the teacher was spatially remote from the 
learner.  Issuing instructions from a separate room seemed to make it easier for the teacher 
to administer “punishment”, but, in replications where the learner could be seen by the 
teacher, obedience reduced until it almost disappeared when the teacher was instructed to 
physically place the learner’s arm onto an electric plate in order to receive the punishment 
of an electric shock.  Similarly, the teacher’s level of obedience to authority diminished as 
the distance between the teacher and the authority figure of the experimenter increased 
(Milgram, 1974).  Milgram’s study has some parallels with WL because the 
participants/contestants had to do something nasty or bad to another person.  The dilemma 
for Milgram’s teacher was how far on a scale of punishment, voltage of electric shocks, a 
participant was prepared to go. 
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The dilemma for the WL contestant was who to choose to receive the bad thing.  
Goddard et al. (2011) reasoned in simple terms that one factor that could influence this 
choice is the physical proximity of the recipient.  In the same way that teachers become 
more reluctant to inflict harm the closer they get to their victims so the WL contestant 
might find it uncomfortable inflicting harm on those closest to them.  Given the fixed 
arrangements of contestants on the WL game-show, it was relatively straightforward to 
measure how often the voter (i.e., contestant who nominate other contestant) and votee 
(i.e., contestant who received the nomination from the voter) were direct-neighbours, or 
next-door-but-one neighbours, or next-door-but-two neighbours and so on.  It was also 
easy to work out how many votes would be expected between voter and votee when they 
were direct-neighbours, or next-door-but-one neighbours, or next-door-but-two neighbours 
and so on.  This was derived based on simple probability alone. 
 
Imagine a model where the nine contestants were only capable of making a random 
vote at the end of each the WL round.  Whereas the WL was used to test discrimination 
and strategy in the sections above, envisaging the contestants as social actors full of 
discrimination and bias, or strategic agents acting rationally to maximise utility, Goddard 
et al. (2011), treat contestants as naive automata and predict their voting behaviour based 
solely on probability.  Goddard et al. (2011) make the assumption that even if bias does 
exist in WL, in whatever form, then it would be evenly distributed across many episodes 
and cancel out.  If a systematic bias existed however, then it would be amplified over the 
course of many shows.  If proximity effects voting behaviour, then a simple linear function 
between vote frequency and proximity would be seen such that there would fewer votes 
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than expected when voter-votee were proximal but more than expected when voter-votee 
were distant. 
 
The voting patterns of contestants in 72 episodes of the UK version of the WL were 
observed.  Goddard et al. (2011) found that there was an effect of voter-votee proximity, 
but not one that conformed to the simple linear prediction above.  Instead voters showed a 
dramatic neighbour effect (NE) by significantly avoiding choosing their direct-neighbours.  
However, they also voted for contestants furthest away with the predicted expected 
frequency, therefore showing no bias.  The contestants in the middle however received 
many more votes than expected.  Therefore, the results showed a strong effect for 
proximity but not a simple function voter-votee distance.  They referred to this as a 
“neighbour-avoidance” effect but offered no explanation for the non-linear pattern of 
voting with distance.  It is almost as if the voting pattern showed three distinct phases: A 
proximal voter-votee phase where voters significantly avoid voting votees, a medial phase 
where voters significantly targeted votees and a distal voter-votee phase where the voter is 
unbiased and neutral making the expected number of votes for contestants furthest away. 
 
Goddard et al. (2011) made a further prediction regarding proximity based on the 
decision-making capabilities of the contestants.  They suggested that there were two 
primary sources of information available to contestants to help them arrive at their voting 
decision.  The first kind of information TYPE I is open, public and overt and would 
typically be based on the observable game playing ability of the other contestants.  For 
example, consider the game scenario where all the contestants answer every question 
correctly, bar one contestant that answers all of the questions incorrectly.  In this scenario, 
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they argued that the decision for the contestants regarding whom to vote is easy and 
straight forward, they would all vote for the contestant that made all of the errors.  The 
contestant would be expected to receive all eight votes (not nine because a contestant 
cannot vote for themselves).  Therefore, in high consensus games like this, the identity of 
the weakest link is usually clear because they are distinctive for having made mistakes and 
these judgements can be made based solely on TYPE I information.  However, consider 
contrasting cases where there is limited availability of TYPE I information.  Imagine, the 
situation where all the contestants get all the questions correct, or incorrect, in which case 
there is limited TYPE I information available with which to make a clear voting decision.  
In these cases, where there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the identity of the 
weakest link, another source of information has to be used to make their decision.  This 
TYPE II information is implicit, private and probably unconscious.  Contestants have to 
guess or use hunches to make their decision as to the identity of the weakest link.  In these 
episodes, it is likely that this uncertainty creates low consensus by the voters as to the 
identity of the weakest link.  Goddard et al. consider that individuals’ bias and prejudice 
come to the fore in these situations, including their bias regarding proximity. 
 
The key variable then is uncertainty.  Goddard et al. (2011) maintain that the voting 
decisions in cases of great uncertainty will be based more on prejudice and proximity.  
Therefore, they predict that as the uncertainty regarding the WL decreases, measured by 
consensus, the greater the proximity bias will become.  They tested this and partitioned the 
72 episodes according to consensus of weakest link votes and discovered as predicted that 
as consensus reduced, proximity bias increased.  They concluded that this provided a 
powerful demonstration of the unconscious influence of proximity on decision-making. 
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I2.3  Evaluation of the Weakest Link Game-show Studies  
 
Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005) carried out studies in parallel to assess 
discrimination in WL.  Although they used different analyses, they largely agreed that 
there was no evidence for white-on-black or male-on-female discrimination in voting 
patterns.  The discrimination that did emerge was somewhat unexpected because females 
showed a taste-based/preference-based discrimination against men.  It remained uncertain 
though as to whether women were making an approval vote for other women or a 
disapproval vote towards men or some combination thereof.  In either event, it seemed that 
the preference/prejudice could not be accounted for by recourse to how accurately women 
and men answered questions so it would appear that, the discrimination was taste-based as 
opposed to information-based. 
 
A key feature that both studies alluded to was the recognition that early voting 
rounds in WL might require different strategic considerations than the later rounds.  In the 
earlier rounds, it was to the advantage of contestants to vote off the weak players, but in 
the final rounds it might be better to collude to oust the strongest player.  It is this shift in 
incentives that Levitt (2004) claimed was the real academic appeal of the WL because it 
gives researchers grounds for distinguishing between taste-based and information-based 
forms of discrimination. 
 
Antonovics et al. (2005), were more circumspect about there being a complete 
switch in incentives and strategy, but readily acknowledge that the strength of the 
incentives changes as the rounds progress.  They disagree somewhat about the predictions 
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regarding discrimination.  Levitt (2004) maintained that taste-based discrimination would 
persist throughout all rounds whereas for Antonovics et al., preference-based 
discrimination would be strongest in the earlier rounds because in later rounds the 
importance of voting strategically outweighs any personal bias.  With information-based, 
statistical-based discrimination Levitt argued that weak players should be targeted in early 
rounds but in later rounds they were favoured as it is better to face them in the final Head-
to-Head than a strong player, hence the switch in strategy.  Recall too, however, Février 
and Linnemer (2006) found no compelling significant evidence of the strongest link being 
targeted in the final voting round, albeit on a limited sample (20 episodes). 
 
Goddard et al. (2011) ignored any potential attitudinal bias of contestants and 
instead tested for a simple bias regarding proximity.  Their methods differed slightly from 
those of Antonovics et al. (2005) and Levitt (2004) who used the GBS, conditional logits 
and regression analysis to model voting behaviour. 
 
Instead, Goddard et al. (2011) simply counted votes according to the relative 
positions of contestants and compared this count with the expected count derived using 
basic probability theory.  This method of analysis was similar to the group bias statistic of 
Antonovics et al. (2005) that in turn gives a probability measure of bias.  However, the 
GBS could not be applied by Goddard et al. because even though they recorded 
contestants’ gender they did not identify groups in their analysis of proximity.  In line with 
the work of Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al., it would be interesting to test if a similar 
gender effect arises in the UK version of WL. 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
56 
Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005), both made use of all rounds in their 
analyses and argued that incentives/strategy changed by round, Goddard et al. (2011) 
meanwhile only measured voting performance in the first-round but argued that grouping 
episodes according to consensus of group vote for the weakest link could be used as a 
more meaningful measure of discrimination.  Goddard et al. (2011) only used first-round 
voting because this is the only round where contestants were truly naive, making use of 
only two types of information (TYPE I & TYPE II). 
 
Another type of information available to contestants and not covered by Goddard et 
al. (2011) was their strategic voting.  This means that, particularly for voting behaviour 
beyond the first-round, another source of information, TYPE III strategic voting, was 
brought into the voting decision to be made in subsequent rounds.  This could be in terms 
of “punishment” that Levitt (2004) found where a surviving votee from the first-round 
targets the voter in the second-round as a kind of revenge (see next chapter too).  
Principally though as contestants get voted off and eliminated it becomes more complex to 
analyse voting as function of voter-votee spacing once gaps emerge in the configuration of 
contestants.  Although Goddard et al. lose some explanatory power by restricting their 
analysis to a single round, they pointed out that more can be gained from looking at 
consensus as an explanatory variable.  Their argument is that bias and discrimination 
become more prominent as consensus drops.  The prediction follows that if Levitt and 
Antonovics et al. (2005) similarly separated their data by consensus in the first-round then 
they might be able to test their first aim, to measure the extent of discrimination too.  
Antonovics et al. actually alluded to this when they noted that with respect to the money 
banked per round, discrimination increased when the money banked was either very low, 
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in the lowest quartile, or very high, in the highest quartile.  As Goddard et al. point out, the 
conditions that maximally favour discrimination occurred when the uncertainty regarding 
the weakest link was greatest, triggering recourse to fallible TYPE II information.  This 
would be expected at the extremes of performance where there were episodes with all 
contestants performing consistently at one extreme level, for instance where all contestants 
were strong so there was no distinctive weakest player to vote for.  Alternatively, when 
many of the contestants were poor performers, the contestants had several candidates to 
choose from.  Both scenarios create uncertainty.  Levitt predicts that taste-based 
discrimination would occur in all rounds, Antonovics et al. predict that it is strongest in the 
first-round and wanes thereafter whereas Goddard et al. predict that it is strongest not only 
in the first-round, but in those episodes in the first-round where the game information is 
ambiguous and uncertain, such that, voting bias increased as uncertainty increased as 
consensus decreased. 
 
 Hence, the following section generates the research aim and objectives for this 
thesis after the evaluation of methods and understanding of the variables exists particularly 
in the voting behaviour.  
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I2.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
  
Research Aims.  The main aim of this thesis was to explore biases in decision-
making and voting with regard to the endogenous and exogenous factors underlying how 
people made voting decisions. This was done indirectly by observing the voting decisions 
made by contestants on a TV game-show.  
 
Research Objectives.  Several hypotheses were developed throughout the thesis 
and these are extrapolated in the appropriate results chapters that come later.  To begin 
with there were two principal objectives (1. and 2.) and two subsidiary objectives (3. and 
4.)  that can be broadly stated thus; 
 
Objectives; 
 
1. To demonstrate/re-validate/replicate/extend the original observations of the neighbour 
effect using observations of the Weakest Link TV game-show. 
 
2. To test the validity and reliability of the observations from 1. by finding other scenarios 
where the neighbour effect can be tested.  
 
3. To test whether neighbour effect occurs with positive votes (as well as negative votes) 
 
4. To assess neighbour effect on tasks involving strategy (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
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Chapter 2 
Methods 
The Methods section comprises three main parts (M1.2, M1.3 and M1.4) to 
present the different methodologies used to collect the quantitative data for this thesis.  The 
first part describes the observational field studies on the Weakest Link TV game-show.  
The second part describes the pilot studies conducted as an attempt to replicate the 
Weakest Link TV game-show. The final part details the observational field studies using 
two experiments in the setting of a University lecture. 
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Chapter M1: 
General Methods 
 
M1.1 Chapter Outline 
 
Two different methods were primarily used in the thesis.  One of the main aims of 
this research was to explore how people made voting decisions.  This was done in the first 
instance by using observational field studies of a very specific social context; the WL TV 
game-show.  The second method used field experiments to test whether the findings from 
the observational field studies could be generalised to other scenarios outside the TV 
studio. 
 
 In each of the results chapters that follow this chapter a brief overview of the 
relevant method is given and pertinent details relating to the particular study. 
 
M1.1 Chapter Outline 
M1.2 Observational Field Study on the Weakest Link TV Game-show 
M1.3 Pilot Studies 
M1.4 Lecture based Field Experiments 
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M1.2 Observational Field Study on the Weakest Link TV Game-show 
 
 The first method used in this thesis was an observation of a TV game-show.  This 
section explained the WL TV game-show format and the data collection procedure. 
 
Rules of the game.  The UK daytime version of the WL game-show was made up 
of nine contestants that answered eight rounds of general knowledge questions to build up 
a cash prize.  After each round of questions one contestant was voted off until only two 
remained.  They played a final round of questions before going on to compete in a Head-
to-Head penalty shoot-out style series of five questions each, to determine the eventual 
winner.  This single winner received the cash prize built up by the contestants over the 
preceding rounds.  The other eight players received nothing. 
 
The team of nine contestants stood side-by-side in a semi-circle and took turns 
answering general knowledge questions from the host who was in the centre.  The aim of 
the WL TV game-show was to create a chain of consecutive correct answers to general 
knowledge question so that the contestants acting as a team built up a cash prize in a single 
collective pot.  Table 1 shows how the chain built up the prize money in the sequence from 
£20 for the first correct answer in a sequence to the maximum £1000 for the eighth correct 
answer in the sequence. 
 
A single incorrect answer broke the chain and the pot reset to zero and a new chain 
started.  However, a contestant could safely bank the money built up in the chain by saying 
“Bank!” on their turn before the question was asked.  This money was safe and set aside.  
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Once the money in the chain had been banked a new chain began from zero.  This carried 
on until the three-minute time limit had elapsed or £1000 had been won in that round (i.e., 
the time limit gets 10 seconds lower after each round).  In addition, any prize money not 
banked prior to the allotted time for the round was lost. 
 
The question round ended with the elimination of one of the contestants, the so-
called weakest link.  Each contestant was required to vote one player as the weakest link.  
Voting was done privately by contestants by writing the name of their choice on a board 
unseen.  Once all the votes had been cast the contestants in turn publicly displayed their 
board and said the name of the contestant they had nominated as weakest link.  The 
contestant with the most votes was the weakest link and eliminated from the game.  Ties 
were resolved by the so-called strongest link, the contestant deemed by the game-show’s 
producers as the strongest player in the round, picking the weakest link. 
 
Table 1 
The Money Tree for the Daytime Episodes 
 
Daytime episode 
£1,000 
£800 
£600 
£450 
£300 
£100 
£50 
£20 
Note.  This observation analysed the episodes from the Daytime episodes only.  There 
were Champion League and Primetime episodes with different money trees allocation. 
 
  
Procedure.  The first-round of the WL TV game-show was observed.  The voting 
behaviour of the contestants was recorded using an Excel spreadsheet.  Each contestant’s 
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position (A-I) and their gender were noted.  The contestant who nominated another 
contestant was known as a voter.  For the purposes of this thesis the recipient of the vote 
was referred to as the votee.  The voter’s vote for a votee was coded as an integer: its 
absolute number denoted the distance between voter and votee that ranged from one space 
away (direct-spatial neighbour) to eight spaces away (N, N+1, N+2, N+3, ..., N+7), its sign 
indicated the direction (+ve towards the right) or negative (-ve towards the left).  To 
illustrate the data collection procedure, the contestants’ positions were denoted 
alphabetically from A to I (i.e., nine contestants).  As an example, Figure 3 shows 
contestant A as the assumed voter.  The positions of other contestants were identified 
based on their distance from the voter, which defined the voter-votee spatial relationships.  
If contestant A voted contestant E as the weakest link, the voter had voted for contestant 
that was four spaces away (N+3) from the voter and was coded as +4.  Had contestant E 
voted for contestant A, then the vote was coded as -4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  The other contestants’ position based on contestant A as the voter.  This 
illustration is based on the WL game-show format.  The contestants are standing in a semi-
circle facing the game host at the centre. 
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Figure 4.  The observation protocol for the Weakest Link TV game-show. 
Start 
The WL TV game-show 
episode selection 
Is episode 
complete? 
Identify contestant gender 
and position 
Identify the contestant votes 
at the end of first-round 
Coding 
Female (1), male (2),  
Position (A to I) 
 
Discard the incomplete 
episode 
Select a new/different 
episode 
 
No 
Yes 
Coding 
Votes from right to end (1 to 8) 
Votes from left to end (-1 to -8) 
 
Identify the weakest 
contestant 
Is the vote 
obvious? 
Yes 
End 
No 
Identify the SL 
SL give the final vote 
to choose the WL 
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 There were two main systems used for coding episodes of WL.  In the first 72-
episode study, episodes were coded by independent raters that were undergraduate students 
using the episodes for their project work.  The simplicity of the coding system, outlined 
above, made it easy to crosscheck their coding to ensure the accuracy of the coding 
procedure. 
 
Figure 4 shows the observation protocol used for coding the 151-episode study.  
The observation protocol is shown in a flow chart.  The protocol was used as a process to 
collect the raw data from the recorded videos. 
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M1.3 Pilot Studies 
 
 A range of methods were piloted as a way to replicate the WL condition.  The pilot 
studies were tested, but not developed due to the impracticality of the format and the 
inconsistent data that they generated. 
 
Pilot laboratory studies.  Small groups of students (5 to 10 participants) were 
recruited with an attempt to replicate the WL condition.  One method involved carrying out 
a variant of the first-round of the WL game-show that fell short of actually labelling a 
participant as the weakest link.  In order to get data that were relevant statistically, several 
rounds were run using the same participants.  However, it soon emerged that participants 
managed their voting by choosing a different peer on each round.  Therefore, voting 
performance was based on participants switching their vote from one peer to another and 
were not based either on the performance of other participants or their spatial positions.  
These studies suffered too because often participants were already known to each other, 
they were time consuming and they lacked the ecological validity of the actual WL game-
show with its payoffs and studio atmosphere. 
 
Similar biases emerged when different game scenarios were adopted (e.g., popular 
parlour games or children’s party games like “Wink Murder”, and variations of the WL 
with a participant playing against pre-set fictitious contestants). 
 
The groups were required to pick someone within the group and later were asked to 
give reasons for their decision.  The results derived from the pilot investigations were 
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inconsistent as the practicality of the study were not be able to be replicated on a larger 
scale.  In comparison to the field experiments that made use of first-round voting in WL 
game-show, data was recorded for a large sample of 2,007 participants.  The smaller group 
pilot studies were unable to generate the same volume and consistency of observations. 
 
Pilot Field experiment: - Fifteen to One TV game-show.  Ten episodes of the 
Fifteen to One (15-to-1) game-show were observed.  The game-show layout was similar to 
the WL game-show, however, it had three rounds of questions and 15 contestants. 
 
First-round.  In the first-round of questions each contestant had to field two 
questions each.  An incorrect answer on the first question resulted in the loss of a “life” 
(each contestant began with three “lives”) a second incorrect answer resulted in the loss of 
the remaining two “lives” and the contestant was eliminated. 
 
Second-round.  In the second-round a contestant was asked a general knowledge 
questions and any incorrect answer caused them to lose one “life”, and as before once a 
contestant had lost three “lives” they were eliminated.  The round finished when there were 
only three remaining contestants.  The feature of interest occurred in this round when a 
contestant had answered a question correctly they could nominate which of their peers 
should field the next question.  The nominations made by contestants were measurable in 
the same way that contestants’ votes in the WL game-show were.  Similar predictions were 
made regarding the NE.  Nominating a peer to receive a question was construed as a 
negative act and therefore nominations for neighbours would be expected to be 
significantly less frequent than for non-neighbours. 
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However, there were several limitations coding and interpreting the outcomes of 
the nominations in the 15-to-1.  Firstly, the outcomes of the first-round in 15-to-1 were not 
stable in the same way that voting in the first-round of WL was stable.  In every episode of 
the WL observed, the first-round resulted in each contestant making a single vote and a 
single contestant eliminated.  In 15-to-1, the outcome differed from one episode to the 
next.  This made models of expected frequencies in WL relevant to all episodes but in 15-
to-1 the models were unique to each episode.  In the second-round of questions in 15-to1, 
nominations were counted as a function of the relative spatial positions of the contestants, 
but as contestants were continually eliminated during the round, the respective neighbour 
relations changed from one question to the next question.  This means that the number of 
contestants that participated in the second-round also varied.  This is one of the major 
differences in comparison to the WL game-show.  The derivation of the expected voting 
pattern in 15-to-1 was convoluted, laborious and ambiguous. 
 
Another confounding factor in 15-to-1 was the nomination for a contestant in 15-
to-1 was not to eliminate them from the game.  Thus, the nominated contestant was able to 
answer their question correctly, and hence re-nominate the previous contestant (Tit-for-
Tat) to answer the following question.  These cyclical nomination patterns were noted in 
the game-show and in one series a rule change was implemented to remove this bias.  This 
strategic nomination by contestants served as an unregulated bias in interpreting the spatial 
nomination patterns in 15-to-1, hence, it meant that the nomination was no longer due to 
spatial position bias, but a strategic decision.  This analysis was not taken further. 
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M1.4 Lecture based Field Experiments 
 
 There were three field experiments: two of them were variants on a voting activity, 
the other used a variety of PD.  This section describes the field experiment setting and set-
up that were common for all the field experiments and then the voting activity and PD 
experiments are considered in turn for three different student cohorts.  The final part 
considers the ethical considerations.  The specific demographics of the participant samples 
used are detailed in the appropriate Results chapters (refer to R2 and R3).  
 
 Field experiment set-up.  The field experiments were conducted in a lecture 
theatre at the University of Lincoln with a capacity of 330 seats (refer to Figure 5).  The 
lecture theatre comprised three blocks and seven rows, with each seat numbered row to 
row from 1 to 330.  The seat numbers were placed at the back of the seat which were 
visible for participants.  The lecture theatre was an ideal location for the activities, as it 
served as the location for the first introduction lecture for the first-year Psychology 
students.  The putative purpose of the introductory lecture was to explain the School of 
Psychology tutorial system and Credit Point system.  A scheme used to reward 
undergraduates with ‘credit’ for participating in studies conducted by staff and students in 
the School.  Prior to the start of the activities, the participants were randomly given unique 
seat numbers, which required them to sit at the allocated seat as per the instruction sheet.  
The allocation was done by randomizing the seat numbers prior to the participants’ 
admittance to the lecture theatre.  A team of ushers was used to hand out the seat allocation 
numbers to the students arriving for the lecture and to guide them to their unique seat.  
Once seated the respective activities took place. 
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 Figure 5.  The lecture theatre seating arrangem
ent in the U
niversity of Lincoln.  A
ll 300 seats w
ere num
bered row
 by row
.  The seating layout 
w
as given to the participants in the instruction sheet in addition of the response sheet.
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Voting Activity Procedure.  The first field experiment was designed in the form 
of a voting task.  The voting activity was set-up to get the participants to act as voters by 
nominating another participant as its recipient, the votee.  The effect of the vote for the 
votee was to either increase or decrease their chances to win a subsequent lottery. 
 
The number of lottery tickets participants had for a lottery for a prize draw was 
based on the votes they received in the voting activity.  The rules of the voting task 
required each participant to cast either a positive (i.e., reward), neutral, or, negative (i.e., 
punishment) vote towards another participant.  The vote choice was made in private by 
each participant who acted as a voter.  A positive vote added to the chances of the votee 
(i.e., its recipient) winning a lottery for a prize draw.  A negative vote reduced the chances 
of the votee winning the raffle.  Neutral vote had no effect on the votee’s chance of 
winning.  All participants were guaranteed an absolute minimum of at least one lottery 
ticket for the prize draw. 
 
Table 2 shows the weight of the votes used in this activity.  
 
Table 2  
The Type of Votes Performed by the Voter 
 
Vote 
 
Value 
Positive +1 and +5 
Neutral 0 
Negative -1 and -5 
Note.  The participants were instructed to vote either +1, +5, 0, -1 or -5.  A positive vote of 
+5 increased the number of lottery tickets a votee received.  A negative vote of -1 
decreased their number of lottery tickets by one.  Neutral votes had no effect on a votee’s 
stack of tickets.  Each participant was guaranteed at least one ticket for the lottery.  Tickets 
were virtual.  
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For the voting activity, each participant was required make three votes for another 
participant: (a) sitting in the same block and in the same row of seats, (b) sitting in the 
same block, (c) sitting anywhere in the lecture theatre.  Participants also had an open-
ended question that asked them to give a reason for their voting choice.  However, the last 
task was not compulsory. 
 
The participants were given a sealed envelope with two forms; instruction and 
response sheets.  The instruction sheet explained the rules of the voting activity and a note 
for giving their consent with a right to withdraw from participating.  Each participant from 
2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts received the same instructions but in a different order.  
Figure 6 shows the instruction given to the participants. 
 
The response sheet served as their ballot paper (refer to Appendix A1-A10 for 
2013/2014 cohort and B1 to B4 for 2015/2016 cohort), which included the seating plan 
(refer to Figure 5) for the lecture theatre.  In the ballot paper, the participants were asked to 
identify their seat number (compulsory), age and gender.  The participants were required to 
complete the voting tasks above (i.e., a, b and c).  The value and valence of their vote were 
random (i.e. -5, -1, 0, +1 and +5).  Votes were cast by marking an X on the seating plan 
and later the response sheet was placed back in the envelope, sealed and given to the 
researchers. 
 
A simple database in Excel was used to code votes made.  The content includes the 
lecture theatre layout with seat number and the measured variables.  The data was later 
cross-checked to ensure the collected data was correct with no error. 
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Procedure: - We will ask you to make THREE votes that vary according to spatial scale.  
 
I.) Vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE by making a cross on the seating plan. 
II.) Vote for someone in your BLOCK by making a cross. 
III.) Vote for someone in your BLOCK and in your ROW by making a cross. 
VI.) MOST IMPORTANTLY, please indicate your seat number here and make a note of it:- 
 
I AM SAT IN BLOCK: -     
 
I AM SAT IN ROW: - 
 
I AM SAT IN SEAT: - 
 
RULES 
Please be quiet until everyone has made their votes and the experimenter  
The only rule is that you can’t vote for yourself!!!! 
 
Procedure: - We will ask you to make THREE votes that vary according to spatial scale.  
 
I.) Vote for someone in the BLOCK and in your ROW by making a cross on the seating plan. 
II.) Vote for someone in your BLOCK by making a cross. 
III.) Vote for someone in your LECTURE THEATRE by making a cross. 
VI.) MOST IMPORTANTLY, please indicate your seat number here and make a note of it:- 
 
I AM SAT IN BLOCK: -     
 
I AM SAT IN ROW: - 
 
I AM SAT IN SEAT: - 
 
RULES 
Please be quiet until everyone has made their votes and the experimenter  
The only rule is that you can’t vote for yourself!!!! 
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2.  The instruction given to the participants on how to take part in the 
voting task for 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts (see Appendix A and B).  Figure 6.1 
(upper panel) is the instruction given to the 2013/2014 cohort and Figure 6.2 (lower panel) 
is given to the 2015/2016 cohort.  The differences were at the item I and III where the 
sequences of the voting task were switched.   
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 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Procedure.  This field experiment was conducted in a 
form of PD game with 2014/2015 cohort.  The aim of this activity was designed to get the 
participants to “defect” or “cooperate” with another participant by playing either tails or 
heads, in a task called Coin’s game (CG). 
 
The rules in the CG required the participants to play against another participant in 
the lecture seated: (a) the same block of the lecture theatre and in the same row of seats, (b) 
the same block of the lecture theatre and one row at the front or back, and (c) anywhere 
within the lecture theatre. 
 
The activity was performed individually and in private.  The task required them to 
choose either Heads (H) or tails (T) as per coin flipping task.  In this activity, the 
participants were presented with four different payoffs as showed in Figure 7, the payoffs 
matrix for the CG. 
 
  Player X   heads (H) tails (T) 
Player Y heads (H) (3, 3)  (0, 5) 
  tails (T) (5, 0)  (1, 1) 
 
Figure 7.  The payoff matrix for the coin’s game.  The first number in the brackets gives 
player Y’s payoff and the second number gives player X’s.  
 
In the CG activity, the participant played as player Y and were asked to maximize 
their payoff by playing with another participant as player X.  In this context, player X 
(another participant) was assumed to be seated either at; (a) the same block of the lecture 
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theatre and in the same row of seats, (b) the same block of the lecture theatre and one row 
at the front and back or (c) within the lecture theatre. 
 
Each participant was given a sealed envelope with a form (response sheet) that 
explained the CG activity.  The response sheet contained two sections; (a) the activity 
instruction and the consent for a right to withdraw from the activity and the response 
sections.  Following instruction was given to the participants (see Figure 8) prior to the 
start of the activity. 
 
We are going to ask you to play the ‘coin game’ 3 times. 
 
Each time you play, you will indicate how your play by circling ‘H’ or ‘T’ or entering 
it into a text box, on the other side of this ‘Response Sheet’. Your responses are secret 
and anonymous and other players will not see what you have done. You will never get 
to see how other players responded. 
 
Your aim is to try and score as many points as possible. We will work this out by 
adding up how many points you scored in the 3 games and dividing it by how many 
players there were that you played against. This will give us an average point score 
for each participant. 
 
When you have made your responses we will give you a verbal debrief about what the 
study is about, but in short there are no catches or tricks involved. Computer 
scientists have generated computer programs that have played these kinds of games 
before. We want to know if a group of people play the game the same way as the 
computer program. 
 
Figure 8.  The instruction given to the participants on how to take part in the coin’s game 
for 2014/2015 cohort (see Appendix C). 
 
Whilst, in the response section (refer to Appendices C1 to C6), the participants 
were asked to identify their seat number (compulsory), age and gender.  It also enclosed 
the information on the CG activity where each individual participant was required to 
  
 
 
                                                          
76 
complete a form with six compulsory questions and one optional open-ended question 
which related to the payoffs matrix in Figure 7. 
 
The first question cantered on their self-assessment on how well they thought they 
had understood the rules of CG (i.e., Fairly well, well, OK, Not very well. Not at all).  The 
participant required only to answer one which best fit their current understanding after 
having been briefed.  Two screening questions were asked next.  Participants had to 
respond by referring to the payoff matrix, if they were to play against player X.  The 
questions were asked in a condition where the player X played either H or T.  The 
participants were required to choose only one option, in which, between H and T as to their 
best response.  The screening questions were another check that participants understood 
the CG task. 
 
The game.  Two questions were described in six different sequences (refer to 
Appendices C1-C6 for different versions).  The versions were randomly assigned to 
participants where the versions were varied to test participants’ decision based on (a) 
playing against participants at lateral (left/right) position, (b) playing against participants at 
longitudinal (front/back) position and (c) playing against participants at lateral and 
longitudinal position.  Each of the question asked the participants to make a choice either 
to play H or T with direct-neighbour(s) and indirect -neighbour(s) two-spaces away.  The 
last question was a standard question across the versions to ask the participants to choose 
playing H and T against their direct-lateral neighbour(s) or somebody else within the 
lecture theatre.  An optional last open-ended question invited participants to give the 
reasons for their choices.  The sealed envelope contained the instruction and response sheet 
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were distributed randomly among participants.  Upon completion, the response sheet was 
placed back in the envelope, sealed and given to the researchers. 
 
 Ethical Consideration.  Ethical approval was received from the School of 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee to conduct the studies.  The participants were 
given consent forms and prior to the activities, they were briefed and debriefed after the 
session end.  Participants were told that they were free not to complete the exercise and if 
this could be done simply by not filling out the form.  The participants were advised that 
they had a right to withdraw from participating in the studies.  No personal details were 
recorded (e.g., name).  All participants received a credit point for participating even if they 
chose not to complete the task. 
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Chapter 3 
Results 
 
The Results section comprises three main parts (R1, R2 and R3) to reflect the 
different methodologies used to collect the quantitative data for this thesis.  The first part is 
made up of three main studies presenting the findings from observational field studies used 
to analyse voting behaviour of contestants on the TV game-show the WL.  The second and 
third part built on the findings from the observational field studies to generate hypotheses 
that were tested using two experiments carried out in the setting of a University lecture.  
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Chapter R1: 
Demonstration and Replication of The Neighbour Effect in The 
Weakest Link TV Game-Show using  
Observational Field Studies 
 
“In addition, this game-show (WL) provides an ideal laboratory to study human 
decision-making.  The rules are well-deﬁned and the stakes are high, something that is not 
easy to replicate elsewhere” (Barmish & Boston, 2009, p. 3). 
 
R1.1 Chapter Outline 
 
The chapter is presented as three studies with the reanalysis of the data used in the 
original study by Goddard et al. (2011) being followed by a new replication.  The final 
study analysed second-round voting. 
 
The starting point for this research was an observation that contestants on a TV 
game-show showed a significant reluctance to nominate the contestants that were next to 
them as the worst contestant, the so called weakest link (Goddard et. al, 2011).  This was 
referred to as the neighbour effect (NE).  The first study presents a 72-episode study where 
the original data was reanalysed.  It confirmed the original NE but went further by also 
showing a significant gender effect in the first-round voting behaviour not originally noted 
by Goddard et al. 
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To test the NE and the unexpected gender effect, the second study used a 151-
episode replication by analysing the first-round voting responses made by contestants in 
this different, extended set of WL episodes.  It was found that the NE was still present but 
a different kind of gender effect was noted.  This was interpreted as there being a robust 
NE but the gender effect that emerged in the original data set (72 episodes) changed using 
the larger set (151 episodes). 
 
The third study analysed the second-round voting pattern from the original 72-
episode study.  This confirmed that the proximity and NE carried over from the first-round 
to the second-round.  Furthermore, it revealed another two biases in voting behaviour.  The 
second-round voters were significantly more likely to retaliate against the contestants that 
had voted against them in the first-round.  Those second-round voters that had picked a 
votee in the first-round appeared to be significantly more likely to vote against them again 
in the second-round voting. 
 
R1.1 Chapter outline 
R1.2 Observational Field Study 1: Original Demonstration of the Neighbour Effect 
R1.3 Observational Field Study 2: Replication of The Neighbour Effect 
R1.4 Observational Field Study 3: Analysis of Second-round Voting Reciprocity, 
         Retaliation and Consistency 
R1.5 General Discussion 
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R1.2  Observational Field Study 1: Original Demonstration of the 
          Neighbour Effect 
 
Abstract.  The pattern of voting in the first-round of 72 episodes of the UK version 
of the TV game-show The Weakest Link (WL) was analysed.  In each episode, the first-
round finished when each of the nine contestants had picked one of their peers as the WL.  
The observations were based on the original data set used by Goddard et al. (2011).  Four 
significant main findings emerged; (i) contestants avoided voting their direct-neighbour (s) 
as the WL, (ii) however, voters’ likelihood to vote for a peer was not a simple linear 
function of distance per se, (iii.) women were more likely to be voted as weakest link (iv) 
the “neighbour-avoidance” effect increased as the group consensus as to the identity of the 
weakest link decreased.  These findings replicated the original conclusions of Goddard et 
al. but extended their observations by demonstrating a significant gender effect in the 
voting patterns.  The gender effect was opposite that found in similar studies using the US 
version of WL.  This suggests that the pattern of voting is more complex than originally 
thought. 
 
Introduction.  The configuration of contestants in the WL makes it easy to define 
the spatial relationships between all contestants.  Furthermore, each contestant made a 
discrete decision at the end of the first-round of questions by voting for one of their peers.  
Therefore, the design of the game-show conveniently affords a means to examine whether 
voting behaviour was affected by the contestants’ spatial arrangement. 
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The null hypothesis was defined by the voting levels expected purely due to 
chance.  For example, in a show with nine contestants (i.e., labelled A-I and arranged 
according to Figure 3) the probability that contestant A vote for any of the other 
contestants is 1
8
 or .125.  With respect to the voting pattern predicted for neighbours, 
contestants A and G only have one neighbour each (B and H respectively), so p 
(neighbour) = .125 for each of them.  Contestants B through H, each have two neighbours 
each so p (neighbour) = 2* .125 for each of them.  Therefore, in a single episode the 
expected number of votes for the neighbour is two, simply the sum of the individual 
probabilities for each contestant voting their neighbour (E (neighbour) = (2*.125) + 
(7*.250) = 2 ).  Across the 72 episodes observed, the total expected votes for the direct-
neighbours based solely on simple probability was 2*72 = 144.  The same reasoning was 
applied to each of the other possible voter-votee spatial relationships to derive expected 
vote frequencies. 
 
It follows that if the contestants were influenced by the spatial proximity of their 
fellows then voting frequency should vary as some function of voter-votee separation.  One 
prima facie prediction was that contestants would be less likely to vote for their close 
neighbours so more likely to vote for those further away, giving an inverse relationship 
between vote frequency and proximity.  This neat linear relationship was originally 
predicted by Goddard et al. (2011), the gradient of which would provide a measure of the 
strength of the proximity effect.  It turned out as it happened that there was a strong effect 
of voter-votee proximity on vote frequency.  Most notably, voters were averse to 
nominating their direct-neighbours as the weakest link.  However, the contestants furthest 
away received the number of votes expected purely due to probability.  Those contestants 
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between these extremes accrued more votes than would be expected.  Therefore, overall, 
there was a significant departure between the observed and expected voting patterns.  It is 
described here in terms of three phases proximal-medial-distal.  Goddard et al described it 
as a neighbour-avoidance effect, NE, (later this becomes a NE because of observations 
regarding valence) that because of their proximity voters avoid doing some bad to their 
direct-neighbours.  They offered no explanation for the medial/distal effects. 
 
The method used in the research presented in this chapter was an observational 
field study of the UK version of the WL game-show.  The first part reanalyses and extends 
Goddard et al’s (2011) original study designed to test the relationship between vote 
frequency and the physical proximity between voter and votee.  These observations were 
extended by including an analysis of the gender of the participants to examine whether 
gender effects similar to the ones exposed by Levitt (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005) 
would also emerge in the UK version of the game-show.  The study used the same original 
coding of the data provided by Goddard et al.  One of the main aims of this opening study 
was to provide the researcher with an opportunity to scrutinise an example of previously 
coded data as a preliminary to carrying out a more comprehensive replication using a new 
set of episodes of the WL (i.e., the same method was used to code and analyse the voting 
patterns of contestants in 151-episodes of the UK version of WL, described in M1.2. 
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Thus, the objectives of this study were: 
 
1. To investigate the relationship between the negative voting pattern and proximity. 
 
2. To understand the consensus (i.e., endogenous factor) effect towards voting 
outcome.  A key factor that lead Goddard et al. (2011) to attribute a NE was 
responsible for the voting bias they found, was because the effect was related to the 
consensus regarding the identity of the WL.  This relationship should become more 
pronounced as the consensus regarding the identity of the WL decreased. 
 
3. To explore gender (i.e., exogenous factor) effect in voting behaviour. 
 
Method.  The methods used here have already been described in the General 
Methods, chapter M1.2.  This section provides a summary of relevant details pertaining to 
a reanalysis of Goddard et al. (2011). 
 
Field observation of WL TV game-show.  The first-round voting patterns in 72 
episodes of the UK version of the WL game-show were analysed.  The episodes were 
originally shown on free to air TV in the UK TV between 24th April 2002 and 8th January 
2003.  Each episode was coded according to the date it was aired using a team of 
independent coders who were undergraduate students at the University of Lincoln.  The 
coders undertook the task as part of project work towards year III dissertations.  Few errors 
were identified in the coding but any discrepancies that did arise were easily corrected at 
the time by recourse to the original episodes.  This part of the study was based on the 
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coding originally undertaken by the independent coders and was not based on observing 
the original 72 episodes of the WL. 
 
This preliminary study, used 72 episodes of the WL, each of which included nine 
contestants in each episode, hence a total of 648 (Female = 300, Male = 348) contestants 
voting activities were recorded altogether.  This study used first-round WL TV game-show 
voting, where the contestants each made an eight-alternative-forced-choice (8-AFC) to 
vote out another contestant as WL.  Each contestant’s position (A - I, see schematic at 
Figure 3) and their gender were noted, as well as their vote.  The votes were recorded as 
integers such that their absolute value represented the distance between voter-votee, from 
one space away (direct-spatial neighbour) to eight spaces away ( N, N+1, N+2, N+3, ..., 
N+7 ).  The number’s sign represented the direction from the voter to the votee (+ve 
towards the right or –ve towards the left).  For example, the voter in position A, 
nominating votee in position I, eight spaces away, was coded, 8.  Similarly, voter in 
position I, picking votee in position H was coded -1. 
 
Other demographic factors (e.g., age, marital status, ethnicity, education, income 
and occupation) were not recorded.  Other game-specific information was also not 
recorded such as number of questions answered, their accuracy, banking decisions, amount 
won per episode were not recorded. 
 
Results.  The analysis used in this section always followed the same pattern in this 
replication of Goddard et al. (2011).  The observed frequency of votes actually made by 
contestants was counted and compared with the frequency of votes expected purely due to 
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probability (Goddard et al.).  This section is structured so that the first part explains how 
the expected frequencies were derived.  The second and third parts replicated the analysis 
of Goddard et al. regarding voting behaviour and proximity followed by proximity and 
consensus; the third part extended the observations of Goddard et al. by testing for a 
gender effect. 
 
Deriving expected frequencies.  Expected voting frequencies were derived by 
recourse to rudimentary probability theory.  By assuming a random unbiased model then 
the probability associated with a contestant voting for any of the other eight contestants 
was always 1
8
  ( .125).  As the contestants at the endpoints of the array, A and I were not 
considered as spatial neighbours (even though they are strictly temporal neighbours in the 
sequence of questions) meant that they only had one direct-neighbour each, whereas 
contestants B through H had two each.  Therefore, the expected frequency for contestants 
voting for their neighbour in a single round was two, simply the sum of the probabilities of 
individual contestants voting for their neighbour (2*.125 + 7*.250).  Expected frequencies 
were calculated for all spatial relationships, neighbour, neighbour +1, ..., neighbour + 7, 
giving, 2, 1.750, 1.500, 1.250, 1, .750, .500, .250 respectively.  Notice that these sum to 
nine, the same as the number of contestant votes in a single round.  Over the course of 72 
episodes the expected number of neighbour votes was 144. 
 
Expected frequencies for other voter-votee relationships (N, N+1, N+2, N+3, ..., 
N+7) are shown below in Table 3, calculated using the same procedure to derive the 
expected frequency.  Notice that commonest contestant spatial relationship is the 
neighbour (N), with 16 neighbours forming 8 pairs.  The next-door-neighbour-but-one 
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(N+1) is the next commonest with 7 pairs, dropping successively, to the least common 
single pairing between the most distant contestants, A and I, eight spaces away (N+7) from 
each other (N = 8; N+1 = 7; N+2 = 6; N+3 = 5; N+4 = 4, N+5 = 3; N+6 = 2; N+7 = 1). 
 
Expected frequencies with weakest link and without weakest link.  Expected 
frequencies were calculated both including and excluding the vote of the eventual weakest 
link in the first-round. 
 
Table 3 
The Calculated Expected Frequencies for Each Voter-Votee Position 
 
Pos. A B C D E F G H I 
 
Freq. 
N 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 2.000 
N+1 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125 1.750 
N+2 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125 0.125 1.500 
N+3 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.250 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 1.250 
N+4 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 - 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 1.000 
N+5 0.125 0.125 0.125 - - - 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.750 
N+6 0.125 0.125 - - - - - 0.125 0.125 0.500 
N+7 0.125 - - - - - - - 0.125 0.250 
Note.  Position (Pos.) for each contestant was denoted by A to I and contestants’ votes 
towards other contestants represented with N, N+1, N+2, ..., N+7.  Each frequency (Freq.) 
was calculated based on the rudimentary probability theory. 
 
Weakest link as a function of contestant position.  One assumption is made that 
there was no systematic bias in the arrangement of the contestants in the game-show.  To 
test this the position of the WL throughout the 72 episodes was recorded and the 
frequencies that first-round weakest links appeared in positions A - I is shown in Figure 9.  
Over the course of 72 episodes and assuming that, there was no significant bias in the 
positioning of the weakest link then there would be no predicted significant deviation from 
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the expected eight occurrences of the weakest link in each position 72
9
 = 8, square 
symbols).  There was no systematic bias in the spatial or temporal order of candidates as 
the observed frequencies (f0) of the weakest link found in each spatial position (A-I) 
compared to the expected frequency (fe) of 8 (n(episodes) / n(positions ); 72
9
 = 8 ) was non-
significant (F(8, N = 72) = 12.750, p = .121, small effect size, Cramer’s V = .149).  
Contestants were no more or less likely to vote for candidates that preceded or followed 
them temporally in the testing sequence. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Plots the frequency that the weakest link landed in each of the nine contestant 
positions (A - I).  The square symbols show the expected distribution and the triangle show 
the observed frequencies. 
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Finding 1:  Voter-votee proximity (The “neighbour-avoidance” effect).  The main 
finding of Goddard et al. (2011) was an effect of proximity on voting behaviour. 
 
Figure 10.1 (upper panel) shows the expected pattern of voting expected (square) 
and observed (triangle) for the contestants following the first-round of questions (The data 
shown here includes the votes cast by the eventual weakest link).  The expected 
frequencies were derived using the method described earlier and the observed frequency 
was a simple count of votes for the specified voter-votee relationships.  The key features of 
the figure show that vote frequency seems to be described by three distinctive phases.  The 
proximal/neighbour phase shows that direct-neighbours avoided voting for each other (N).  
The medial phase (N+1 to N+4) shows where contestants were most vulnerable to being 
voted whilst those furthest away in the distal/distant phase (N+5 to N+7) showed the 
expected vote frequencies. 
 
The voting frequencies including the weakest link votes change the voting pattern 
slightly such that the spatial effect is non-significant but the neighbour versus non-
neighbour remains significant.  If implicit processes operated to influence decision-
making, then they should become apparent as systematic biases over the course of many 
decisions.  In the context of the weakest link, decisions were the votes cast measured as a 
function of the spatial relationship between the voter and the candidate. 
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Figures 10.1 and 10.2.  shows the voting frequency as a function of spatial position for 72-
epside study.  It compares the expected voting frequency (square), derived as the unbiased 
pattern of voting, with the observed pattern of voting (triangle).  Voting frequency is 
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plotted as a function of the spatial relationship between voter and candidate where ‘N’ 
refers to the voter’s neighbour and ‘N + 1’ the next-door-but-one neighbour and so on.  
The upper panel (Figure 10.1) is the voting pattern which includes the votes cast by the 
eventual weakest link while the lower panel (Figure 10.2) is the voting pattern which 
excludes the votes cast by the eventual weakest link. 
 
Significant departures between the unbiased pattern of voting and the observed 
pattern of voting can be seen in Figures 10.1 and 10.2 where contestants were less likely to 
vote for their direct-neighbour, N.  Although this supports the predicted avoidance of 
voting for neighbours, Figure 10.1 also shows that there was not a simple linear 
relationship between voting pattern and proximity as more distant candidates were not 
necessarily more likely to acquire votes (The data shown here includes the votes cast by 
the eventual weakest link).  A comparison between voters’ ‘neighbour votes’ against ‘non-
neighbour votes’ was significant (F2(1) = 7.508, p < .005). 
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Finding 2: The effect of gender.  A simple analysis across the 72 episodes reveals 
that the gender of the weakest link in the first-round voting was a woman on 46 occasions 
and a man in only 26 episodes.  This is surprising because there were more male’s 
contestants than females.  If this followed the composition of the sample then men would 
be the weakest link in 38.667 episodes with 33.333 female weakest links (F2(1, N = 72) = 
8.993, p < .005, medium effect size Cramer’s V =.353).  On first sight, it seems that at 
least for the first-round of voting there is marked discrimination in voting the weakest link 
based on gender.  Breaking these results down further, Figures 11, 12.1, 12.2, 13.1 and 
13.2 show the observed and expected vote frequencies for female and male voters voting 
for females and males respectively. 
 
Figure 11.  The vote frequencies with respect to female and male contestants for 72-
episode study.  The triangular is the observed vote frequencies and the square is the 
expected vote frequencies by each gender. 
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Figures 12.1 and 12.2.  Voting performance for both gender in 72-episode study.  Figure 
12.1 (upper panel) is a voting performance for female contestants and Figure 12.2 (lower 
panel) is a voting performance for male contestants.  The triangular is the observed vote 
frequencies and the square is the expected vote frequencies. 
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Figure 11 shows that females in the first-round of voting were subject to significant 
negative bias and discrimination by both male and female voters.  This result was a 
surprise.  Firstly, the predicted bias was in terms of voter-votee spatial relationships rather 
than gender.  Secondly, although gender effects had been noted previously they were in the 
opposite direction.  Particularly in the case of women voters showing a preference-based 
discrimination for women and against men.  Antonovics et al. (2005) used the Group Bias 
Statistic (GBS) to measure group bias statistic and found that for women voting for other 
women the GBS in first-round voting were .739 (n = 222, sd = 1.41) and .783 (n = 111, sd 
= 1.086) for the different types of WL show.  Applying their metric to Goddard et al.’s 
(2011) data gives a GBS of 1.21 (n = 300) in the opposite direction (recall that 1 = no 
discrimination).  The GBS statistic for males GBS were non-significant revealing no 
gender based discrimination in the U.S versions of WL, .976 (n = 222, sd = 1.22) and 1.00 
(n = 113, sd = 1.185), compared with the GBS of 0.764 (n = 348) indicating strong out-
group discrimination in the UK version of WL.  Levitt (2004) found “...women receive 
weakly fewer votes than men…, although in no case is the difference across gender 
statistically significant” (Levitt, 2004, p. 446). 
 
The possible source of the discrimination found in Goddard et al. (2011) data is 
important because it introduces the possibility that the significant differences that emerged 
were not simply attributed to voter-votee proximity, but represent a more complex picture 
of bias regarding proximity and gender affecting voting in which regarded as the 
endogenous and exogenous factors.  They are also important as a potential way of 
investigating discrimination something overlooked in their original analysis. 
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Distribution of men and women.  Aside from the advantages highlighted in I1.2 
detailing the advantages of studying game-shows, a glaring disadvantage is that the 
researcher has no control over the selection of the contestants and their distribution in the 
setting of the game-show.  Table 4 presents the arrangement of contestants by gender in 
the shows configuration, shows that the distribution is not random.  Of the 72 episodes, 60 
had five males and four females with the remainder having five females and four males. 
 
Table 4 
Contestant Arrangement by Gender (72 - episode Study) 
 
Arrangement Number of episodes 
mfmfmfmfm 29 
mfmmfmffm 5 
mfmffmmfm 5 
mfmfmffmm 6 
mfmffmfmm 3 
Note.  The remaining 24 episodes comprised 16 arrangements that occurred once and four 
that occurred twice. 
 
Table 4 shows that the distribution of contestants was not random.  The commonest 
pattern that accounted for 40% of the episodes interleaved male and female contestants 
(i.e., Male-Female-Male-Female-Male-Female-Male-Female-Male).  The vast majority of 
the other combinations were variants of this form also, meaning that in the first-round the 
neighbours of the male contestants were females and vice versa.  This raised the real 
possibility that what Goddard et al. (2011) interpreted as a proximity based voting bias 
might actually be the manifestation of a gender effect allied with the non-random 
distribution of contestants by the show’s producers. 
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Gender and proximity.  Both males and females demonstrated discrimination by 
significantly voting against women.  Women make up the majority of the neighbours for 
male contestants and it follows that males make up the majority of neighbours for female 
contestants.  If Goddard et al. (2011) NE is just gender bias, then male and female voters 
should show different voting patterns as a function of voter-votee spatial relationships.  
Female voters should demonstrate a strong NE because their neighbours are males and 
they have a voting bias against females, therefore they will be more likely to vote for 
females that are not near neighbours.  Males on the other hand should show no NE, or if 
anything a reversed NE, because their neighbours are females and males are biased against 
them. 
 
Figures 13.1 and 13.2 show these predictions were not completely borne out.  
Figure 13.1 (upper panel) shows the female voters’ voting pattern as a function of voter-
votee spatial relationships.  A significant departure from the expected is noted and 
alternates about the expected performances according to the predominate gender of the 
votee.  Where votees were predominantly male (N, N+2, N+4, N+6) voters elected them 
fewer times than would be expected.  When the votes were predominantly female (N+1, 
N+3, N+5, N+7) voters tended to vote them as the weakest link more than expected.  This 
causes the observed voting pattern to alternate above and below the expected pattern.  This 
shows the expected pattern for a NE but can also be accounted for by the biased voting of 
the female contestants. 
 
Figure 13.2 (lower panel) shows the performance of the male voters using the same 
axis.  They also demonstrate that the expected pattern of performance was not a good fit 
  
 
 
                                                          
97 
for the observed pattern of voting.  Given that males also show a strong discrimination 
against women, and their direct-neighbours were predominantly females then it was a 
surprise that they voted for their female neighbours fewer times than would be expected.  
If anything, they would be expected to vote for their female neighbours more than would 
be expected.  It seemed that males still demonstrated the NE.  The gender effect is still 
visible by the alternating pattern of the observed voting aside from the neighbour position 
(N).  When the votees were predominantly male however (N+1, N+3, N+5, N+7) voters 
tended to vote for them as weakest link fewer times than expected, but when 
predominantly female (N+2, N+4, N+6) they voted them weakest link more than expected. 
 
This section suggests that the voting in WL is subject to at least two forms of bias 
regarding gender and proximity.  The next section follows Goddard et al. (2011) analysis 
of the proximity effect as a function of the consensus of the other voters towards the WL. 
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Figures 13.1 and 13.2 show the votes by gender as a function of spatial position in 72-
episode study.  Figure 13.1 (upper panel) is the female voters and Figure 13.2 (lower 
panel) is the male voters.  The triangular is the observed vote frequencies and the square is 
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the expected vote frequencies.  Figures 13.1 and 13.2 show vote frequency as a function of 
voter-votee relationships for male and female voters.  Notice in both cases the NE is 
apparent at N. 
 
 Finding 3: The effect of consensus.  Consensus refers to the number of votes 
accrued by the eventual weakest link.  The assumption was that in a round where all eight 
contestants (i.e., aside from the weakest link themselves) voted for the same votee then 
there was some degree of certainty over the identity of the weakest link.  Likewise, low 
consensus rounds were indicative of uncertainty.  Proximity biases would be more likely to 
be found in circumstances of uncertainty therefore the NE should increase with a decrease 
in consensus.  Table 5 below shows the distribution of consensus across the 72 episodes. 
 
Table 5 
The Contestants Consensus Votes in 72 Episodes 
 
Consensus Frequency 
1 0 
2 1 
3 12 
4 16 
5 17 
6 11 
7 12 
8 3 
  
Total 72 
Note.  Shows the frequency distribution of episodes according to consensus, the number of 
votes cast for the eventual weakest link during the first-round of voting. 
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Generating the null hypothesis for the distribution of votes according to consensus.  
The format of the WL game-show had nine contestants with each selecting one other 
contestant as the weakest link from a menu of eight choices.  Therefore, each contestant 
had a slightly different choice-set as a contestant was unable to vote for themselves as the 
weakest link.  This gave a total number of unique voting permutations for the show of: - 
89 = 134,217,728 
 
The number of permutations that resulted in any one of the contestants, say 
contestant A, as being the “Weakest Link” was therefore: - 
89
9
= 14,913,080.9 
 
The generation of the null hypothesis for the distribution of episodes as a function 
of the consensus for votes for the weakest link was calculated in two steps.  In the first 
step, simple probability theory was used to establish the frequency of episodes that resulted 
in n votes for a particular contestant, say the contestant in position A.  For example, when 
the consensus was the maximum of eight, such that all eight contestants were in agreement 
by voting for the weakest link as the contestant in position A, then there were eight ways in 
which this could possibly happen.  The contestants in positions B through I must have all 
voted for A.  The contestant in position A, unable to nominate themselves, voted for each 
of the other eight contestants in positions B through I in turn. 
 
Therefore, there were eight permutations where it was possible for the contestant in 
position A to be voted as the weakest link.  Extrapolating this for the other positions means 
that for a consensus of eight votes for the weakest link, there were eight ways for each 
  
 
 
                                                          
101 
position and nine positions (A to I) giving 72 of the 132,217,728 million permutations that 
give a consensus of eight, with probability 𝑃(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 8) =  72
89
. 
 
Following this line of reasoning for a consensus of seven, such that seven of the 
contestants voted for the Weakest Link in position A: - 
Suppose B disagreed... 
B can vote 7 ways (not B, not A), 
A can vote 8 ways (not A), 
There were 8 positions for disagree, 
It gives, 7*8*8. 
 
Similarly, if 6 contestants voted for the Weakest Link in position A, and 
B, C disagree... 
B can vote 7 ways (not B, not A) 
C can vote 7 ways (not C, not A) 
A can vote 8 ways (not A) 
there were 8 positions for disagree 1 
there were 7 positions for disagree 2 
As there were repeats (e.g., C, B disagree is the same as B, C disagree), divide by 2. 
It gives,  
(7∗7)∗8∗(8∗7)
2
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From this, the formula below was derived for the number of permutations, P, for 
any consensus of n, where 0 < n < 8. 
 
𝑃(𝑛) = 7(8−𝑛)8 (
8!
𝑛!
(8 − 𝑛)!
) 
 
This formula was used to generate the permutations in the second column of Table 
6 below.  Notice that the permutations sum to the total number of possible permutations 89. 
In the cases when the consensus was 8, 7, 6 or 5, these permutations also yielded 
contestant A as the weakest link by majority vote (the third column and tenth column in 
Table 6). 
 
However, when consensus was between 1 and 4, the identity of the weakest link 
had to be enumerated for the cases where either another contestant received a majority vote 
or when there were ties.  For example, when there was a consensus of four votes for 
contestant A as the weakest link, there was also the possibility that another contestant (e.g., 
B) received a majority vote of five.  Also, there was the possibility that there would be a tie 
with another contestant also receiving four votes.  The number of ties involving a 
consensus vote of four was 10,640 (column four in Table 6), all of which were 2-way ties 
resulting in  10,640
2
= 5,320 permutations giving contestant A as the weakest link (Column 
five in Table 6 below). 
 
The total number of permutations for generating contestant A as the weakest link 
with a consensus of four votes was therefore the sum of the permutations giving contestant 
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A by majority plus the ties 1,333,640 + 5,320 = 1,338,960 (column nine in Table 6 below).  
This gives a probability of    1,338,960
14,913,081
=  .0898 (Column ten in Table 6 below) for a 
contestant to be voted as the Weakest Link with a consensus of four.  Table 6 shows the 
relative frequencies and probabilities that would be expected purely due to chance for each 
of the different levels of consensus.  This formed the basis for the null hypothesis for the 
distribution of consensus votes.
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Table 6  
 The C
alculated Frequencies for N
ull C
onsensus for D
ifferent Level of C
onsensus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
onsensus 
Perm
utation 
M
ajority 
Ties 
2-w
ay 
3-w
ay 
4-w
ay 
9-w
ay 
Total - Ties 
Probability 
0 
46,118,408 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
1 
52,706,752 
- 
133,496 
- 
- 
- 
14,833 
14,833 
0.000994623 
2 
26,353,376 
526,568 
16,628,304 
2,726,472 
2,988,160 
552,720 
- 
6,793,920 
0.455567837 
3 
7,529,536 
5,840,912 
1,523,760 
754,320 
5,040 
- 
- 
6,600,272 
0.442582726 
4 
1,344,560 
1,333,640 
10,640 
5,320 
- 
- 
- 
1,338,960 
0.089784265 
5 
153,664 
153,664 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
153,664 
0.010303974 
6 
10,976 
10,976 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10,976 
0.000735998 
7 
448 
448 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
448 
3.00407E-05 
8 
8 
8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
8 
5.36442E-07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
134,217,728 
7,866,216 
18,296,200 
3,486,112 
2,993,200 
552,720 
14,833 
14,913,081 
1 
N
ote.  See text above for explanation. 
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Table 7  
The Calculated Frequencies for Voting by Consensus (72 – episode Study) 
   
Consensus 72-episode Null 
1 0 0.071612835 
2 1 32.80088425 
3 12 31.86595631 
4 16 6.464467049 
5 17 0.741886139 
6 11 0.052991867 
7 12 0.002162933 
8 3 3.86238E-05 
      
Total 72 72 
Note.  Shows the calculated frequencies by consensus for 72-epsisode and based on the 
null hypothesis probability (refer to Table 6).  
 
The comparison of consensus frequencies between the observed 72-episode study 
and the null hypothesis distribution of votes is shown in Table 7 above and plotted in 
Figure 14 below.  Figure 14 shows the vote frequencies cast by contestants as a function of 
consensus based on the probability, (F2(2, N = 72) = 411.924, p < .001; large effect size, 
Cramer’s V = 1.691).  Notice that the observed pattern differs from that expected due to 
chance.  This is not a surprise as the contestants taking part in the actual game-show have 
the added information available of observing the game play of their fellow contestants and 
are thus less reliant on casting random votes. 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
106 
 
 
Figure 14. shows the consensus based on probability (squares) and votes cast by 
contestants (triangles) by consensus level.  See Table 7 for the consensus frequency and 
probability values used to generate the null hypothesis. 
 
Partitioning Consensus.  The overall pattern of voting across the 72-episode study 
was described previously by Figure 10.1 and 10.2 above.  It revealed three distinct phases 
of voting behaviour at three different levels of proximity between the voter and votee; 
proximal, medial, distal. The proximal phase incorporated the NE and only included the 
most proximal voter-votee relationship between the voter and their immediate neighbour(s) 
(N).  The NE was characterised by a positive ratio 144
115
= 1.252.  The medial (N+1, N+2, 
N+3) and distal (N+4, N+5, N+6, N+7) phases had respective vote ratios of 0.904 and 
1.137.  The three phases having been characterised as ratios provide an indication of the 
strength of voting bias across the three phases as plotted in figure 15 below. A ratio greater 
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than one shows the NE as a bias in the proximal phase, as the votes observed were less 
than the expected vote.  When the ratio was less than one in the medial phase, the observed 
votes were more than expected.  A ratio of one occurred when the observed votes were as 
expected. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. shows the vote frequency ratio as a function of spatial proximity for the 72 – 
episode study.  The proximity is divided into three phases (proximal, medial, and distal).  
The red line indicates the ratio is equal to one as the baseline.   
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Figure 16. shows the same data as in Figure 15 above using the same axes. In this figure the 
consensus was partitioned from low to high (2/3, 4, 5, 6, 7/8). The ratio was measured by 
diving the expected vote frequency for each consensus with the observed vote frequency.  
Notice that the NE in the proximal phase tended to be greater for lower consensus.  
 
Figure 16, above, shows that at the proximal phase of proximity, at lower 
consensus levels (2/3, 4, 5) the ratio was greater than one indicating a NE bias. The NE (at 
proximal proximity) was strongest when the voting consensus was 4, 1.882, nearly half 
less votes than expected.  This was followed by the consensus at 2/3, 1.444, and consensus 
5, 1.308. In contrast when consensus was highest (7/8) the ratio was just above one, 1.071, 
and even dropped below one at a high consensus of 6. It shows that those episodes with 
lower consensus (2/3, 4, 5) show a strong NE and episodes with high consensus show no 
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NE (6, 7/8). The remainder of this section compares voting between these high and low 
consensus episodes. 
 
Figures 17.1 and 17.2 below, show that the voting pattern changes by partitioning 
consensus.  Figure 17.1 (upper panel) shows high consensus (n=26 episodes; combining 
episodes where 6, 7 or 8 contestants voted for WL) because a large number contestants 
agreed on the WL, then there was no observable NE because the observed voting pattern 
was largely as expected (F2(7, n = 234) = 1.616, p =.978).  However, once the consensus as 
to the identity of the WL dropped, a marked NE emerged when the observed vote 
frequency dropped well below the expected frequency at N (F2(7, n = 414) = 20.263, p 
=.005; Cramer’s V = .084, small effect size) (see Figure 17.2, lower panel).  When 
consensus was high the voting pattern was as expected but when low there was a notable 
bias in the voting pattern showing the characteristic proximal, medial and distal phases, 
with a strong NE at the proximal phase. 
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Figures 17.1 and 17.2. shows the voting pattern at high (at 6, 7 and 8) and low (2,3,4 and 
5) consensus episodes.  
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Discussion.  The main purpose for undertaking this reanalysis of Goddard et al. 
(2011) data was two-fold.  Firstly, to become acquainted with how to code and analyse 
data from the observational field study and secondly to carry out a replication of their 
original findings.  The main finding from Goddard et al was largely confirmed, that 
contestants show a strong avoidance for voting for their direct-neighbours but that the 
voting was not a simple function of the spatial distance between the voter and the votee.  
As the consensus regarding the weakest link reduced then the NE in the contestants’ voting 
increased.  Additionally, however, this replication undertook an analysis of voting by 
gender and using the GBS of Anotonvics et al. (2005) revealed another strong bias 
regarding gender where both male and female contestants show significant discrimination 
by voting against women. 
 
TYPE I v TYPE II info/uncertainty.  One possibility for how a contestant made a 
decision was that they made their voting decision based on the availability of two very 
different sources of information.  Firstly, TYPE I game-specific information (i.e., 
exogenous factor) was the primary source of information.  This kind of information was 
public, explicit and encompassed the observable performance of the contestants during the 
round of questions.  The kinds of factors that could contribute towards this would be the 
measurable game performance of the other contestants encompassing aspects of game-play 
like the accuracy of answers provided and the accuracy of banking decisions made. 
 
However, the cognitive task of keeping track of the eight other contestants’ 
performance in answering something in the region of 30 questions in a three-minute 
interval is a challenging one under the best of times.  Managing this task whilst also taking 
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part in answering the questions and being subject to the peculiar demands of being in the 
high pressure environment of the TV studio makes making their voting decision an even 
more daunting prospect.  Rather than keeping some accurate tally of all of the other 
contestants it is far more likely that they register the more distinctive and observable 
negative aspects of their fellow contestants’ performance.  This would be in the form of 
obvious errors or even other perceived gaffes like errors in answering questions especially 
if allied with a failure to bank a large sum.  When once the integrity of this source of 
information was high and unambiguous, contestants faced a relatively easy and reliable 
decision identifying the weakest performer.  This is particularly the case in the ‘high’ 
consensus rounds where there is near unanimity over the identity of the weakest link. 
 
On the other hand, in rounds when game-specific information becomes equivocal 
then voters were in a quandary on who to pick as weakest link.  For example, in episodes 
when all candidates answered all of the questions correctly, or, in episodes where many of 
the contestants performed badly, it is unclear who the weakest link really is.  In these 
cases, where TYPE 1 information is worthless so, cannot be used, they had to rely instead 
on secondary subject-dependent sources of information.  This TYPE II subject-dependent 
(i.e., endogenous factor) source was private, implicit and encompassed each voter’s 
individual subjective dependent attributions, discriminations and other biases.  In these 
rounds, group consensus over the identity of the weakest link was lower because decision-
making shifted away from the primary high fidelity source of game-specific information to 
the secondary subject-dependent source, more prone to biases like NE and the other forms 
of implicit discrimination that were the subject of Levitt’s (2004) and Antonovics et al. 
(2005) research.  The increase in the NE as consensus dropped below six highlights the 
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increase in uncertainty as to the true identity of the weakest link.  It would also be expected 
that these kinds of discrimination would come to prominence during the first-round 
episodes where there was low consensus about the WL’s identity. 
 
Gender discrimination.  The most dramatic addition to the analysis conducted by 
Goddard et al. (2011) was the finding of a strong gender effect in the voting of all 
contestants against women contestants.  What remains uncertain is the cause of this 
apparent discrimination.  Discrimination can take different forms.   
 
The preference-based discrimination in the first-round voting by females against 
males was attributed by Antonovics et al. (2005) as a preference for women rather than 
necessarily as a dislike for men.  However, the outcome amounts to the same which was a 
negative outcome for males that was otherwise undeserving.  This discrimination 
disappeared immediately after the first-round.  Statistical discrimination could arise if the 
group performance was statistically worse for men than women.  This was not the case in 
Antonovics et al. data.  Males performed effectively the same as females regarding the 
accuracy of their answers to questions.  Antonovics et al., raised a second kind of statistical 
discrimination, where the signals on ability are more informative for one group than 
another.  Typically, though, the signaling is stronger for the in-group so would be applied 
more to women-on-women discrimination.  A third possibility is incorrect prior beliefs that 
men perform worse.  However, after a number of rounds this would be corrected.  Strategic 
alliances in the form of explicit/implicit group collusion was another possibility raised 
although Antonovics et al. found little evidence for this. 
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The discrimination they found is still open to interpretation.  They conclude that 
“There are a number of possible explanations for this type of behaviour” (Antonovics et 
al., 2005, p. 942).  The discrimination shown is considered to be preference-based largely 
on the basis that this is the remaining form of discrimination that cannot be discounted.  
Women might have some kind of dislike for some aspect of how men play the game.  They 
might have more compassion for other women, or even they might wish to avoid 
competing against men in future rounds.  Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) found 
that in experimental settings women perform worse when competing against men.  Women 
also seem to favour women when voting for political candidates Dolan (1998).  While, 
Levitt (2004) talks of difficulty addressing discrimination. 
 
The discrimination found here is more difficult to address because unlike Levitt 
(2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005), Goddard et al. (2011) data coding did not include the 
performance of the contestants or any other demographics aside from contestants’ gender, 
position on the game-show (A-I), their first-round vote choice.  As the original episodes 
are no longer available, it is not possible therefore to ascertain whether the women that the 
contestants voted for was based on their game playing performance or their membership of 
the group identified as “female”.  Women in the U.S show a preference for other women 
whereas the women in the UK show discrimination against women.  It remains to be seen 
whether these reflect cultural differences or some aspect of their game playing 
performance. 
 
The only way to resolve the issues relating to this replication of Goddard et al. 
(2011) is to carry out a further replication by repeating the field observation of the WL 
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using a different set of episodes including a consideration of the game performance of the 
contestants.  The aim of the next study is to carry out this replication with an emphasis on 
testing for voting bias in proximity/gender/game performance and consensus to investigate 
the endogenous and exogenous factors in the voting behaviour. 
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R1.3 Observational Field Study 2: Replication of The Neighbour Effect 
 
Abstract.  The main question for this research was to verify whether the first-round 
voting behaviour previously observed in the preliminary study was affected by the voter-
votee physical proximity.  The analyses of results are presented in three parts; the 
neighbour effect (NE), the gender effect and consensus.  Voting behaviour, position gender 
and game performance were recorded for 1,359 contestants (Female = 606, Male = 753) in 
151 episodes of the UK version of the WL TV game-show.  The main findings of Goddard 
et al. (2011), and the reanalysis above, were supported because there is a strong significant 
voting effects were recorded for voter-votee proximity and consensus.  The other main 
finding was that the gender effect found in the reanalysis of Goddard et al. was not 
apparent in this extended data set, instead, traces of discrimination were much weaker and 
had reversed.  Whereas, the data reanalysed from Goddard et al showed a strong 
discrimination against women, the data here showed a weaker discrimination against men. 
 
Introduction.  From the preliminary study that reanalysed Goddard et al. (2011) 
data there was a significant association between proximity and voting behaviour.  It 
showed the NE because the proximity bias was strongest towards contestants who were 
physically closest to the voter.  On top of that, there was gender discrimination where both 
genders voted against females as first-round weakest link.  Therefore, this study was 
carried out using more episodes to test, if both effects would still be evident using a larger 
set of episodes. 
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Method.  The method used was for the most part the same as that described above 
and relayed in the General Methods chapter M1.2. 
 
Data was obtained by observing 151 episodes of the UK version of WL TV game-
show broadcast on UK free to air TV in the United Kingdom between 1st May 2009 and 
17th January 2011.  The observation excluded the celebrity episodes.  In each episode, 
there was nine contestants, hence a total of 1,359 contestants’ (Female = 606, Male = 753) 
voting activities were observed.  Other demographic factors (i.e., age, marital status, 
ethnicity, education, income and occupation) were not recorded due to limited information 
and it was not applicable for the study. 
 
A simple database was used to code data collection in Microsoft Excel.  
Information recorded included the file name, episode date, spatial position of each 
contestant (A-I), their gender, their vote and additional remarks for any observed 
behaviour.  The collected data was cross-checked to ensure the collected data was correct 
with no error.  Computation of the accumulation of the WL’s votes were computed by 
using a simple function in the Excel formula builder and the data was validated by another 
independent researcher for the data authenticity.  All of the observations were made by the 
principal researcher and author of this thesis. 
 
Results.  The analysis used in this section always followed the same pattern as that 
described above in the replication of Goddard et al. (2011).  Again, the observed frequency 
of votes actually made by contestants was counted and compared with the frequency of 
votes expected purely due to probability (Goddard et al.).  The method used to explain how 
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the expected frequencies were derived was explained at the beginning of the results section 
in the previous study but is briefly explained again here using 151 episodes.  The structure 
of this results section also follows the same path as that from the previous study.  The first 
replicated the analysis of Goddard et al. regarding voting behaviour and proximity, the 
second part tests for the gender effect exposed by the previous study and the final part 
examines proximity and consensus. 
 
Calculation of expected vote frequencies in 151 episodes.  Table 8 below, shows 
how the expected frequencies for a single episode were simply multiplied by the number of 
episodes, 151, to generate the expected vote frequencies for each voter-votee spatial 
relationship in the first-round. 
 
Figure 18 below, shows the expected frequencies from Table 8 plotted as a function 
of spatial position.  Error bars for each expected frequency are estimated from the variance 
(+/- 2) of the underlying theoretical probability distribution, 
𝑝𝑞
𝑁
,  with, p, the expected 
percent of votes for that spatial position, and 𝑞 = (100 − 𝑝).  N was the total number of 
votes made.  
 
The votes from each contestant (N = 1,359) were recorded based on the relative 
spatial positions of voter-votee.  Observed and expected vote frequencies were calculated 
to both include and exclude votes from the first-round WL.  Recall that a vote denoted the 
negative choice that been made by the voter to a votee. 
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Table 8  
The Calculated Expected Frequencies for 151 Episodes 
 
Pos. 
 
1 ep. 151 ep. 
N 2.000 302.000 
N+1 1.750 264.250 
N+2 1.500 226.500 
N+3 1.250 188.750 
N+4 1.000 151.000 
N+5 0.750 113.250 
N+6 0.500 75.500 
N+7 0.250 37.750 
Note.  N is one space away neighbour, hence +1, +2, +3, …+7 denoted as added spaces in 
addition to N.  For every calculated frequency, each spatial position was multiplied with 
number of episode (ep.) observed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. shows the expected voting pattern with error bars (see text above). 
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WL as a function of contestant position.  The position of the weakest link 
throughout the 151 episodes was recorded and the frequencies that first-round weakest 
links appeared in positions A-I is shown in Figure 19.  Over the course of 151 episodes 
there should be no significant deviation from the expected 16.778 occurrences of the 
weakest link in each position (151
9
= 16.778, triangular symbols).  There was no 
systematic bias in the spatial or temporal order of candidates as the observed frequencies 
(f0) of the weakest link found in each spatial position (A - I) compared to the expected 
frequency (fe) of 16.778 (n(episodes)/n(positions); 151
9
= 16.778) was non-significant 
(F(8, N = 151) = 12.967, p = .113, small effect size, Cramer’s V = .104).  Contestants 
were no more or less likely to vote for candidates that preceded or followed them 
temporally in the testing sequence. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Shows the distribution of the WL across the nine contestant’s position A - I for 
the first-round (151-episode study). 
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Finding 1: Voter-votee proximity (The “neighbour-avoidance” effect).  The 
calculated 𝜒2 for each spatial position over 151 episodes is shown in Table 9.  Figures 20.1 
and Figures 20.2 show the comparison between the observed and expected voting 
frequency as a function of voter-votee proximity.  The observed frequencies show the now 
familiar three-phase proximal-medial-distal pattern of voter-votee first-round voting.  
Again, there was no simple linear relationship between votes and proximity.  The result 
shows that, there is a significant association between spatial position and the vote 
frequencies of WL, 𝜒2 (7, N = 1,359) = 48.223, < .001 small effect size, Cramer’s V = .071 
(The data shown here includes the votes cast by the eventual weakest link, see Figure 20.1, 
the upper panel).  It shows that there is a significant descent at the N point, which is the 
direct spatial contestant.  This demonstrates the proximity effect even more clearly than in 
Goddard et al. (2011) 72-episode study.  Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and 
H1 was accepted.  Figure 20.2 (lower panel) demonstrate a significant NE, 𝜒2 (7, N = 
1,208) = 38.575, p < .001, small effect size, Cramer’s V = .068 (The data shown here 
excludes the votes cast by the eventual weakest link). 
Table 9 
The Chi-Square Value for Each Spatial Position. 
 
Spatial position Observed Expected 𝜒2 
N 218.00 302.00 23.36 
N+1 259.00 264.25 0.10 
N+2 245.00 226.50 1.51 
N+3 210.00 188.75 2.39 
N+4 196.00 151.00 13.41 
N+5 132.00 113.25 3.10 
N+6 74.00 75.50 0.03 
N+7 25.00 37.75 4.31 
 
Total 
 
1359.00 
 
1359.00 
 
48.22 
Note.  The observed and expected frequencies were derived from 151 episodes of the WL, 
N = 1,359, df = 7 (The data shown here includes the votes cast by the eventual weakest link). 
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Figures 20.1 and 20.2.  Compares the expected voting frequency, derived as the unbiased 
pattern of voting, with the observed pattern of voting.  Voting frequency is plotted as a 
function of the spatial relationship between voter and candidate where N refers to the 
voter’s direct-neighbour and N + 1 the next-door-but-one neighbour and so on. 
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 Finding 2: The effect of gender.  A simple analysis in the 72 episodes’ study 
revealed a strong gender bias regarding the identity of the weakest link in the first-round 
voting (i.e., 46 Females versus 26 Males).  At least for the first-round of voting there was a 
marked discrimination in voting.  In the extended observations over 151 episodes this first-
round gender effect disappears.  The expected frequencies for weakest link (Female = 
63.336; Male = 83.667) compared closely to the observed weakest link (Female = 61; Male 
= 90).  If anything, the bias reversed from the 72 episodes’ study but there was no 
significant departure from the expected frequencies in the 151 study (F2 (1, N = 151) = 
.978, p = ns).   
 
Figure 21.  Shows the vote frequencies with respect to female and male contestants for 
151-episode study 
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Breaking these results down further, Figure 21 shows the observed and expected vote 
frequencies for female and male voters voting for females and male respectively.  In the 
reanalysis of Goddard et al. (2011) data females in the first-round of voting were subject to 
significant negative bias and discrimination by both male and female voters in the 72 
episodes’ study.  Figure 21 shows that this pattern of discrimination has changed completely 
in the replication using 151 episodes.  Figure 21 shows the overall expected votes for males 
and females and the actual observed frequencies, 𝜒2 (1, N = 1,359) = 18.178, p < .001, small 
effect size, Cramer’s V = .116.  The votes targeted towards women were significantly fewer 
than expected with the corollary that male votes were greater than expected.  Figures 22.1 
and 22.2 show the separate votes made by males and females.  Figure 22.1 (upper panel) is 
a voting performance for female contestants, 𝜒2 (1, n = 606) = 12.932, p < .001, small effect 
size, Cramer’s V = .146 and Figure 22.2 (lower panel) shows a voting performance for male 
contestants, 𝜒2 (1, n = 753) = 6.323, p < .01, small effect size, Cramer’s V = .092. 
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Figures 22.1 and 22.2.  Voting performance for both male female contestants.  Figure 22.1 
(upper panel) is a voting performance for female contestants and Figure 22.2 (lower panel) 
is a voting performance for male contestants. 
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 Women now show the kind of discrimination also found by Antonovics et al. 
(2005).  Females show a preference for other females by being more likely to vote for 
males.  Males, show a similar bias because they also avoided voting for females at the 
expense of males.  Updated GBSs for the 151-episode study gives females = 0.991 (n = 
606) and males = 1.092 (n = 753).  Goddard et al. data yielded a GBS of 1.21 (n = 300) for 
females and 0.764 (n = 348) for males. 
 
Distribution of men and women.  The arrangements by gender for each episode 
were observed and in total five arrangements were identified.  Table 10 shows the different 
arrangement by gender for the 151 episodes.  The commonest format for WL TV game-
show was the same as used in the original 72-episode study (Male-Female-Male-Female-
Male-Female-Male-Female-Male).  Though in the 151-episode study the arrangement 
accounted for 93.378% of episodes relative to the 40.278% of episodes in the 72-episode 
study.  Only five arrangements were encountered in the 151-episode study compared to 25 
different arrangements in the 72-episode study.  Of the 72 episodes, 60 had five males and 
four females with the remainder having five females and four males.  Of the 151 episodes, 
149 had five males, only two had five females with four females. 
 
Table 10  
Contestant Arrangement by Gender (151- episode study) 
 
Arrangement Number of episodes 
mfmfmfmfm 141 
mfmfmfmmf 6 
fmfmfmfmf 2 
fmfmfmmfm 1 
mmfmfmfmf 1 
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Female and male contestants voted males more than females as WL which rebuts 
the finding in the previous 72-episode study where the observation showed a significant 
gender bias against other females.  These results are more in line with previous researchers 
using WL (Antonovics et al., 2005; Levitt, 2004). 
 
Finding 3: The effect of consensus.  The assumption was made that when all eight 
contestants (high consensus) voted the same contestants as weakest link, it indicated a high 
level of certainty to identify the weakest contestant.  Similarly, a low consensus was 
indicative of uncertainty identifying the WL.  The prediction is that the NE increases with 
uncertainty.  The distribution of the voting consensus among the contestants over 151 
episodes is shown in Table 11.  It shows that the commonest consensus was when all eight 
contestants were unanimous by voting for the same WL. 
 
Table 11 
The Contestants Consensus Votes in 151 Episodes 
      
Consensus 151-episode Null 
1 0 0.150188029 
2 8 68.79074335 
3 21 66.8299917 
4 19 13.55742395 
5 27 1.555900097 
6 21 0.111135721 
7 26 0.004536152 
8 29 8.10027E-05 
      
Total 151 151 
Note.  Shows the calculated frequencies by consensus for 151-epsisode and based on the 
null hypothesis probability (refer to Table 6).  
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The comparison of consensus frequencies between the observed 151-episode study and the 
null hypothesis distribution of votes is shown in Table 11 above and plotted in Figure 23 
below.  Notice that in the actual episodes observed voting tended towards the highest 
consensus over the WL with the most frequent being the maximum consensus of eight 
(F2(2, N = 151) = 833.868, p < .001; large effect size, Cramer’s V = 1.662). This is not a 
surprise as contestants were likely in most cases to base their voting decision on the 
obvious poor performance of the worst contestant. In the random model derived from 
probability theory the modal consensus was a low two. 
 
 
 Figures 23.  shows the consensus based on probability (squares) and votes cast by 
contestants (triangles) by consensus level for 151 episodes. 
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Partitioning Consensus.  The overall pattern of voting across the 151-episode study 
was described previously by Figure 20.1 and 20.2 above.  Similar to the 72-episode study, 
voting behaviour was grouped into three proximity phases (proximity, medial and distal).  
The grouping of the 151-episode study was done to give an indication of the strength of 
any voting bias as a function of proximity.  Figure 24 shows that, at proximal proximity, 
the NE indicates a positive bias as the ratio given was more than one, at 1.385.  Whilst, for 
the medial (.952) and distal (.884) proximity, the ratios were close to but less than one, 
which suggests that the contestants were showing either no bias, or a slight negative bias 
towards contestants medial or distal to them.   
 
 
 
 
Figures 24. . shows the vote frequency ratio as a function of spatial proximity for 
the 151 – episode study.  The proximity is divided into three phases (proximal, medial, and 
distal).  The red line indicates the ratio is equal to one as the baseline.   
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Discussion.  The main findings that came out from this replication were that they 
supported and strengthened the main conclusions of Goddard et al. (2011).  Firstly, 
contestants showed significant bias in their first-round voting behaviour based on the 
proximal relationship between voter and votee, second, this proximity bias/effect was not a 
simple linear function of distance, third, three phases were apparent, proximal-medial-
distal and fourth, the proximity effect was related to uncertainty, because as uncertainty 
increased with reduced weakest link consensus so did the proximity effect. 
 
Using an extended data set of 151 episodes made the effects more clear cut than in 
Goddard et al. (2011) and in the reanalysis of Goddard et al above.  Another main finding 
from this study was that the gender effect revealed in the reanalysis of Goddard et al., 
disappeared and even reversed in this study.  The GBS for females of 0.991 was close to 
one indicating no discrimination.  The associated 𝜒2 was significant however, showing a 
small effect size bias against voting men (similar to Antonovics et al. (2005) this can be 
attributed in part to the sensitivity 𝜒2  shows for high numbers of observations.  Men 
showed a similar bias against other men by voting for them as WL. 
 
A shortcoming of the reanalysis of Goddard et al. (2011) in the previous study was 
that it was based on already coded data without recourse to the original episodes making it 
impossible to determine the source, preference-based or statistical-based, for the 
discrimination against women discovered.  The current replication had the advantages of 
being based on more episodes that the principal researcher had direct access to.  This 
meant that the performance of contestants was recorded and it showed that there was no 
difference in the accuracy of men and women addressing first-round questions.  Males 
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fielded first-round questions with an accuracy of 0.890 compared to females’ accuracy of 
0.885.  Consequently, there is no performance-based statistical information to hand for 
contestants to favour either males or females.  The discrimination that emerged, akin to 
that exposed by Antonovics, et al. (2005), was most likely preference-based.  The precise 
explanation for this discrimination remains open to interpretations however.  The 
difference between these observations and those reported by Levitt (2004) and Antonovics 
et al. was that both males and females here showed a preference-based discrimination for 
women, or, against men.  Whichever, it amounts to a kind of discrimination. 
 
It remains unclear, however, why there was such a marked discrimination against 
women in Goddard et al. (2011) data.  One possibility is that their data incorporated 
statistical-based discrimination against women due to poor performance by women during 
the first-round, otherwise it is difficult to arrive at an explanation for why preference-based 
discrimination should shift so dramatically in the space of less than a decade between the 
recordings from the two studies. 
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R1.4 Observational Field Study 3: Analysis of Second-round Voting 
Reciprocity, Retaliation and Consistency.  
 
Abstract.  The pattern of voting in the second-round of 72 episodes of the UK 
version of the WL TV game-show was analysed.  The observations were based on the 
original data set used by Goddard et al. (2011).  In each episode, the first-round had 
finished with the elimination of one of the nine contestants voted the weakest link by their 
peers.  The second-round began, therefore, with just eight contestants.  There were two 
main aims, (a) to test whether the proximity bias that was exposed in the first-round of 
voting would also carry into second-round voting; (b) to test whether the votes cast in the 
first-round had an effect on the second-round voting (i.e., reciprocity and consistency) and 
(c) to test for the effect of consensus. 
 
For (a) and (c) the second-round voting pattern showed the same proximity and 
consensus effects previously reported in first-round voting of the 72- and 151-episode 
studies.  A cumulative analysis was also provided for proximity and consensus of voting as 
a function of voter-votee spatial relationships using the first and second-round voting from 
the 72-episode study and first-round voting from the 151-episode study generating an 
analysis based on 2,583 voting decisions.  For (b) second-round voting showed two biases 
emanating from the first-round of votes.  Voters in the second-round were significantly 
more likely to retaliate against the contestants that had picked on them in the first-round.  
Furthermore, the second-round voters that had picked someone in round one were still 
significantly more likely to target the same votee again in the second-round. 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
133 
Introduction.  Observations from first-round WL voting showed a peculiar bias for 
proximity.  One argument put forward for studying the first-round voting was the 
advantage that it was untainted by any previous voting.  The contestants voting behaviour 
in round one is also the least likely to be influenced by strategic voting.  The key goal in 
voting in the first-round was predominantly to return a vote for the weakest link, the 
“worst player”, based on the TYPE I game-specific (i.e., exogenous factor), objective 
information where available.  When this type of information was not available, or it was of 
low signal strength then contestants picked the weakest contestant using TYPE II, 
subjective information (i.e., endogenous factor) containing all of the implicit biases that the 
contestant might harbour.  The proximity bias became stronger as the consensus about the 
weakest link decreased.  This was taken to be an indirect measure of low signal strength 
TYPE 1 information. 
 
This chapter looked at the second-round voting decisions made by contestants in 
the 72-episode study.  One aim was to test whether contestants introduced a third factor 
into their decision-making by using TYPE III strategic information.  This type of 
information rests on the ability of the contestants to make conscious and deliberate choices 
to underpin their voting decisions.  This kind strategic-based discrimination, less 
influential in the first-round becomes more prominent as the rounds progress (Levitt, 2004; 
Antonovics et al., 2005).  Contestants now have the extra information available to them 
from a combination of information accumulated from the first-round of questions/answers, 
the voting decisions from the first-round and the second-round questions/answers to make 
their second-round voting decision.  In particular, the possibility is now open for second-
round voters to use first-round voting information to explicitly retaliate and reciprocate by 
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punishing the first-round voters that had picked them.  This chapter tested for evidence of 
this kind of punishment in second-round voting.  Another prediction was that first-round 
voters having already voted a contestant might be consistent by voting the same contestant 
in the second-round. 
 
Antonovics et al. (2005) found that their evidence for gender discrimination 
disappeared immediately after the first-round.  Another aim for this section was to test 
whether the proximity bias also persisted into second-round voting. 
 
A key factor that lead Goddard et al. (2011) to attribute the NE was responsible for 
the voting bias they found, was because the effect was related to the consensus regarding 
the identity of the weakest link.  This relationship should become more pronounced as the 
consensus regarding the identity of the weakest link decreased. 
 
Method.  The methods used here have already been described in the General 
Methods chapter in M1.2.  This section provides a summary of relevant details pertaining 
to a reanalysis of Goddard et al. (2011). 
 
Field observation of WL TV game-show.  A group of players (N = 8) accumulated 
a pot of money by fielding a second-round of general knowledge questions.  Next, each 
player identified one of their fellows as the “weakest” in that round.  The player accruing 
the majority of votes was summarily eliminated from the show.  The second-round voting 
patterns in 72 episodes of the UK version of WL game-show were analysed.  The episodes 
were originally shown on free to air TV in the UK TV between 24th April 2002 and 8th 
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January 2003.  Each episode was coded according to the date it was aired using a team of 
independent coders who were undergraduate students at the University of Lincoln.  This 
part of the study was based on the coding originally undertaken by the independent coders 
and was not based on observing the original 72 episodes of the WL.  Each contestant’s 
position (refer to Figure 3, p. 62) and their gender were noted, as well as their vote.  The 
votes were recorded as integers in the manner previously described in M1.2. 
 
Results.  The data used for this part of the study were the second-round votes from 
72 episodes of the WL, each of which included eight contestants, hence a total of 576 
(Female = 254, Male = 322) contestants voting activities were recorded altogether.  
Therefore, each contestant made a seven-alternative-forced-choice (7-AFC) to vote out 
another contestant as WL. 
 
The analysis used in this section followed the same pattern as before.  The observed 
frequency of votes cast by contestants was compared with the frequency of votes expected 
purely due to probability.  The first and third parts replicated the analysis of Goddard et al. 
(2011) regarding voting behaviour and proximity followed by proximity and consensus; 
the second part tested for any bias from first-round voting affecting second-round voting. 
 
WL as a function of contestant position.  The same assumption was made as 
previously that there should be no systematic bias in the arrangement of the contestants in 
the second-round of the game-show too.  To test this, the position of the weakest link 
throughout the 72 episodes was recorded and the frequencies that second-round weakest 
links appeared in positions A - I is shown below in Figure 25.  There was no systematic 
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bias in the spatial or temporal order of candidates as the observed frequencies (f0) of the 
weakest link found in each spatial position (A - I) compared to the expected frequency (fe) 
was non-significant, F(7, N = 72) = 5.514, p = .702, small effect size, Cramer’s V = .105).  
Contestants were no more or less likely to vote for candidates that preceded or followed 
them temporally in the testing sequence. 
 
  
 
Figure 25.  Plots the frequency that the weakest link landed in each of the nine contestant 
positions (A - I), the expected distribution (square) and the actual are shown (triangle) for 
the second-round. 
 
Finding 1:  Voter-votee proximity (The “neighbour-avoidance” effect).  One of 
the key findings has been the demonstration of a proximity effect in voting.  Figure 26.1 
(upper panel) shows that this reluctance to vote neighbours as weakest link carries on into 
second-round voting too.   
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Figures 26.1 and 26.2.  Voting frequency as a function of spatial position.  Compares the 
expected voting frequency (square), derived as the unbiased pattern of voting, with the 
observed pattern of voting (triangular).  Voting frequency is plotted as a function of the 
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spatial relationship between voter and candidate where N refers to the voter’s neighbour 
and N + 1 the next-door-but-one neighbour and so on.  (The data shown here includes the 
votes cast by the eventual weakest link).  Figure 26.1 (upper panel) shows the vote 
frequencies from the second-round of voting (72-episode study).  Figure 26.2 (lower panel) 
shows the accumulated data from the first and second-round of the 72-episode study 
(dashed line) and the accumulated proximity data from the 72-episode study with the first-
round voting from the 151-episode study (solid line). 
 
Figure 26.1 shows the expected pattern of voting (square) and observed vote 
frequencies (triangular) for the contestants following the second-round of questions.  The 
same key features of first-round voting persisted into the second-round voting.  The 
proximal/neighbour phase shows that direct-neighbours avoided voting for each other (N, 
N+1).  The medial phase (N+2, N+3, N+4) shows where contestants were most vulnerable 
to being voted whilst those furthest away in the distal/distant phase showed the expected 
vote frequencies. 
 
Figure 26.2 shows the accumulated vote frequencies from the various studies of 
WL observed.  The dashed line shows the first and second-round votes from the 72-
episode study.  The solid lines show the sum of the first and second-rounds of the 72 
episodes summed with the first-round vote frequencies of the 151-episode study.  Taking 
these observations together reveals a clear effect of proximity on the voting by contestants 
on the WL TV game-show.  What becomes most pronounced is a reluctance for 
contestants to pick their direct-neighbours as the weakest link. 
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Finding 2:  The effect of reciprocity/punishment/consistency.  One bad turn 
deserves another.  The analysis of first-round voting allowed for a consideration of voting 
untainted by any voting in previous rounds.  This part examined whether first-round voting 
did have any effect on second-round voting.  One possibility was that surviving votees 
from the first-round voting experience might seek “revenge” by significantly targeting 
their first-round voters, so reciprocating by voting for them in the second-round.  Equally, 
surviving voters from the first-round might be expected to remain consistent in their first-
round judgement by targeting the same votee again in the second-round.  The contestants 
in the second-round were then identified as belonging to one of the following four 
categories: 
 
1. Potential retaliation:  A contestant that survived first-round voting but got voted for by 
someone anyway; these people were coded as “reactive”, meaning they got voted for in 
round one and might react by voting for the person who voted for them. 
 
2. Potential consistent:  Someone who cast a vote for a votee who survived to the second-
round (i.e., potentially reactive above) was coded as potentially “consistent”; they would 
be consistent by voting against the same contestant again as in the previous round.   
 
3. Potential retaliation and consistent:  Contestants that fit both the above categories, they 
got voted for and voted for someone who was not the actual weakest link.  
 
4. Neutral:  Someone who does not fit into either of the above categories, they did not get 
voted for nor did they vote for someone who was not the weakest link.  These people 
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were coded as “neutral”.  Meaning they voted for the contestant in round one who was 
the actual weakest link and eliminated from the game-show.  These contestants were 
important by acting as a control group against which to test if the contestants with 
grounds for retaliation and consistency actually went on to realise their potential for bias.  
 
 
 
Figure 27.  Breakdown of contestants in a Venn diagram in four categories.  Contestants 
were grouped according to their potential for retaliation and their potential for consistency 
based on whether they were surviving voters or votees from the first-round.  If the potentially 
vengeful contestants from the first-round exercised tit-for-tat voting, then they would be 
expected to vote for their first-round tormentors significantly more often than expected.   
 
Figure 27 shows the distribution of contestants by their potential for retaliation 
(votees from the first-round) and their potential for being consistent (voters from the first-
286 
58 77 155 
Potential Consistent 
Potential Retaliation 
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round).  From the 576 contestants that made it through to the second-round of the game-
show, 286 of them had voted for the first-round weakest link so, they had no one left from 
the first-round that might seek revenge on them.  These 286 contestants also had not 
received any first-round votes from the other contestant, so, in the context of this analysis 
they were neutral because they had no reason to retaliate against another contestant, at 
least based on them being voted for.  Another 58 contestants, however, were both first-
round votees and first-round voters whose votee was still “alive” in the second-round.  
Therefore, these contestants had the dual potentiality for retaliation and consistency.   
 
Expected frequencies were again derived in the usual fashion for each contestant in 
each episode to reflect their potential for retaliation and consistency.  It was fairly easy to 
work out potential consistency because for those contestants made only a single vote in the 
first-round, their expected probability to vote for the same votee again in round two was 
always 1
7
 .  The expected frequencies for the contestants that were potentially “vengeful” 
was a little more complex because they might have had more than one voter from the first-
round.  The computation of the expected frequencies took these factors into account and 
are shown in Figures 28.1 and 28.2.   
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Figures 28.1 and 28.2.  Shows the second-round voting for contestants that had the 
potential to retaliate (Figure 28.1, the upper panel) and the potential to be consistent 
(Figure 28.2, the lower panel).  In both cases the respective categories of contestants show 
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significantly more retaliation and consistency than expected due to chance as indicated by 
one way F2 tests. 
 
 On the face of it, Figures 28.1 and 28.2 show that, the contestants that had been 
singled out with a vote in first-round voting were also more likely to react by returning the 
vote in the second-round voting.  Also, as predicted (see Figure 28.2), the contestants that 
identified a votee for WL in the first-round were also significantly more likely to be 
consistent by voting for them again in the second-round. 
 
However, these observations need to be considered in the context of the other 
voters in the second-round.  For example, the potential retaliators (n = 135) were 
categorised as such because they were a recipient of first-round vote(s).  Although they 
were more likely to show “retaliation” by returning the vote, there still remains the 
possibility that they chose their vote based on TYPE 1 game-specific information rather 
than utilising TYPE III strategic information in the form of “cold revenge”.  In order to 
test whether their votes were motivated by “revenge” then the retaliators choice must also 
be compared with the votes made against the same votees by the other contestants in the 
second-round that had no grudge or reason for retaliation against the votees.  This data is 
shown in Figure 29.1 (upper panel).  Those contestants (n = 441) that had no reason for 
retaliation would nevertheless still be expected to vote for some of them through chance (n 
= 151).  The potential retaliators voted according to retaliation (41
30
= 1.367) compared to 
their non-retaliatory controls (146
151
  = .967) that performed almost at chance levels.  This 
suggests that the retaliators were motivated by revenge! (F2(1, N = 576) = 5.437, p = .039; 
small effect size, Cramer’s V = 0.097)  
  
 
 
                                                          
144 
Figure 29.2 (lower panel), tells a rather different story regarding the consistency of 
contestant votes.  Again, on first analysis it seemed that the contestants that had the 
potential to vote consistently, did so by being significantly more likely to vote for the same 
contestant again in the second-round.  However, once the control was introduced, it 
revealed that the contestants with no grounds to be consistent still targeted those same 
contestants significantly more than expected.  This suggests that there are some other 
factors, other than consistency to target these contestants.  In this case, it was more likely 
that voting was based on TYPE 1 game-specific information than TYPE III strategic 
voting.  In fact, the consistent voters show a reluctance to vote for the contestants than the 
neutral controls, suggesting that their targeting of them in the first-round might make them 
more reluctant to vote for them again.  The proportion of votes for the consistent votee 
from the potentially consistent second-round voters was 1.5 compared to 1.68 by the 
controls (45
30
  and 123
73
). 
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Figures 29.1 and 29.2.  Show the same data as in Figures 28.1 and 28.2 with second-round 
voting for contestants that had the potential to be purely retaliatory (Figure 29.1, the upper 
panel) and the potential to be consistent (Figure 29.2, the lower panel).  This time their 
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
270
300
330
360
Retaliation Non retaliation
Vo
te
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Type of vote
𝜒2 (1, N = 576) = 5.437 , p = .039, 
small effect size, Cramer's V = .097 
Retaliation obs
Retaliation exp
Non-retaliation obs
Non-retaliation exp
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
270
300
330
360
Consistent Non consistent
Vo
te
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Type of vote
𝜒2 (1, N = 576) = 51.600 , p < .001, 
medium effect size, Cramer's V = .299
Consistent obs
Consistent exp
Non-consistent obs
Non-consistent exp
  
 
 
                                                          
146 
performance is compared with their respective counterparts that had no potential for 
retaliation and consistency. 
 
Finding 3:  The effect consensus.  Consensus represents an important independent 
variable because of the underlying assumptions.  When there was high consensus, for 
example where all eight contestants (i.e., aside from the weakest link themselves) chose 
the same votee then there was some degree of certainty over the identity of the weakest 
link in that episode.  Likewise, low consensus rounds were indicative of uncertainty.  
Uncertainty is the key factor as to why contestants will show prejudice, discrimination, 
proximity biases or any other kind of bias in making their voting decisions.  Therefore, the 
proximity bias should one exist, should become more pronounced under the conditions of 
greatest uncertainty.  The assumption is made that contestant uncertainty will be related to 
consensus so that the neighbour-avoidance effect should increase with a decrease in 
consensus.  In order to investigate this, the episodes from the 72-episode study (first and 
second-round, 144 episodes) and the 151-episode study were considered together.  In 
doing that a better distribution of episodes across the levels of consensus is generated (N = 
295).  Table 12 shows the distribution of consensus across the 295 episodes and plotted in 
Figure 30.  Notice that in the actual episodes observed, voting tended towards the higher 
consensus over the WL (F2(2, N = 295) = 1504.398, p < .001; large effect size, Cramer’s V 
= 1.597). 
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Table 12 
The Contestants Consensus Votes in 295 Episodes 
      
Consensus 295-episode Null 
1 0 0.293413699 
2 14 134.3925118 
3 51 130.5619043 
4 51 26.48635805 
5 56 3.039672375 
6 45 0.217119455 
7 46 0.008862019 
8 32 0.00015825 
 
 
 
Total 295 295 
Note.  The table shows the frequency distribution of episodes (N = 295) by consensus, the 
number of votes cast for the eventual weakest link; first-round and second-round voting of 
72-episode study and first-round voting of 151-episode study. 
 
 
 
Figure 30.  shows The comparison between the observed accumulated first and second-
round voting of 72-episode and 151-episode studies with the null hypothesis distribution of 
votes. 
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Partitioning Consensus.  Figure 31 below shows the vote ratio as a function of 
proximity for 295-episode study.  A similar pattern was observed in 72-episode and 151-
episode studies where in all three studies, it displays a positive bias at proximal proximity, 
1.357 where the ratio value was more than one.  Similarly, in medial and distal proximity, 
the ratio values were less than one which suggests either no bias or a slight negative bias 
towards participants who were medial or distal. 
 
Figure 31.  shows the vote frequency ratio as a function of spatial proximity for the 295 – 
episode study.  The proximity is divided into three phases (proximal, medial, and distal).  
The red line indicates the ratio is equal to one as the baseline. 
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Discussion.  Three main findings emerged; (a) contestants still avoided voting their 
direct-neighbour (s) as the weakest link, (b) surviving votees from the first-round were 
significantly more likely to “punish” the voter in the second-round, (c) the voters that 
elected a votee in the first-round were still significantly more likely to be consistent and 
vote for them again in the second-round.  Other features from the second-round voting are 
discussed in the General Discussion.  
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R1.5  General Discussion 
  
The three studies presented in this chapter all used the same pseudo-naturalistic 
field observation of the WL game-show.  The unique features of the game-show 
underlined an implicit bias that exists in decision-making and proximity.  Another bias was 
discovered regarding the voter-votee gender.  Finally, a third kind of bias was 
demonstrated based on reprisal and consistency with first-round voting. 
 
Proximity and consensus.  The main finding was the demonstration and repeated 
replication of the proximity bias in voting.  It was most clearly manifested in three phases, 
where the proximal phase was characterized by the neighbour effect (NE):  a significant 
reluctance to do something negative to close neighbours.  A medial phase where 
intermediate contestants were more likely to be voted against and a distal phase where the 
most distant contestants received the expected vote frequency.  
 
The proximal bias occurred as a NE and it is suggested the distal phase occurred 
because the voters were reluctant being in a situation where they had to mete out 
“punishment” towards the recipient.  Such behaviour can even be construed in a 
sociological perspective as an interaction order bias (Goffman, 1983) whereby the physical 
proximity affects the doctrine to punish an individual who is closer to the punisher, such as 
in the case of the voter.  
 
It is proposed that, the observed NE happened when the signal strength of TYPE I 
information was low.  Trope and Liberman (2010) suggested that this occurrence can be 
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explained with construal level theory and psychological distance.  The greater the voter-
votee distance becomes then the TYPE II information is less visibility, therefore the voter 
is assumed to have low construal level towards contestants that were physically and 
socially distant.  By contrast, contestants that are close in distance, or high construal level, 
such as direct-spatial neighbours, were considered to have a concrete visibility for the 
voter to make a more rigorous judgement. 
  
However, information availability is an important element for the contestants to 
cast their vote.  NE was less profound in situation with high explicit information 
availability, for example, in episodes where a single contestant constantly gave incorrect 
answers and was easily identified as the weakest contestant.  Thus, in the scenario of high 
voting consensus, it is suggested that the decision made relied on the observed cue during 
the game session.  The public, situational factors accounted for the voter’s choice.  This 
was made using the conscious, slow system 2 decision-making. 
 
Conversely, when the situational information signal strength was low, or its 
availability was low, for example, when all the contestants were performing well with 
correct answers:  the voters had a tough decision to make.  One compromise choice, to 
avoid making an uncomfortable atmosphere for the next round, would be to avoid picking 
on neighbours.  This would appear a sensible strategy especially given that contestants 
likelihood for tit-for-tat in the second-round voting shown in the R1.4.  Hence, it is 
suggested that the decision made with low information TYPE I availability, used 
dispositional TYPE II information, processed in a different stream of the dual process 
theory.  The ability to process the information due to limited external cues, meant that the 
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contestants made a fast and automatic decision, yet without conscious reasoning.  The 
voter used their System 1 to make their decision followed by System 2 to justify when 
asked to.  
 
The most compelling aspect of the results relates to the effect of consensus where 
in all of the examples the strength of the proximity bias increased with reduced consensus.  
This was most pronounced when the many episodes from all of the observations were 
concatenated in R1.4.  This allowed for sufficient observations to partition the episodes 
according to consensus.  Under these conditions there was a general trend for contestants 
to become increasingly more likely to avoid neighbours, at least up to a consensus of four.  
Lower consensus episodes (2 and 3 consensuses) still had a pronounced NE but less than 
consensus four.  It is uncertain what the cause of this is or whether it has any deeper 
significance. 
  
Gender.  The first study (see R1.2) carried out a reanalysis of Goddard et al. 
(2011) 72-episode study confirmed their findings on proximity and consensus but also 
revealed a surprising gender effect.  Goddard et al. referred to a gender effect but this was 
mainly restricted to the disproportionately unequal numbers of male and female first-round 
weakest links.  A closer examination of their data, however, exposed a much more 
systematic gender effect as females were much more likely to be voted against, both by 
males and other female contestants.  This surprising finding was consequential in two 
respects.  Firstly, it went against the previous findings on discrimination where females 
and males were more likely to vote for females not against them (Antonovics et al., 2005).  
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Secondly, and especially pertinent to this thesis, was the possibility that the proximity 
effect was merely an artefact of the gender voting bias. 
 
The reason for suspecting the latter was that as an observational field study there is 
no control over randomisation of participants to conditions.  A tally of the contestant 
configurations found a bias with nearly half taking the same arrangement (i.e., Male-
Female-Male-Female-Male-Female-Male-Female-Male.  Given this dominating pattern 
allied with the gender effect it is not surprising if females were to avoid neighbours as they 
were mostly men.  It turned out though that breaking proximity voting down by gender still 
revealed a strong NE.  Moreover, as the consensus reduced the NE increased as predicted.  
Nevertheless, the gender effect and proximity effect required further scrutiny.  This was 
particularly warranted because the data coded by Goddard et al. (2011) was only restricted 
to voting behaviour and gender with no game-specific noted (e.g., accuracy of questions 
answered; banking et cetera).  This means that it is not possible to ascertain whether the 
gender bias occurred as some taste-based or information-based discrimination.  The two 
possibilities existed that, the contestants were prejudiced and harboured deep rooted 
negative stereotypes about women and their abilities on game-shows, taste-based 
discrimination.  Another possibility was that the discrimination was information-based due 
to the poorer performance of women in the first-round.  As the reanalysis was based on the 
coding of the episodes rather than the actual episodes themselves then this could not be 
resolved.  Recall that Antonovics et al. (2005) showed that women discriminated against 
men even though there was no basis for this at least according to their ability to answer 
questions accurately. 
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In light of these new revelations in the reanalysis of Goddard et al. (2011) 72-
episode data, a replication was needed.  This prompted perhaps the major work of the 
thesis in the form of the 151-episode replication.  The findings that came out of the 151-
episode study once again confirmed the proximity bias but also displayed a different 
gender bias more in line with Antonovics et al. (2005).  It showed that there was a bias for 
women not against women and that this bias was strongest for female voters. 
 
Limitations.  The demonstration of NE occurred in a quasi-naturalistic setting and 
the advantage of this study is that, it is free from demand characteristics where the 
observed behaviour was performed without any interference from the researcher.  The 
contestants were taking part in a real event where they believed that, they were taking part 
in a TV game-show, such that the votes cast were derived from the genuine setting and 
rules of the games. 
 
However, the limitations inevitably arise from this field observation.  Principal 
amongst them being, is first, lack of control on the salient variables (e.g., gender), second, 
the selection of contestants (e.g., demographic factors), third, non-random allocation (i.e., 
at least five different contestant’s arrangement by gender) and finally, the contrived setting 
of the TV studio. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the NE was observed as a peculiar artefact of the TV 
studio.  Moreover, it remains uncertain as to whether the NE would be evident in other 
social scenarios.  Further, the vote in the context of the weakest link was construed as 
being negative, nasty or bad in some way.  It also remains uncertain as to whether the NE 
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would still occur if the contestants were making a vote of approval, by for example, 
picking the strongest link.  The NE could just be a consequence of picking from a one -
dimensional (1D) array, irrespective of the value of the choice being made.  These 
questions however, cannot be addressed by recourse to an observational field study.  The 
only way that they can be resolved is by designing scenarios that come under some kind of 
experimental control.  The next two results chapters record the attempts to demonstrate the 
NE outside the confines of the WL TV game-show. 
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Chapter R2 
Testing the Neighbour Effect using Voting Acvitity 
 
R2.1 Chapter Outline 
 
R1 demonstrated a compelling neighbour effect (NE) that emerged as a bias in the 
voting behaviour of contestants on the WL.  For this demonstration to have any wider 
significance though it also needs to be exhibited in contexts other than the TV studio.  The 
aim of this section was to test whether the conditions could be designed to replicate the 
NE.  This section presents investigation into the NE in the different social context of a 
standard lecture hall populated by first-year undergraduates.  The participants were 
presented with a kind of voting task to pick another person in the lecture theatre to receive 
a reward or punishment, by adding or removing their chances to win a prize draw.  
 
The rest of the chapter is in four sections:  a general introduction focuses on the 
effect of reward and punishment to understand the NE, the methods give the details of the 
experimental set-up, results and discussion.  
 
R2.1 Chapter outline 
R2.2 Introduction 
R2.3 Methods 
R2.4 Results 
R2.3 Discussion 
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 Abstract.  R1 demonstrated how individuals (i.e., contestants of the WL TV game-
show), avoiding doing nasty things towards their direct-spatial neighbour(s), which in this 
case meant voting out another contestant as the weakest link.  This behaviour was denoted 
as the neighbour effect (NE).  At this point, it seems that the NE might be a profound bias 
that affects an individual when performing nasty or negative actions against another 
individual who is closest to them by physical proximity. 
 
One issue that remains unresolved concerns whether the NE occurs merely as an 
effect of voting.  Hence, one test would be as to whether the NE also occurs if tested in a 
way where an individual ought to be nice.  Participants were the first-year students 
(N=449) attending an induction lecture during their orientation week.  They were asked to 
cast a closed, secret vote, for another person in the (a) same row, (b) same block and (c) 
the lecture theatre by marking a ‘X’ on a seating plan.  The vote carried either a positive or 
negative outcome for its recipient (i.e., another participant) by adding or removing their 
chances to win a prize draw.  The findings showed that the participants who cast negative 
votes demonstrated a significant NE by avoiding voting for their nearest neighbour(s). 
However, a reverse pattern was found when participants gave positive votes. 
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R2.2 Introduction 
 
The empirical demonstration (refer to R1, p. 77) of the neighbour effect (NE) was 
observed from an observational field experiment of the WL TV game-show.  The study 
was replicated suggesting that the NE was a robust bias in WL voting.  However, despite 
the strength of the demonstration of the NE, field observations, although conferring special 
advantages, fundamentally lack the required control to scrutinise the phenomenon further.  
This leads to the following predictions and tests regarding the robustness of the NE and its 
nature. 
 
1. Replication.  The demonstration of the NE in the WL should be tested for its 
robustness by being replicated in other voting scenarios and 
 
2. Valence.  Given (a) if the NE occurs as a simple spatial bias in voting per se, then 
the NE would be expected irrespective of vote valence.  That is, if there is an 
inherent avoidance of selecting neighbour(s), then it will occur whether the 
consequences of choosing them are positive/ neutral/negative.  If, however, the NE 
is selective for vote valence, by only occurring when the vote has a negative 
valence, then it shows that it can be interpreted as a social preference.  Given that 
people tend to avoid conflict more when an outcome is potentially positive (Weber 
& Camerer, 1998) then the NE might also be expected to switch if the valence of 
the vote (i.e., positive or negative) changed. 
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Does Prize Size Matter.  Consider the unique context of the WL as experienced by 
the contestants.  The NE was observed in the rarefied atmosphere of the TV studio, where 
contestants were aware of playing the game with strangers being faced by an intimidating 
host, whilst being filmed for national TV and facing a TV studio audience.  Any of these 
factors alone would be sufficient to raise the stress and adrenaline of the contestants but 
taken together produced a highly charged incentive to the play the game well.  Further 
incentive, should they be needed, included the value of the cash prize on offer and the 
desire not to appear foolish on TV.  Questions have to be raised therefore about the NE and 
whether it is just something that occurs in the rather peculiar surroundings of a TV 
recording studio.  It could be argued that the observed behaviour exists in an environment 
where the conditions such as the game rules were well defined and the prize values were so 
high. 
 
Several studies have shown though that an increase in the prize size does not 
necessarily significantly affect the behaviour of decision-makers.  For instance, Kocher, 
Martinsson and Visser, (2008) claim that an increase in the prize values did not 
significantly affect behaviour in their study (e.g., cooperation).  They investigated the 
effect of stake size in a form of public goods game in a field experiment with a standard 
laboratory setting.  The experiment was conducted with 120 high school participants in 
South Africa.  The experiment consisted two parts, in which, the first part of the 
experiment was to ask the participants to indicate their preferred contribution to the groups 
without fear of receiving any punishment, while, the second part was to suggest their 
contribution would have some consequence or punishment.  The participants were divided 
into two groups, one with low stakes size (LOW) and the other group with high stakes size 
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(HIGH).  Participants were randomly assigned into two groups and they were briefed about 
the task and been reminded not to communicate among participants to avoid unnecessary 
information leakage.  Since the participants were attending the same school and the 
chances were higher for them to share information because of familiarity in that particular 
context, Kocher et al., scheduled the session to be executed at the same time.  Their 
findings showed that, in both treatment LOW and HIGH, there were small differences in 
both tasks.  For contribution task without punishment, the average contribution level in 
LOW is 34.4% while, in HIGH is 32.9%.  In contribution task with punishment, both 
group given 41.2% in LOW and 40.9% in HIGH.  However, for punishment level, their 
study found that, the participants directed their punishment towards those who were either 
contributed less or more than themselves.  Hence, their study suggested that the increase in 
the stake size had no significant effect either on their level of contribution or on the 
punishment.  However, a potential drawback of this study was that they were conducted 
among high school students, who might not understand the consequences of contribution 
and punishment despite being briefed and tested if they had understood the task.   
 
The findings were consistent with a study done by Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter 
(2008) in their large scale study among 1,120 University undergraduate students in public 
goods games.  They also found that, individuals punished those who consistently 
contribute lower but at the same time, they also punished those who contribute more.  In 
which, this statement is true in the sense of fairness where in whatever situation, “People 
might punish not only freeloaders, but cooperators too” (Herrmann et al., 2008, p. 1,362). 
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In comparison, in a study conducted by Fehr, Tougareva and Fischbacher (2014) on 
gift exchange experiments, found that the stake level was less important than the situation 
itself.  Their study focused on the reciprocal fairness, in which the experiment was 
conducted among 120 first and second year undergraduate from a college in Russia.  The 
participants were divided into two groups whereby each group were split into normal and 
high stakes.  Despite the difference between stakes there were no significant effects, with 
relatively minor differences in their effort levels.  
 
Parke and Parke (2013) stress the importance of real life scenarios by, for example, 
using data from the real gambling environments to understand the effect of the prizes and 
stakes.  Stake or prize value is regarded as important element especially in gambling, 
where individuals willing to take risks with assumption that in return the higher the risk, 
the better they gain.  They suggested that, there were massive limitation in laboratory 
experiments particularly to test and understand the value of the stakes, which was not 
possible for any experimenters to conduct a huge scale experiments in comparison to 
casino.  In contrast, the NE displayed in R1 was first observed in a TV game-show, where 
the prize is considered huge in comparison to other methods.  Therefore, in this study, it is 
important to test the NE in a more controlled environment so as to assess if NE is a robust 
bias in decision-making. 
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Aim, Objectives and Hypotheses.  The aim of this study was to test the NE in a 
different setting (i.e., non-exclusive environment as a TV game-show) and to understand 
the effect of vote valence in NE.  Hence, to achieve the aims of this study, the objectives of 
this study were; 
 
1. To test whether the NE bias in decision-making is a robust endogenous factor.  
 
2. To test the effect of the exogenous factor, vote valence, on NE. 
 
 
Thus, to test whether the NE, and spatial proximity, occur in contexts other than the 
TV game-show.  the hypotheses were;  
 
1. The null hypothesis, as in the observations of the WL, was the expected pattern of 
voting due to chance.  
 
2. Based on the strong NE on the observation of WL then a similar neighbour effect 
was predicted here.  
 
3. Another test concerned identifying whether vote valence was an endogenous factor 
in decision making and follows on from whether an NE is found in 2.. If valence has 
no effect on NE then it would imply that it is not a factor at all. A universal NE lacks 
sensitivity and is of limited interest but a change in voting according to valence 
shows that there exists a sensitive and powerful endogenous bias working at an 
implicit level. 
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R2.3 Method 
 
 Participants.  Participants were undergraduate freshers attending their first 
orientation lecture at the University of Lincoln (N = 449; Female = 340 (75.724%), Male = 
85 (18.931%), Undisclosed = 24 (5.345%), see Table 13).  The participants’ responses 
were collected from two different cohorts (2013/2014) and (2015/2016). 
 
Table 13  
The Participants’ Gender (n=449) for 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 Cohorts 
   
n 
 
% Characteristic 
Gender   
 Female 340 75.724% 
 Male 85 18.931% 
 Undisclosed 24 5.345% 
 
Procedure.  For this study, the participants were asked to take part in a Voting 
activity.  The Voting task took approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete which included 
introduction and debrief.  The procedure was explained in the Methods Chapter, M1.4.  
For this activity, the main aim of this task was to get the participants to cast a private vote 
that carried either a positive, neutral or negative (i.e., -5, -1, 0, +1 and +5) effect for its 
recipient.  Five levels of valence (i.e., +1, +5, 0, -1 and -5) were used in the 2013/2014 
study, but, the 2015/2016 study only used the extreme valence levels (i.e., +5 and -5).  The 
positive vote (i.e., +1 or +5) added to the chances of its recipient winning a raffle by 
increasing the number of virtual ‘tickets’ the participant received.  The negative vote (i.e., -
1 and -5) reduced the chances of the recipient winning the raffle by the amount stated.  The 
neutral vote (i.e., 0) carried no weight and its recipient was neither advantaged nor 
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disadvantaged by its receipt.  Irrespective of the total tickets accrued by each participant 
during the voting activity it was ensured that every participant received at least a minimum 
of one ‘ticket’ for entry into the raffle.  All of the tickets were virtual.  Subsequent prizes 
were course related text books for the (2013/2014 cohort) or Amazon Gift Vouchers (for 
the 2015/2016 cohort).  Three winners were picked randomly for each cohort following the 
orientation lecture.   
 
Each participant also received a credit point (CP) that allowed them to open an 
account with School of Psychology Credit Point System, this served as a means by which 
to encourage undergraduates to volunteer as participants within the research community of 
the School of Psychology.  The principal aim of the orientation lecture was to introduce the 
new students to the School of Psychology tutorial system and Credit Point Scheme.  
Participants were instructed that the main aim of the lecture activity was to encourage them 
to register their CP online account to redeem their CP.  Participants were reassured that 
they would receive the CP whether they participated in the task or not and would be 
entered into the raffle also.  Although signed informed consent was not sought participants 
were assured of their anonymity and no identifiable personal details were recorded.  
Participants were also reminded of their right to withdraw and were told that if they did not 
wish to carry out the vote then they could simply submit their ballot paper blank in the 
envelope provided.  If they subsequently decided to withdraw their data, then they could 
do so easily by making a note of their seat number and contacting the researchers.  It was 
stressed that the activity was private and that their choice would not be revealed. 
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Four different versions of response sheets (refer to Appendix A1-A10) were 
randomly assigned to the participants to ensure the reliability of the data collected.  The 
response sheet served as their ballot paper, which included the seating plan for the lecture 
theatre (refer to Figure 5 for the seating plan).  Each participant was required to vote for a 
candidate that was another participant, (a) sitting in the same block and in the same row of 
seats, (b) sitting in the same block and (c) sitting anywhere in the lecture theatre. 
 
Observation from the voting activity.  The voting activity data was collected 
from two different batches of the first-year undergraduate Psychology students by using 
the same procedure.  However, the changes were made at the sequence of the questions 
and randomly distributed with different versions.  The participants seat numbers (i.e., 
participant’s position in the lecture theatre) and gender were noted.  Each position was 
denoted by a unique seat number with alphabets according to each row (i.e., total number 
of observed row was 21) in the lecture theatre layout, with the first row for all three blocks 
were left empty (i.e., with the exception for disabled students).  Table 14 shows the 
differences in row designated with different number of seating plan for two different 
batches.  Hence, the possible maximum range for the voting distance were from nine-
spaces away (N+8) to 15-spaces away (N+14) between the voter and the recipient.  
However, for this study, the maximum expected voting distance between voter and the 
recipient was corrected to 14-spaces away (N+13). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
166 
Table 14 
The Observed Seats Available for Each Row by Block in the Lecture Theatre 
Row by 
block 
 
2013/2014 2015/2016 
Seats 
A1 12 12 
A2 16 16 
A3 11 11 
B1 12 12 
B2 15 15 
B3 12 12 
C1 12 12 
C2 14 14 
C3 12 12 
D1 12 12 
D2 13 13 
D3 13 13 
E1 12 12 
E2 12 12 
E3 13 13 
F1 12 12 
F2 11 11 
F3 14 14 
G1 10 12* 
G2 10 10 
G3 14 14 
Note.  The letters represented the row and the blocks were represented by numbers (e.g. A 
= Row A, 1 = Block 1).  *The additional seats added in the lecture theatre at G1 for 
(2015/2016) batch.
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Expected voting pattern based on 14-AFC for participant in the same block in the 
same row.  The expected voting pattern was calculated by replicating the similar procedure 
as discussed in R1, by using rudimentary probability theory, in which, assuming each of 
the votes by the voter was always one over the available recipient’s distance from the 
voter.  For all the expected voting frequencies, its calculated by each row by block for each 
batch based on observed participants seating arrangement and voting valence (i.e., -5, -1, 0, 
+1 and +5).  
 
The expected frequencies were computed from each single position and added up 
to complete the overall expected frequencies for 449 participants to derive.  Table 15 
shows the expected frequencies calculated separately by each batch and each valence. 
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Table 15  
The Expected Frequencies for the Voting Activity by C
ohort 
  
 
C
ohort 
N
 
N
 + 1 
N
 + 2 
N
 + 3 
N
 + 4 
N
 + 5 
N
 + 6 
N
 + 7 
N
 + 8 
N
 + 9 
N
 + 10 
N
 + 11 
N
 + 12 
N
 + 13 
T
otal 
Positive 
2013/2014 
15.662 
14.061 
12.426 
11.091 
9.372 
7.681 
5.892 
4.497 
3.255 
2.064 
1.319 
0.271 
0.205 
0.138 
87.933 
2015/2016 
18.850 
16.875 
14.484 
12.181 
10.088 
8.536 
6.738 
5.334 
4.108 
2.697 
1.639 
0.605 
0.225 
0.071 
102.433 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
otal 
34.512 
30.937 
26.910 
23.272 
19.460 
16.217 
12.630 
9.831 
7.363 
4.761 
2.958 
0.877 
0.430 
0.210 
190.367 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
N
egative 
2013/2014 
17.507 
15.751 
13.987 
12.267 
10.433 
8.580 
6.965 
4.963 
3.271 
2.013 
0.963 
0.552 
0.410 
0.271 
97.933 
2015/2016 
20.816 
18.636 
16.339 
13.954 
12.025 
9.306 
7.282 
5.398 
3.871 
2.530 
1.280 
0.605 
0.368 
0.071 
112.483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
otal 
38.323 
34.388 
30.326 
26.221 
22.458 
17.886 
14.247 
10.362 
7.142 
4.544 
2.243 
1.158 
0.778 
0.343 
210.417 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
N
eutral 
2013/2014 
8.831 
7.920 
7.052 
5.838 
5.124 
4.399 
3.535 
2.664 
1.617 
0.582 
0.229 
0.138 
0.071 
0.000 
48.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
otal 
8.831 
7.920 
7.052 
5.838 
5.124 
4.399 
3.535 
2.664 
1.617 
0.582 
0.229 
0.138 
0.071 
0.000 
48.000 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
G
rand total 
81.667 
73.244 
64.288 
55.331 
47.042 
38.502 
30.413 
22.856 
16.121 
9.887 
5.430 
2.173 
1.279 
0.552 
448.783 
N
ote.  The positive and negative voting are the accum
ulation of +1, +5, 0, -1 and -5 respectively.  The overall total Exp. (expected) frequencies 
w
ere used to plot the expected voting pattern. 
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R2.4 Results 
 
The lecture based voting activity was designed to test if the NE occurred in a 
setting different to the WL game-show.  The results from the voting activity are presented 
in two parts to test for the effect of proximity and the effect of vote valence.  The effect of 
gender was not tested for and no predictions were made regarding gender. The opportunity 
sampling procedure used meant that the distribution of gender within the study was heavily 
weighted towards female participants (female participants were 75.724% from the overall 
combined sample 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts).  Given the distorted imbalance in the 
uneven distribution of gender in the lecture based studies; the failure to find significant 
gender biases in the 151-episode replication study of WL; and differences in seating 
configurations between the Lecture based and the 151-episode study; gender was not 
analysed as a main factor in the lecture based study. Descriptive analysis of gender based 
voting suggested that gender had no impact on voting. 
 
The effect of proximity.  The WL TV game-show demonstrated that NE was a 
significant effect of direct-neighbour(s) avoidance when the contestants were required to 
perform negative voting (Goddard et. al., 2011; Goddard, 2012; Goddard, Hylton, Parke & 
Noh, 2013).  For this study some of the key features of the WL TV game-show format were 
simulated to test for the NE in a different setting to the TV game-show.  R1 concluded that 
the unique conditions of the WL that give rise to the proximity based NE were: 
 
1. Negative vote:  The negative vote of WL was simulated by including a negative 
valence voting condition. 
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2. Uncertainty:  The key factor that was identified as contributing to the NE was the 
voter’s uncertainty regarding the identity of the WL.  When consensus was low 
regarding the identity of WL the NE proximity bias increased.  This study was 
designed so that there was maximum uncertainty about whom to vote for.  At least in 
the WL there was some TYPE I game-specific information or even TYPE III strategic-
based information.  However, in the lecture study there was no information or guidance 
of any kind regarding how to choose to allocate the vote. 
 
3. Voter-votee spatial relationship was clearly defined:  Both the WL and lecture study 
had a clearly defined spatial relationship that could be easily measured and recorded. 
 
Table 16 shows the calculated 𝜒2 for each voter-votee spatial relationship in the 
lecture theatre.  The analysis from the votes cast by each participant shows that (2013/2014 
and 2015/2016 cohorts), there was a significant association between the vote cast and the 
voter-votee spatial position, 𝜒2 (13, N=449) = 69.454, p < .001, small effect size, Cramer’s 
V = .109. 
 
In Figure 32 below, the observed (triangular) and the expected (square) votes were 
plotted according to the spatial relationship of voter-votee.  The analysis shows that, a 
similar pattern emerged in this study in comparison to the study from the WL (refer to 
R1.2 and R1.3).  Furthermore, the voting pattern shows the same distinctive phases (dotted 
line) as in the WL (refer to Figure 10.1 and 10.2).  The proximal phase (N to N+2), medial 
phase (N+3 to N+8) and the distal phase (N+9 to N+13).  Figure 33 below shows the same 
data split to show the 2013/2014 cohort and the 2015/2016 cohort. 
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Table 16  
The Overall 𝜒2 Value for Each Spatial Position for 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 Cohorts 
    
Spatial position Observed Expected 𝜒2 
N 58.000 81.667 6.859 
N + 1 42.000 73.244 13.328 
N + 2 44.000 64.288 6.402 
N + 3 63.000 55.331 1.063 
N + 4 59.000 47.042 3.040 
N + 5 73.000 38.502 30.910 
N + 6 36.000 30.413 1.027 
N + 7 31.000 22.856 2.902 
N + 8 23.000 16.121 2.935 
N + 9 10.000 9.887 .001 
N + 10 6.000 5.430 .060 
N + 11 3.000 2.173 .315 
N + 12 1.000 1.279 .061 
N + 13 .000 .552 .552 
    
Total 449.000 448.783 69.454 
Note.  The overall (i.e., positive, negative and neutral votes) observed and expected 
frequencies were derived from 449 participants from two different cohorts (i.e., 2013/2014 
and 2015/2016). 
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Figure 32.  O
verall vote frequency as a function of spatial proxim
ity. The proxim
al, m
edial and distal is sim
ilar as observed in R
1.2 and R
1.3 
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Figure 33.  O
verall vote frequency as a function of spatial proxim
ity for 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts
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 The effect of valence.  In addition, the NE was further investigated to test the 
association with voting valence.  In contrast to the WL study, this lecture study 
differentiated between positive and negative voting.  Table 17 shows the calculated 𝜒2 for 
each valence as a function of voter-votee spatial position.  The results show that, there was 
a significant association between voting and spatial position in negative voting (from 
2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts, see Figure 34), 𝜒2 (13, n = 211) = 50.169, p < .001, 
medium effect size, Cramer’s V = .135, and it shows that there was a significant 
association between voting and spatial position in positive 2015/2016 cohorts, see Figure 
37), 𝜒2 (13, n = 190) = 24.637, p = .026, small effect size, Cramer’s V = .100.  Whereas, 
for the neutral voting (i.e., as a control task, only from the 2013/2014 cohort, see Figure 
42), it also showed that there is a significant association between voting and spatial 
position, 𝜒2 (13, n = 48) = 40.810, p < .001, large effect size, Cramer’s V = .256. 
 
Figure 34 shows an overall negative voting pattern (from 2013/2014 and 
2015/2016), which is consistent with the voting pattern that was observed in the WL and 
for the overall voting pattern in this study, in which it was observed that, the participants 
were avoiding to cast negative votes towards other participants who were sitting the closest 
(N) to them.  Figure 35 below shows the same data separated for the two different cohorts. 
Both show significant associations between the negative vote frequency and spatial 
position (2013/2014 cohort, 𝜒2 (13, n = 98) = 33.839, p < .001, medium effect size, 
Cramer’s V = .163. and 2015/2016 cohort, 𝜒2 (13, n = 113) = 27.476, p <.01, medium 
effect size, Cramer’s V = .137).  A similar pattern was found in Figure 38 for the neutral 
voting, in which the participants also avoided the closest participants to receive a neutral 
vote.  However, it shows a sudden spike for the participants who were six-spaces (N+5) 
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away from them.  In contrast, Figure 36 below shows the overall positive voting 
frequencies, where the participants’ votes benefitted the recipients, plotted as a function of 
spatial proximity of the recipient (N = neighbour).  For comparison, Figure 37 shows the 
same data partitioned for each cohort (2013/2014 cohort, 𝜒2 (13, n = 88) = 17.494 p =.178 
and 2015/2016 cohort, 𝜒2 (13, N = 102) = 14.406, p = .346).  
 
Table 17  
The 𝜒2 Value for Each Spatial Position Over Voting Valences for 2013/2014 and 
2015/2016 Cohorts  
    
Spatial position Negative Positive Neutral 
N 15.438 .352 .908 
N + 1 5.212 4.606 4.425 
N + 2 2.286 2.950 1.321 
N + 3 2.308 .003 .004 
N + 4 4.054 .644 .247 
N + 5 8.205 11.713 16.816 
N + 6 1.586 .149 .081 
N + 7 1.277 .139 4.179 
N + 8 4.805 .055 .091 
N + 9 .467 .651 .300 
N + 10 3.389 1.296 .229 
N + 11 .021 1.439 .138 
N + 12 .778 .430 12.071 
N + 13 .343 .210 .000 
    
Total 50.169 24.637 40.810 
Note.  The 𝜒2 voting valences were derived from 211 participants for negative voting, 190 
participants for positive voting and 48 participants for the neutral voting. 
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Figure 34.  O
verall negative voting from
 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts. 
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Figure 35.  O
verall negative voting by different cohorts (2013/2014) and (2015/2016)  
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Figure 36.  O
verall positive voting from
 2013/2014 and 2015/2016 cohorts 
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Figure 37.  O
verall positive voting by different cohorts (2013/2014) and (2015/2016)
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Figure 38.  N
eutral voting from
 2013/2014 cohort
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Further observations on positive voting in the 2013/2014 lecture study.  Figure 39 
and 40, below, show the positive and negative valence voting respectively for the 
2013/2014 cohort only. The vote magnitude changed (either +1/+5; -1/-5), which means, at 
+5, the recipient received higher chances to participate in the prize draw.  For votes that 
carried a value of +1, the 𝜒2 test shows that there is no significant association between the 
vote valence and the spatial position, 𝜒2 (13, n = 45) = 16.575, p = .219.  Likewise, when 
the vote carried a value of +5, the result shows that there is no significant association 
between the vote at +5 with the spatial position, 𝜒2 (13, n =43) = 9.748, p = .714.  
Whereas, for the negative voting in 2013/2014 cohort, Figure 40 presents the votes which 
carries -1 and -5.  For the votes that carries -5, it lesser chances in contrast to -1, for the 
recipient to be nominated as the candidate for the prize draw.  For the vote that contributes 
to -1, the 𝜒2 test shows that there is no significant association between the vote valence and 
the spatial position, 𝜒2 (13, n =49) = 21.972, p = .058.  However, for the votes that gives -
5, it shows that there is a significant association with the vote valence and the spatial 
position, 𝜒2 (13, n = 49) = 23.962, p = .033, medium effect size, Cramer’s V = .194. 
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Figure 39. Positive voting at +1 and +5 valences in 2013/2014 cohort 
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Figure 40. N
egative voting at +1 and +5 valences in 2013/2014 cohort
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R2.5 Discussion 
 
This study is important for several reasons.  Firstly, it replicates the NE that was 
originally shown in the voting patterns of contestants on the WL TV game-show (Goddard 
et al., 2011; Goddard, 2012; Goddard et. al., 2013).  The contestants on the WL game-
show significantly avoided doing a nasty thing to their direct spatial neighbour(s), by not 
voting for them as the weakest player.  However, the replication in the lecture study was in 
some ways even more surprising because, whereas the votes cast in the WL were open and 
public, in the lecture study votes were closed and private. 
 
A limitation of the WL field experiment was the lack of control over key variables 
and conditions.  This study, however, included the scenario where the students’ selection 
of a peer carried a positive outcome rather than just the negative outcome in WL.  When 
the student participants were asked to do a nice thing towards someone along the same 
row, they tended to favour their direct spatial neighbour(s) when it was seen as conferring 
a positive benefit.  This is a particularly important finding as it shows that the neighbour 
effect (NE) is not simply a bias in making spatial selections per se, rather it changes with 
the positive/negative valence of the outcome. 
 
At a cognitive level the voting behaviour in the WL and this study can be 
considered in terms of them utilising two sources of information to make their decision and 
cast their vote.  Firstly, there is the primary source, of open public information that 
everybody has access to and can be used to make a rational informed decision.  For 
example, in the WL this would be the performance of the contestants answering questions. 
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If one contestant repeatedly makes errors responding to questions but all their fellow 
contestants make no errors, then the decision is simple.  However, when this information is 
equivocal, uncertain and ambiguous, then the secondary source of information based on 
intuition is used.  This is private, individual, subjective and prone to bias.  This secondary 
source of information comes to the fore, when the primary source is not reliable.  It 
suggests that in the WL, and in this lecture study, that the NE comes about when the 
contestants and student participants have to make decisions when there is a limited primary 
source of information on which to base their judgement.  Under these conditions, error 
prone, biased intuition dominated objective decision criteria.  This NE is an underlying 
bias in decision-making that is part of this secondary source of information.  This is akin to 
Kahneman (2011) fast and slow thinking in decision-making and it concurs with bounded 
rationality theory (Simon, 1955), where the decision maker’s rationality is limited by 
information processing capacities and access to information. 
 
When the valence of the vote is negative it can be considered as in some way 
punishing the receiver.  This places the voter in a dilemma especially if they operate a ‘do-
no-harm’ principle (Baron, 1995), where participants will be reluctant to harm others.  It 
seems that they avoid meting out punishment to their direct-neighbour(s) possibly through 
fear of retaliation.  On the other hand, when the valence of the vote is positive it can be 
considered as a kind of gift to be bestowed on a valued individual (e.g., Bell, 1991).  In this 
case the NE disappears and the neighbour is once again favoured.  Nevertheless, the effect 
was asymmetric being far stronger in the negative rather than the positive valence scenario.  
This suggests that the participants’ fairness norm was stronger in the negative valence 
condition compared to the positive valence condition, whereby the participants were 
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favouring the negative recipient(s) by avoiding doing bad thing towards them (Leliveld, 
van Beest, van Dijk, & Tenbrunsel, 2009). 
 
As opposed to the WL TV game-show, that involved with public open voting and 
high stakes, in this study, the NE was also tested with comparatively low stakes.  As the 
voting activity incorporated positive as well as negative voting valences, it concurs the 
observation by Kocher et al. (2008) and Fehr et al. (2014) which suggested that the stakes 
level does not affect the decision-makers behaviour.  In which, for this study, the behaviour 
of avoidance to penalize their direct-neighbour(s) in a negative voting valence regardless of 
the stakes size were consistent. 
 
Thus, it suggests that the NE occurred as an implicit bias in decision-making, 
probably working at an unconscious level and possibly arising as a reluctance to engage in 
actions that could potentially result in conflict with those most nearest to them.  Therefore, 
both predictions relating to proximity bias and valence were supported. 
 
However, studies have consistently shown that, the NE is a bias in decision-making 
and question has been raised, if this bias existed as result of conflict avoidance to those 
who nearest in proximity (at N).  Hence, the next study seeks to address the robustness of 
the NE, if the participants were given the choices to either cooperate or defect those who is 
closest in proximity (at N and N+1) in a form of experimental game. 
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Chapter R3 
Testing the Neighbour Effect using Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
R3.1 Chapter Outline 
 
R2 demonstrated another compelling neighbour effect (NE) that emerged in a field 
experiment set in a lecture theatre.  Its success prompted the design of this experiment.  If 
the NE can be demonstrated in a simple voting behaviour on WL and in a lecture could it 
also have an impact on a well-established classic scenario like the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD).  
 
This chapter is presented in four sections: a general introduction that focuses on the 
PD perspective to understand the NE, the elaboration of the methods, results and 
discussion.  
 
 
R3.1 Chapter outline 
R3.2 Introduction 
R3.3 Methods 
R3.4 Results 
R3.3 Discussion 
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Abstract.  The neighbour effect (NE) is a bias in social decision-making exhibited 
by actors that (usually) favours their direct-spatial-neighbours rather than non-neighbours.  
The NE was tested using participants seated in a lecture theatre (N = 229) by getting them 
to play a closed form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Participants had to choose whether 
to cooperate or defect with either their direct-spatial-neighbours or non-neighbours.  The 
result showed that, the participants were significantly more cooperative with their lateral 
(left/right) direct-spatial-neighbour(s) than non-neighbours.  However, the participants 
became significantly less cooperative with their longitudinal (front/back) direct-spatial-
neighbour(s) than their non-neighbours, χ2 (1) = 7.376, p = .007.  Therefore, NE is not just 
a bias based on simple spatial proximity but is based on the relative lateral/longitudinal 
positioning of actors. 
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R3.2 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the exploration of the neighbour effect (NE) in a form of PD 
game format to understand the extent of the NE in a cooperative social interaction.  The 
participants (i.e., players) were prompted to choose either to cooperate or defect with 
another player with the goal to maximize their utility: to earn as many points as possible.  
 
Demonstration and the replication studies in R1.2 and R1.3 established that the NE 
is a profound bias in decision-making.  The contestants of the WL TV game-show 
significantly avoided penalizing their direct-neighbour(s) when they were called to identify 
one of the contestants to be the WL (Goddard et al. 2011; Goddard, 2012).  In addition, R2 
demonstrated the effect of vote valence (i.e., negative and positive voting).  A vote that 
carried negative consequences to the recipients (i.e., another recipient) showed the 
consistent proximity-voting pattern as observed in the observations of WL in R1.2.  
However, a positive vote for a recipient demonstrated that the voter favoured the closest 
recipients.  Hence, this study was designed to contest the notion that the NE is a bias in 
decision-making when the obvious proximity exists.  
 
Gardin, Kaplan, Firestone and Cowan (1973) suggest that, there was a significant 
association between positive cooperation with proximity when the participants were seated 
at proximal side-by-side when the visibility was blocked.  Their study used PD to examine 
the effect of the seating arrangement and other attributes such as, visual contact, attitude 
and approach-avoidance tendencies.  In their method, 80 male participants were assigned 
randomly into pairs up to 10 pairs for each condition (i.e., four conditions of the payoff 
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values:5/5, 0/6, 0/0, 1/1).  The game was repeated in 50 trials for each condition.  In the 
session, the participants were assigned to be seated either side-by-side or across-table 
seating condition.  During the session, dividers were used as barriers in some of the 
conditions.  Prior to begin the session, the participants were instructed to accumulate as 
many point as possible and there was no constraint to confront each other either in extreme 
cooperation or competition.  At the end of the session, the participants were asked to 
answer a questionnaire on their response to the session, and the earning was distributed (10 
points = $0.10) and participants were debriefed.  Their study suggested that, the 
participants were more likely to cooperate with the absence of the barrier when the 
participants were seated across, but less likely to cooperate when they were seated next to 
each other.  However, a reverse pattern was observed when there was a barrier.  The 
participants who were seated next to each other tended to cooperate more than those who 
were seated across from each other.  In the other condition, as in approach avoidance and 
interpersonal attitude, in both conditions where the participants were seated across from 
each other, with no barrier, showed a positive pattern.  Gardin et.al’s study was important 
as it shows an effect of seating arrangement on cooperative behaviour.  However, they also 
noted that the participants’ responses to questionnaires neglected any mention of the 
seating arrangement. This suggests that the effect of the participants seating was 
endogenous and implicit. 
 
 De Heus, Hoogervorst and Van Dijk (2010) investigated the effect of positive and 
negative valence payoffs in Prisoner’s dilemma and the Chicken game.  They argued that, 
to understand risky choices in social dilemmas, either to cooperate or defect, it was vital to 
have clear ‘risky’ options.  Participants (N=198) were recruited for a 2 x 2 game format 
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(see Figure 41 that shows the pay-offs structure presented to the participants) where they 
were presented with either the Prisoner’s dilemma or the Chicken game with framing 
between gain versus loss (valence).  The participants were allocated to separate cubicles 
equipped with PCs, they were instructed that all communication, to the experimenter and 
other participants, must be through the PC, hence proximity was not measured in relation 
to understanding the valences in social dilemmas. Participants completed questionnaires to 
measure risk orientation and were informed that they would be involved in a game with 
another participant to win lottery tickets, which they would give them a chance to win a 
voucher worth €20 (approximately £17).  The participants played a one-shot game (i.e., 
Prisoner’s dilemma or Chicken game) where they chose between A (cooperation) or B 
(defection). 
 
Differences were found between how the two dilemmas were played out and this 
was attributed to the clearer payoff structure in the chicken game with regard to risk.   
Participants with a tendency for risk showed greater willingness to take risks by playing B 
(defection) in the Chicken game relative to Prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
The effect of valence was clearer in the Chicken game than in the PD, where the 
participants perceived a defection was riskier choices as in the Chicken game.  In the 
Chicken game, the positive valence (gain) was considered as a cooperative choice than in 
negative valence (loss) compared to PD game where it showed insignificant framing effect 
towards both valences.  Hence, from this study, it was suggested that, to understand risk 
taking behaviour, clearer options and alternative valences of choices should be presented.  
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Figure 41.  The gain-frame and loss-frame pay-off structures for the Prisoner’s dilemma 
and the Chicken game.  The pay-off matrix is reprinted from “Framing prisoners and 
chickens: Valence effects in the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game” P. de Heus, N. 
Hoogervorst and E. van Dijk, 2010, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 737-
742. Copyright (2010) by Elsevier Inc. 
 
 In a more recent study, McCall and Singer (2015) suggested that, there is a 
significant relationship between proxemic images and unfairness behaviour.  In their study, 
they investigated four different tasks (i.e., Prisoner’s Dilemma game, memory task in 
virtual environment, punishment task and post-task questionnaire).  In the PD game, the 
participants were asked to play the game on a computer and each player was represented as 
an avatar.  The task was played by three players (i.e., the participant become an avatar, two 
other players were avatars created by the experimenter) in each session where prior to the 
session, the first player was given 10 monetary units, in which the player can decide either 
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to keep or to transfer to the second player.  Participants were led to believe that one of the 
players (e.g., the player B) was always the first player and for each round, the other players 
were chosen to be the second player.  The next task was also tested in a virtual 
environment for a memory task where the participants were told that, towards the end of 
the task, they will be quizzed to test their memory.  For this task, the participants were 
geared up with the head-mounted display and they were lead into the virtual world.  In the 
virtual environment, two other players were stood in the room and the participants were led 
to believe that the other players were located in separate rooms. 
 
The task involved looking at images and green dots for approximately three 
minutes.  In the third task, they were asked to play monetary punishment whereby, for each 
contribution made, the other player will be punished by losing their monetary unit.  The 
final task, was to rate their liking towards of the other two players.  To ensure that there 
was no manipulation, McCall and Singer validated that, the fairness manipulation was 
perceived as a salient behaviour where they run a simple t-test to confirm the fairness.  
Another prominent finding in their study was the pattern of gaze: the high punisher tended 
to lock gaze with the other two players more than the low punisher.  Yet, it could be 
argued, that the pattern observed in this study existed merely due to lack of real interaction 
between participants and the players due to the context of the study done in a virtual world.  
Hence, they highlighted that, for future research to explore whether the participants were 
able to distinguish differences between the known proxemic pattern, which could affect the 
social interaction and to further the investigation with nonverbal cues. 
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Hence, this study was designed to challenge the limitation of the aforementioned 
studies and also to understand the proximal effect in NE.  It is believed that, such 
behaviour could also exist in a perception of self-interest, the ideal concept could be 
derived from the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).  In PD, the concept of rationality could affect 
an individual’s choice when presented with options to either cooperate or defect with each 
other.  
  
Aim, Objectives and Hypotheses.  The aim for this study was to challenge the 
notion of the NE as a spatial bias in the context of the PD’s game.  It is assumed that if 
players are rational then they should seek to maximize utility and play the Nash 
equilibrium by defecting, the unique solution for the game.  However, if, neighbours are 
swayed by the NE then they might opt to cooperate.  Hence, to achieve the aim of this 
study, the objectives of this study were; 
 
1. To test whether the endogenous factor of the NE (derived from previous studies) 
extends to choices in PD.  
2. To test the association between cooperation and defection (i.e., endogenous factors) in 
NE. 
 
 Therefore, several assumptions were made based on the PD model (Figure 42) to 
understand the voter dilemma, which in this context is the player Y, while the recipient is 
player X.  The payoff matrix was extended from the original version (see Figure 2) by Tucker 
(1983) and the pay-off matrix in De Heus et al., 2010 (see Figure 41), in which it follows 
the rank of T > R > P > S. 
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  Player X   heads (H) tails (T) 
Player Y heads (H) (3, 3) RR (0, 5) ST 
  tails (T) (5, 0) TS  (1, 1) PP 
 
Figure 42.  The pay-off matrix for the coin’s game.  The first number in the brackets gives 
player Y’s payoff and the second number gives player X’s. 
 
Assumption 1.  (Reward, R) 
If player Y decides to play H with player X, with assumption that the player X plays H, the 
accumulate point is six. 
 
Assumption 2.  (Temptation, T) 
If player Y decides to play T with player X, with assumption that the player X plays H, the 
accumulate point is five. 
 
Assumption 3.  (Punishment, P) 
If player Y decides to play T with player X, with assumption that the player X plays T the 
accumulate point is two. 
 
Assumption 4.  (Sucker, S) 
If player Y decides to play H with player X, with assumption that the player X plays T, the 
accumulate point is five. 
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Therefore, in this pay-off matrix, the optimal strategy for the player Y is to play T 
in which, for any situation given with assumption that, the player X might defect by 
playing T, the player Y will always be better off and earn better points, five (SW) and one 
(SE) respectively.  In addition, if the player Y trusts the player X, the dominant strategy is 
by playing H.  Thus, given four assumptions of the strategies that can deployed by the 
player Y with regards the proximity and outcome from the payoff, the hypotheses were; 
 
1. The null hypothesis (H0) suggested that, there is no association between the player Y’s 
strategy and spatial proximity. 
 
2. The first alternative hypothesis (H1) predicted that, the player Y will be more likely to 
play H with player X who is closer in proximity. 
 
3. Second hypothesis (H2) suggested that, the player Y will be more likely to play H with 
player X who is closer in proximity with high visibility. 
 
Thus, the following section presents the method in this study to test the association 
between the NE and the spatial proximity in the context of PD game. 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                          
197 
R3.3 Method 
 
Participants.  First-year Psychology undergraduates (N = 229; Female = 182, 
Male = 30, Undisclosed = 17; 2014/2015 cohort; age between 18 to 46 years old), were 
recruited at their orientation lecture during their first induction week at the University 
(refer to M1.4 p. 67, for the setting and participants).  Table 18 presents the participants’ 
gender and age group recruited for this study. 
 
Table 18 
The Participants’ Demographics (n=229) for Cohort 2014/2015 
 
Characteristic n % 
Gender   
 Female 182 79.476% 
 Male 30 13.100% 
 Undisclosed 17 7.424% 
Age   
 18 - 24 214 93.450% 
 25 - 34 4 1.747% 
 35 - 44 5 2.183% 
 45 - 54 2 0.873% 
 Undisclosed 4 1.747% 
Note.  67% of the participants were 18 years old.  Participants were informed that they have 
a right not to disclose their gender and age.  
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Procedure.  For this study, the participants were asked to participate in an activity, 
which required them to play a classic Coins game (a simple version of PD).  The task took 
approximately 10 minutes to complete including introduction and debrief.  The rules of the 
games and the procedure were explained in general in M1.4. 
 
The goal of the Coins Game (CG) activity required participants to score as many 
points as possible in three simple games.  The participants had to choose either H or T 
(denoting Heads or Tails on a coin) by circling the answer on their response sheet for 
Game 1 and Game 2.  For Game 3 in which the participants were required to write either H 
or T to play against another player X.  They were shown the four permutations for 
cooperation/defection (refer to Figure 42 for the CG payoff matrix) and they had to decide 
the best strategy to play (participants were required to score as many points as possible 
when playing against another player for the three games, and the scores were averaged 
out).  The task was performed secretly without the knowledge of the other participant 
(player X).  Table 19, shows the original payoff matrix (refer to Appendix C1 to C6) 
presented to the participants.  
 
Table 19  
Original Table Score Presented in the Response Sheet 
 
you them your score their score  Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
Note.  This is the original table that was given to the participants on the response sheet (refer 
to Appendix C)  
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For the task, the participants (always player Y) played three games with another 
participant (player X) potentially seated at, (a) the same block of the lecture theatre and in 
the same row of seats, (b) the same block of the lecture theatre and one row at the front and 
back and (c) within the lecture theatre, either as their direct-neighbour(s) or their two-
spaces away neighbour(s).  
 
Six different versions (refer to Appendix C1 to C6) were randomly allocated (in 
sealed envelopes) to the participants.  Table 20 shows the distribution of the completed 
form (response sheet) when the participants completed all the required questions (two 
screening questions, Game 1, 2 and 3, refer to Appendix C1 to C6).  The collected data 
were counted and coded accordingly based on the type of the question (refer to M1.4) 
 
Table 20  
The Distributions of the Coin Game Response Sheet 
 
Version (v) Participants 
1 42 
1r 40 
2 39 
2r 37 
3 34 
3r 37 
  
Total 229 
Note.  Each version indicates the player X position for Game 1 and Game 2 (refer to 
Appendix C1 to C6 for the full versions).  
 
 
 The following diagrams (Figure 43, 44 and 45) illustrate the three versions of the 
spatial arrangements (lateral, longitudinal, and their combination) and their 
counterbalanced mirrors.     
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Figure 43.  Diagram of version 1 and version 1r with the seat arrangement in the lecture 
theatre.  Consider Player Y in seat number 111, receiving version 1. For Game 1, Player Y 
has an option to play against Player X seated either at 110 or 112.  In Game 2, Player Y can 
play against Player X seated either at 109 or 113.  Version 1r is the counterbalanced mirror.  
 
Version 1r 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away to your left 
and right (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away from you, to 
your left and right (your direct-neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Version 1 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away from you, to 
your left and right (your direct-neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away to your left 
and right (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
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Figure 44.  As Figure 43 above. In version 2, Player Y has an option to play against Player 
X seated either at 110, 112, 148 or 74 in Game 1.  In Game 2, Player Y as an option to play 
against Player X seated either at 109, 113, 186 or 37.  Version 2r is the counterbalance. 
 
Version 2 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away from you, to 
your left and right, front and back (your direct-neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away to your left 
and right, front and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Version 2r 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away to your left 
and right, front and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away from you, to 
your left and right, front and back (your direct-neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
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Figure 45 as Figure 43 illustrates the possible option opted by participants (Player 
Y) when they received the instruction for version 3 and 3r.         
 
 
 
Figure 45.  As Figure 43 above. In version 3, Player Y has an option to play against Player 
X seated either at 148 or 74 in Game 1.  In Game 2, Player Y can play against Player X 
seated either at 186 or 37.  Version 3r is the counterbalance. 
 
Version 3 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away from you, to 
your front and back (your direct-neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away to your front 
and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Version 3r 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away to your front 
and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away from you, to 
your front and back (your direct-neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
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 Expected Frequencies for playing H and/or T.   Given the assumption that the 
probability of the player Y plays H with assumption that, they strategized for the optimal 
strategy to collect six points, there is a probability that player X will defect by playing T.  
Figure 46 illustrates the pathway of player Y strategies to achieve the optimal payoff. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46.  Illustrates player Y pathway to play against player X. To optimize own gain, 
player Y has one optimal strategy, provided player Y thinks that player X will cooperate 
and vice versa.  
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R3.4 Results  
 
The results are in two parts.  First, the analysis to test the NE is presented and then 
the second part tested the association between NE and the direction of spatial relationship.  
Given the unequal distribution of gender described in the lecture based voting activities 
previously (see p 168) gender was not studied as an independent variable in this section 
either (F=182; M=30 of those that expressed gender). In the screening questions, 
participants were asked to demonstrate their understanding of the game’s rules, which 
showed that the majority (from fairly well and well) of the participants (79.039%) out from 
229 participants expressed that, they understood the instruction either fairly well or well in 
comparison to 2.183% responded that, they had either not understood the game and 
instruction at all or not very well.  The participants’ knowledge on the activity by response 
rate were presented in Figure 47.  In general, the majority of the participants were well-
informed on how to play the CG.  In addition, the participants were asked on their choices 
if, (a) the opponent played H and (b) the opponent played T.  The questions were asked to 
understand their judgement on how they would respond to maximize the overall points to 
score.  Figure 48 shows how the participants responded.  The rational strategy was that 
they should play T in both situations to maximize their payoffs (see Table 19, for the pay-
off table).  By going through these questions it was shown to the participants explicitly 
what the best strategy was to play the game.  These questions tested that they had 
understood this explanation.  The findings showed that the participants (Player Y), will 
choose to play T regardless the strategy played by Player X (see Figure 48).   
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Based on the choices made by each individual, it was assumed that maximizing the 
payoffs would be the rational decision in a situation either to defect or cooperate with 
another individual whilst performing the choices privately (Gottman, 2011).  Further 
analysis shows that, 89.083% of the participants were consistent in their choices in both 
Game 1 and Game 2, where 93.627% of the participants chosen to play T in both 
scenarios. 
 
 
 
Figure 47.  Participants’ knowledge about the activity 
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Figure 48.  Participants’ response against their opponent’s choices 
 
 
 
Finding 1:  The player Y will be more likely to play H with player X who is closer 
in proximity.  The previous studies (R1 and R2) established that the NE exists when 
individuals were required to make choices that could affect others.  The behaviour was most 
profound when the individuals were required to punish another individual (Goddard et al., 
2011; Goddard, 2012; Goddard et al., 2013; Noh et al., 2014).  Hence, the main analysis for 
this study was to understand the extent of the NE in the context of a non-cooperative game, 
to determine whether the NE bias exists in a form of cooperation.  In Game 3 the participants 
were asked to choose how to play the CG with their direct-spatial neighbour(s) in a lateral 
(left/right) position and somebody else, which we identified as player X (refer to Appendix  
C1 to C6).  The participants were required to make a choice as to who they play H with and 
who to play T.  Figure 49 shows that 65.066% of 229 participants were more likely to play 
H with their direct-neighbour(s) instead of somebody else in the lecture theatre.  From the 
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payoffs matrix in Figure 42, by playing H, the player indicated that, they would cooperate 
with their direct-neighbour(s) instead of somebody else, which shows NE in expression to 
avoid penalising their direct-neighbour(s). 
 
Thus, we would like to explore if NE has significant differences if the direct-spatial 
neighbour(s) were individual in a lateral (left/right), longitudinal (front/back) and lateral 
and longitudinal (left/right and front/back) proximity. 
 
  
Figure 49.  Response rate as a function of recipients’ position. The response was made by 
the player Y when plays H against the player X. 
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Finding 2: The player Y will be more likely to play T with player X who is closer 
in proximity with high visibility. The earlier analysis showed that the NE was most 
profound, when the neighbour(s) were at the lateral (left/right) position than somebody else 
in the lecture theatre (Finding 1).  Which as the player, the participants were avoiding to 
defect their direct-spatial neighbour (s) by playing H.  Hence, in consideration of Game 1 
and Game 2, the analysis aimed to distinguish if the proximity does affect NE, if the 
participants were given an option to play with participants either at lateral (left/right), 
longitudinal (front/back) position or both (lateral and longitudinal). 
 
Figure 50 shows that participants were more likely to play T with player X at the 
lateral position in contrast to the longitudinal position (χ2 (1, n = 153) = 7.380, p = .007, 
small effect size, Cramer’s V = 0.220).  The analysis indicated that the participants were 
more likely willing to take a risk of defecting their lateral neighbour (s) rather than than 
their longitudinal neighbour (s). 
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Figure 50.  Vote frequency as a function of spatial proximity when player X is at lateral, 
longitudinal and both (lateral and longitudinal) positions. 
 
In Figure 51.1 (upper panel), the result shows that the participants were more likely 
to play T with their direct-neighbour(s) at lateral position (52.439%) and at longitudinal 
position (67.606%), compared to when their direct spatial neighbour(s) were at the both 
position (46.053%).  And similar pattern was observed at longitudinal and both (lateral and 
longitudinal) position for indirect-neighbour (s) (see Figure 51.2, lower panel) for 
neighbour(s), in which the participants were more likely to play T with indirect-
neighbour(s) two spaces away, 61.972 % and 63.158% respectively.  However, when the 
participants were asked to play against neighbour(s) who were at the lateral position, the 
result show (Figure 51.2, lower panel) that participants were more likely to play H with the 
indirect-neighbour two spaces away, 52.439%. 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Head Tail
Overall Vote (Head/Tail) as a function of 
Spatial Proximity
Lateral Longitudinal Lateral and Longitudinal
  
 
 
                                                          
210 
 
 
Figures 51.1 and 51.2.  Vote frequency for as a function of spatial proximity. Figure 51.1 
(upper panel) shows the direct-neighbour(s), while Figure 51.2 (lower panel) shows the 
indirect-neighbour(s). 
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R3.5 Discussion 
 
This study was designed to test the neighbour effect (NE) in a context where there 
was likely to be a self-interest conflict against the observed spatial proximity bias.  
Participants had to choose either to cooperate or defect (play H or T) with other players 
that were their neighbour(s).  The study showed significant NE when the participants had 
to pick another participant to cooperate with to gain a bigger payoff as a team, where they 
would likely to play H with their neighbour(s).  This suggested that, the participants 
demonstrated a sympathetic equilibrium with the other player by choosing to cooperate 
even though, by playing H, the probability to lose is 50% (Sally, 2001).  Approximately, 
54.148% of the participants commented that their choices were either random or made by 
calculating the possible outcome that gave them a bigger payoff.  
 
The NE is put forward as a bias where individual tends to avoid penalizing another 
individual.  It is argued that, the differences in the physical settings (lateral/longitudinal 
positioning of individual) could affect the interaction order in which the proxemics bias 
might exist (Goffman, 1983; Hall, Birdwhistell, Bock, Bohannan, Diebold, 
Durbin,…Vayda, 1968).  
 
The results show that, the NE was significantly associated with lateral (left/right) 
proximity more than longitudinal (front/back) proximity.  Hence, it recommended that, the 
spatial proximity based on the positioning is vital to determine the level of cooperation 
with their neighbour(s).  The participants were more associated with the NE when it was 
proximal side-by-side and closer in the seating arrangement against the position where 
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there was relatively low visual contact as in the longitudinal (front/back) position.  In 
which contradicted the study done by Gardin et al. (1973) who suggested that there was a 
significant association between the level of interaction and level of visibility. However, for 
the proximal lateral condition it was always explicit which players were neighbours, but in 
the longitudinal conditions there was some ambiguity over the exact neighbour for players 
in the central block. This is unlikely to account for the difference between lateral and 
longitudinal NEs.   
 
Thus, the significant association between NE and spatial proximity means that the 
null hypothesis that there would be no association between the Voter’s strategy and spatial 
proximity is rejected.  Therefore, it is suggested that the Voter will be more likely to play 
H with player X who is closer in proximity with high visibility. 
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Chapter 4 
Discussion 
 
The Discussion section comprises four main parts (D1.2, D1.3, D1.4 and D1.5) 
which summarized the results from the three main studies, evaluation of the main 
contributions, discussion on the limitation and suggestions for future study. 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                          
214 
D.1: General Discussion  
 
D1.1 Chapter Outline 
 
The starting point for this thesis was an observation of a proximity bias in the rather 
unlikely setting of a TV game-show.  Thereafter the thesis aimed to verify the original 
observation and test its portability.  This chapter gives a summary and evaluation of the 
main findings and contributions that can be gleaned.  Limitations are discussed and 
speculations for future research proposed. 
 
D.1.1 Chapter Outline 
D.1.2 Summary of the Results 
D.1.3 Evaluation of Main Contributions 
D.1.4 Limitations 
D.1.5 Suggestions for Future Study 
D.1.6 Conclusion 
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D1.2 Summary of the results 
 
The two principal objectives were:- 
1. To demonstrate/re-validate/replicate/extend the original observations of the 
neighbour effect using observations of the Weakest Link TV game-show to 
investigate the endogenous and exogenous factors in voting. 
and, 
2. To test the validity and reliability of the observations from 1. by finding other 
scenarios where the neighbour effect can be tested.  
 
The subsidiary objectives were conditional on 1. And 2., 
3. To test whether neighbour effect occurs with positive vote as well as negative vote 
(i.e., exogenous factors) in the Weakest Link 
 
4. To assess neighbour effect on tasks involving strategy (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
 
Objective 1.  To demonstrate/re-validate/replicate/extend the original 
observations of the neighbour effect using observations of the Weakest Link TV game-
show to investigate the endogenous and exogenous factors in voting. 
 
Objective 1 was addressed in chapter R1. The original neighbour effect (NE) was 
demonstrated/re-validated and replicated.  The original observations were also extended 
by introducing gender into the analysis.  The original observations of Goddard et al. (2011) 
were one-dimensional by focusing only on proximity and not taking into account the 
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observations showing gender discrimination from studies by experimental economists.  
Once gender was introduced as a factor it was shown to make a significant impact on the 
contestants voting behaviour. 
 
The original 72-episode study was reanalysed.  This confirmed the original 
demonstration of the proximity/NE.  A more substantial 151-episode study was required 
though because the reanalysis threw up a hitherto unexplained gender effect.  The 
explanation for the gender effect remained obscure because the original study had failed to 
record contestants’ accuracy fielding questions on the Weakest Link (WL) game-show.  
The replication resolved this issue by showing no difference in question accuracy between 
female and male contestants.  The gender effect from the original study was not replicated 
but a different gender effect emerged that showed females and males were more likely to 
vote against males.  This appeared to be taste-based discrimination because otherwise, at 
least based on their (male and female) ability to answer questions, there was no other 
obvious difference between genders.  The source of the gender discrimination found in the 
original 72-episode study has not been resolved. 
 
Objective 2.  To test the validity and reliability of the observations from 1. By 
finding other scenarios where the neighbour effect can be tested.  
 
If the interesting observation of the NE seen in the WL was to have any real 
significance, outside of the rather narrow academic community of WL scholars, then it 
needed to be shown as a bias that had a more universal impact on human social behaviour 
and decision-making.  One aspect of WL that made it so special for researchers was that 
the particulars of the game format happened upon precisely the right conditions to expose 
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the psychological biases in voting that would ordinarily remain hidden.  R2 described the 
field experiment based on a lecture study voting activity.  It was designed carefully to 
simulate some of the key features of WL that were postulated to nourish the NE.  Chief 
among these key factors was uncertainty.  Consensus studies from WL showed that once 
contestants become unsure whom to vote against then any bias, like NE or similar would 
be more likely to sprout.  The uncertainty surrounding whom to vote for in the lecture 
study was massive because they were given no useful information as to whom to vote for. 
In the absence of any reliable game-specific situational information, participants had only 
their unreliable, dispositional hunches to go by.  This latter source of information included 
the proximity bias responsible for the NE.  
 
That the field experiment yielded such a compelling NE was a genuine surprise. 
Due to its scale, pilot studies were not possible beforehand and each field experiment was 
a major event in itself.  Great effort was made to ensure that participants were unlikely to 
know other people in the lecture.  This was the first major induction and orientation event 
that the students had been exposed to.  Even if some early friendships had been forged and 
groups turned up together their random allocation to their unique seats made it unlikely 
that they would be seated by acquaintances.  This random allocation went beyond the non-
random contestants’ configuration in WL.  Although the study was designed to mimic the 
uncertainty in the low consensus WL voting rounds, any effect was predicted to be most 
likely masked by other factors.  Also given the low stakes and relative insignificance of the 
task at hand to participants, made it seem unlikely that voting patterns would be anything 
other than noisy random picks.  Certainly not the clear tri-phase pattern that mirrored the 
phenomenon from WL almost perfectly.  
  
 
 
                                                          
218 
 This observation of NE was probably the most important finding in the thesis.  It 
meant that the proximity bias in WL was not merely a symptom of the TV game-show, 
rather it was more likely to be a universal facet of human social life, at least in the UK. 
Furthermore, embedded within the field experiment of the voting activity was the solution 
to the third objective, because now the NE could be created outside WL it could also be 
manipulated and probed.  
 
Objective 3.  To test whether neighbour effect occurs with positive votes as well as 
negative votes (i.e., exogenous factors) in Weakest Link 
 
The field experiment of the voting activity produced potentially the second most 
important finding in the thesis as well as the most important.  The possibility remained that 
the powerful NE recorded in the WL, and the field experiment, might be a fundamental 
bias associated with picking from any choice menu, irrespective of its type or valence.  For 
example, consider what would happen if the negative vote made by WL contestants was 
replaced with a positive vote: voting for the SL rather than the WL.  If the NE was a 
simple, generic, automatic voting effect then the same pattern would be seen, an NE and 
avoidance for picking the neighbour as SL.  If, however, the NE was an avoidance for 
doing something ”bad” to their direct-neighbours then switching the vote valence from 
“bad” to “good” should eliminate, or even reverse, the NE, as neighbours are chosen.  This 
enabled a clear distinction to be made in the predicted outcome. 
 
As it turned out, the change in vote valence from negative to positive eliminated the 
NE.  It seemed that the proximity bias, the NE, was a reluctance to do something bad or 
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“nasty” to a neighbour.  Whether this was borne out because of altruism or a fear of 
retribution was not resolved.  The important thing about this observation though, is that the 
implicit, unconscious NE, was sensitive to the valence of the vote.  It is almost as if there is 
an implicit ‘do no harm’ (to the neighbour) principle.  This could form the foundation for a 
built in automatic bias for pro-social behaviour.    
 
Objective 4.  To assess neighbour effect on tasks involving strategy (e.g., 
Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
 
The second subsidiary objective was to test whether the NE extended to judgments 
other than voting.  This was assessed in R3 detailing the second field experiment.  The 
findings confirmed that participants played the PD game in a significantly different way 
with direct-neighbours rather than indirect-neighbours.   
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D1.3  Evaluation of Main Contributions 
 
The two main contributions from this thesis that deserve the attention of the wider 
academic community of researchers were the claim that this research has established the 
NE as a robust bias in decision-making and implicit social cognition and the advantages of 
the WL TV game-show as a research methodology in Psychology. 
 
Contribution 1: The neighbour effect as a proximity effect.  The NE proved to be 
a consistent theme that ran through all of the studies in the thesis.  It was shown to be 
robust and likely to be useful in understanding discrimination, implicit social cognition, 
altruism (pro-social behaviour) and cooperative (trust behaviour). 
 
1. Discrimination.  The NE in the WL emerged as a useful method for measuring in 
an indirect fashion implicit bias and discrimination.  The results from R1 confirmed that 
the WL exposed aspects of gender related discrimination largely in line with other US 
based studies of WL.  Females and males tended to vote against males and/or for women. 
 
2. Implicit and Explicit information.  A wealth of research suggests that much of 
our social cognition, attitude formation, decision-making, judgements of attractiveness et 
cetera are mediated by unconscious, implicit processes.  The NE exists as another key 
feature of our implicit social cognition.  Prior to the research presented in this thesis there 
had been relatively little work on these proximity biases.  
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It was assumed that voting decisions were mediated by using two very different 
sources of information: situational (exogenous), the game-specific, public performance of 
the other players, and, dispositional (endogenous), their individual, internal, subjective-
dependent attributions.  In rounds where situational information was unequivocal, so the 
weakest player was easily identified by the other players (high consensus), there was no 
voting bias.  However, significant biases emerged as uncertainty increased (consensus 
decreased) about the identity of the weakest player.  In the absence of clear-cut situational 
information, because all players performed equally well (or badly), players resorted to their 
private, bias-prone dispositional information source.  A third information source was also 
likely to be available that referred to the contestants’ ability to react to other contestants’ 
voting decisions.  This source of information was likely to be conscious and deliberate. 
This third source emerged in the literature review (Antonovics et al, 2005; Levitt, 2004) 
and through the voting biases in the WL second-round, reciprocity and consistency.  
Although, this strategic game-playing was treated as a third source of information bias, 
further research is required to determine if it is a separate TYPE III bias, or whether it 
could just as easily fit with the TYPE I, situational source described above in the form of 
information-based discrimination.  
 
3. Altruism and Fairness.  The sensitivity of the NE that was seen once the vote 
valence switched suggests that the NE might serve some function as an implicit bias 
favouring their closest neighbour(s) more than participants who were further from them as 
an act of altruism (Baron, 1995; Bell, 1991).  It remains to be seen whether the altruism to 
the neighbour is a genuine selflessness, or a cooperative strategy to avoid conflict.  
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The retaliation witnessed in second-round voting suggests that there was some 
good reason to expect retribution.  If conflict was an inevitable risk of doing something 
bad to somebody, then it would be reasonable to assume that the feud should be initiated 
with a contestant further away than the direct-neighbour.  Altruism might also have 
mitigated the extent of second-round consistency voting.  Although on the face of it, 
consistent voters were significantly more likely to vote for same contestant again in 
second-round, once the voting of controls was taken into consideration, it actually showed 
that the consistent voters were significantly less consistent than controls.  Their reluctance 
to target the same votee again in the second-round, even though justified by the controls, is 
a kind of altruism that might reflect their reluctance for conflict.  These hypotheses require 
further elaboration and testing. 
 
4. Cooperation and Trust.  The NE was strongly dominant when the contestants 
were favouring their closest fellow contestant(s) (i.e., direct-neighbour) in contrast to 
contestants that were further from them.  Proximity played an important role to explain this 
behaviour when they were making the decision with regards to any social context (i.e., WL 
observation, voting activity and the coin’s game activity).  This supported construal level 
theory where spatial proximity effects perception and decision making (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010).  Additionally, it was also suggested that the NE was more obvious at the 
lateral (side-by-side) proximity than the longitudinal (front and back) proximity.  
 
The NE explained the level of cooperation and trust shown by participants in the 
second field experiment study (PD).  PD is a dilemma for the player as they must take into 
consideration the likely strategy of the other player.  Participants were more likely to play 
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H (cooperate), with the presumption that this was the optimal strategy when the 
participants believed that the other player would play H.  The implicit NE worked twofold: 
to influence the inclination to cooperate with a neighbour(s) and influencing the implicit 
assumption that the neighbour will most likely act cooperatively too.  When players play 
against direct-neighbours they are more likely to pursue a pareto-dominated strategy even 
though the pure strategy to defect, according to the Nash equilibrium, should dominate 
when a rational player seeks to maximize payoffs. 
 
5. Proximity.  The observations of WL and the set-up of the field experiments were 
designed in such a fashion so as to create the optimal conditions for creating the kind of 
proximity bias associated with the NE.  These conditions have been detailed previously but 
mimic the uncertainty associated with low consensus voting rounds in WL.  The strength 
of the NE in both the observational field studies of WL and the field experiments was 
nevertheless a surprise.  The consistency of the pattern of voting as a function of voter-
votee spatial relationships was also a surprise.  It typified a three phase pattern.  In the 
cases highlighted where the vote carried a negative valence, the proximal phase was 
characterized by a neighbour avoidance effect.  This was followed by a medial phase, 
where the contestants located most centrally received more votes than expected.  Finally, 
the distal phase had the contestants furthest away voted for as expected.  
 
Construal Level theory (CLT) would suggest that the direct-neighbours were most 
concrete in the voter’s thinking and benefit accordingly from their benevolence, the 
furthest become the most abstract and so are largely disregarded whereas those located 
centrally fall between the extremes and suffer as a consequence of the charity afforded the 
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neighbours.  The suggestion is that the central contestants were not targeted because of 
their centrality but because voters tend to avoid votes for neighbours.  
 
Another related explanation for the tri-phasic proximity effect was that it was the 
manifestation of two choice biases.  The first choice bias was the oft discussed NE.  This 
was followed by the second choice bias for centrality preferences among similar options. 
Shaw, Bergen, Brown & Gallagher (2000) showed that participants have a strong 
automatic and unconscious bias for selecting the middle one of three items in an array.  
Taken together these biases combined would lead to the pattern of performance exhibited 
by contestants on the WL and on the fresher in a lecture. 
 
The CLT provides a psychological explanation whereas NE allied with centrality 
bias is based more on choice theory.  It could even be the case that the NE and centrality 
biases become the manifestation of CLT. 
 
Contribution 2: The TV Game-show is a Useful Tool to Observe Behaviour.  The 
review of the WL game-show as a methodology in I2, showed that a disparate set of 
researchers from different academic fields have converged on the utility of using WL as an 
empirical testing bed for their theories.  In doing this a WL contestant was considered 
variously as a potential source, or target, of discrimination (explicitly or/and implicitly), as 
a rational and strategic game player and as a decision maker prone to unconscious bias.  
 
The WL contestant as prejudiced, strategic, biased, decision maker.  Key features 
of the vote were that it involved an eight alternative-forced-choice (8AFC), it was cast 
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under effectively blind conditions without knowledge of the votes of other contestants, it 
was privately made. 
  
Putting oneself in the proverbial shoes of the contestant, it is reasonable to assume 
that during the first-round of questions that they would be in a state of heightened anxiety 
and excitement due to their unusual social context.  They were appearing in public, in an 
unfamiliar situation on a TV game-show that was scheduled to be broadcast nationally.  
They were facing a set of unknown questions to be answered quickly and without error and 
faced the prospect of elimination should they perform badly.  Taken together it is 
reasonable to assume that their decision-making would be affected by these external 
situational factors many beyond their control.  Moreover, the structure of the game-show 
and the atmosphere created by the host were designed to make the contestants 
uncomfortable and ill at ease.  On top of all of this they were put in the very uncomfortable 
position of having to pick someone, a relative stranger, to do something bad to.  Taken 
together these different factors mean that their performance demands their upmost 
attention and makes the WL an ideal methodology.   
 
The WL confers many advantages as a research tool.  Perhaps, the main advantage 
the WL offers is as an alternative method for studying sensitive topics such as race and 
gender discrimination.  For example, it is difficult for experimental economists to examine 
factors such as discrimination in active labour markets.  In the laboratory, participants are 
also unlikely to reveal hostile discriminatory behaviour.  In Psychology, it is also often 
difficult to measure such behaviour systematically, either in a laboratory setting or through 
observation elsewhere due to ethical considerations.  However, in the WL, it was easy to 
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study specific demographic variables of contestants, like race and gender, and relate the 
measured variables through to their game playing behaviour.  In this way gender/race 
could be investigated in the WL in an unobtrusive fashion that was not likely to inhibit or 
even be noticed by the participants.  In other words, the participants were unaware that 
their behaviour was under scrutiny.  
 
In a similar fashion, the WL offered a unique way to study the voting behaviour of 
contestants.  In particular, a vote can be seen as choosing to do something “bad” (i.e., 
voting out from the game) to another contestant.  It is difficult to devise scenarios to entice 
people to do ‘bad’ things in the laboratory that satisfy both ethical guidelines and have a 
meaningful credibility for participants.  
 
Taking these factors together means that the WL offered a perfect indirect method 
for studying implicit social cognition.  The format of the game itself and its popularity 
afforded the possibility of analysing a very large data set.  For instance, in this thesis, 
2,583 votes were observed.  A figure that is not feasible to replicate by recruiting 
participants in laboratory based studies.  Another advantage of the game-show format is 
that the WL game-show offered a high degree of effective control between episodes, which 
is something that is almost impossible to be observed in a normal laboratory setting.  
 
The information about the WL game-show was accessible and almost as visible to 
researchers as it was to the contestants.  Whereas, there was still the possibility that 
researchers were not privy to off-screen interactions between contestants, there was also 
the advantage that the researcher could replay and reanalyse the game over and over again, 
  
 
 
                                                          
227 
something that a contestant was unable to do in real time.  The contestants taking part were 
fully familiar with the game-show and the rules and so were unlikely to be susceptible to 
the kind of participant effects that often blight experimental work, where participants try to 
anticipate the goals of the research in tasks that can appear confusing and contrived.  The 
WL also allowed the researchers to use independent observers to code the contestants’ 
performance reducing the possibility of introducing experimenter bias.  The task was 
simple, countable and observable meaning it was unlikely that experimenters could 
introduce subjective interpretations particularly as data from WL was collated and 
corroborated by independent coders.   
 
In summary, the WL provided an empirical test-bed for theories in social 
psychology, decision-making and economics.  The WL as a method was effectively double 
blind by being relatively free from participant effects and experimenter bias.  The task was 
credible and authentic for participants because the goal made sense to them.  Their choices 
were natural and last, but not least, the high stakes offered in the game based TV game-
show is something that is impossible to be executed or replicated in a laboratory setting. 
 
However, there were also important limitations to studying WL.  Despite the large 
sample size, it was not representative the population in general.  The sample was by its 
very nature self-selected, comprised only of the kind of participants that put themselves 
forward to appear in TV game-shows.  Furthermore, it was selected further by the 
producers that presumably selected on the basis of the kinds of attributes that would be 
deemed attractive to a TV audience.  There was a lack of researcher control over the 
participants and their briefing and arrangement in the game.   
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Another limitation was the contrived context where participants made their choices. 
Being filmed for a TV game-show is not necessarily typical of normal day to day 
behaviour.  Although this unusual context could also be considered as an advantage as it 
required participants to take the task seriously.  The laboratory cannot easily recreate a 
context where participants’ decisions are open to such public scrutiny. 
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D1.4 Limitations of the Study 
  
In spite of the findings above there were some limitations to be addressed in this 
thesis. 
 
Limitation 1:  Difficulty isolating neighbour effect.  It was documented above 
that the clarity of the tri-phasic proximity effect coming out of the field experiment voting 
activity was a surprise.  This was largely because in many voting decisions or choice 
scenarios, there are many factors that can make up or dominate a choice decision.  In WL, 
a contestant’s primary choice information was how players play the game.  Only in the 
absence of this kind of information does the proximity bias come to the fore.  This made it 
very difficult to find instances of the NE in experimental settings.  Aside from the field 
experiments, most of the laboratory studies piloted failed to show any consistent results. 
 
Several pilots (refer to M1.3) were run in an attempt to replicate the findings from 
WL regarding the NE.  These attempts centred on recruiting small groups of students to 
work on an initial group task that later required each of them to “pick” someone from the 
group on some pretext.  The idea was that once the participants got around to picking one 
of their peers then they would display the NE.  Several games, and their variants, were 
used to entice some kind of choice from the participants.  The tasks were in the form of 
popular party or parlour games like wink murder; angels and detectives and even variants 
of the WL.  However, no consistent NE findings emerged from any of these pilot 
investigations that typically turned out to be fraught with practical difficulties. 
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Even if the students were not close friends they frequently were acquaintances of 
each other which was likely to affect the choices they made.  Recruiting the student 
participants and setting up a game playing scenario took, including briefings on playing the 
game, upwards of one hour and beyond, following which seven bits of data were recorded 
which were the voting decisions of the seven participants.  One way round this was to 
repeat several rounds of the game but then the voting took on features of retaliation and 
consistency voting that typified the second-round voting pattern on WL.  The only 
consistently reliable experiment used the field experiment lecture based studies. 
 
Limitation 2: Dynamic interaction.  This thesis was restricted to fixed interaction 
is in a static social context.  For instance, in the WL TV game-show as well as the field 
experiments, all the participants were positioned at one point without having to move to 
another point.  In the context of daily life, events are experienced as a temporal series of 
dynamic interactions, through which the spatial relationships between people is usually 
changing rapidly as they move from one point to another.  For example, in road traffic 
congestion, or even when people are walking on the pavement.  Hence, it will be 
interesting to test whether the NE is still a robust bias in dynamic social interactions.  
Testing this remains a challenge. 
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Limitation 3: Cultural differences.  Another potential limitation of this study was 
an absence of cultural differences as all the participants were predominantly UK residents.  
As reported by Hall (1963), different cultures have different interpretations of closeness 
“…it became apparent that people from different cultures interacting with each other could 
not be counted on to attach identical meanings to the same or similar measured distances 
between them” (Hall, 1963, p. 1003).  Hence, sensitivity to proximity varies according to 
social norms and it remains to be established whether the NE is a universal human trait or a 
cultural norm.  
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D1.5 Suggestions for Future study 
 
Community Impact.  Nieuwenhuis, Völker and Flap (2013) surveyed residents’ 
relationship in the Netherlands.  They suggested that the likelihood of a negative 
relationship in the neighbourhood was associated with the likelihood that the residents had 
rented their property.  The likelihood that they wanted to leave the neighbourhood was also 
related to the mode of property ownership.  One argument that they put forward was that 
the healthiest neighbour/neighbourhood relations were realized by citizens that had cast a 
long shadow into the past and looked to cast a long shadow into the future as long term 
residents.  It is likely the strength of the NE in these different kinds of communities would 
also shift.  One area where the implications of NE can be investigated is within real 
communities with meaningful neighbours.  Following the lead of Nieuwenhuis, Völker and 
Flap (2013) the concept of neighbourliness can be developed and potentially measured in 
communities. 
 
Tests of Neighbour Effect.  Tests of NE like those in WL and the field 
experiments provide an indirect measure of implicit social bias.  Although the pilot 
attempts to generate NE failed, Valenzuela and Raghubir (2007) found that a replication of 
WL using 67 students demonstrated authentic game-playing scenarios.  They managed this 
using a clever variant of WL that involved footage from the original episodes and included 
the students as an extra player in WL.  The students were required to choose which player 
from the actual WL they would prefer to face in the final.  They introduced a twist 
however by putting students in a cooperative or competitive condition.  The cooperative 
condition meant that the student should imagine that they were playing the game 
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cooperatively and would share the eventual prize fund.  In the competitive condition, 
however, the student had to choose whom to face under the usual rules where there was 
only one victor.  In the cases when the students were allocated the competitive condition, 
59% elected to play against a female contestant.  In the cooperative condition only 21% of 
students chose to play with a woman finalist.  It seemed that the students would prefer to 
face a woman in a competitive final but would rather play with a man if the proceeds were 
to be split.  They go on to suggest that one reason why women were retained in the early 
rounds of WL was because they were perceived to be less threatening than men, possibly 
accounting for the positive discrimination towards women contestants seen in the WL in 
R1 and in Antonovics et al., 2005). 
 
Self-Reflection.  Voting behaviour was used as an unorthodox alternative to 
traditional methods in psychology to try and explore how people make social choices in 
their everyday lives.  It was challenging at first using participants that were contestants on 
TV shows but it became very exciting to find out that the behaviour that they showed on 
TV was found as predicted in the studies that I had designed.  Therefore, this research 
established an alternative method to investigate individual choices, particularly relating to 
spatial proximity.   
 
The study found that the Neighbour Effect is an important phenomenon, a spatial 
bias in decision-making that was hitherto largely unknown until I confirmed it in my 
studies.  From a personal point of view I feel privileged to have happened upon a facet of 
human nature that was unknown before my work.  The real challenge is to develop these 
discoveries for publication and wider dissemination.  
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D1.6  Conclusion 
 
“A bad neighbour is as great a plague as a good one is a great blessing”  
(Nieuwenhuis. Völker & Flap, 2013, p. 1) 
 
A robust proximity bias was demonstrated that affected voting decisions.  The 
source of this bias was unconscious and automatic.  The bias worked by predominantly 
favouring direct spatial neighbours.  The neighbour effect was an avoidance to vote against 
neighbours if the consequence of the vote was perceived as being negative for the 
recipient.  When the consequence of the vote was perceived as positive the neighbour 
effect disappeared.  Therefore, the neighbour effect was not just a simple bias of choosing, 
as it changed according to the perceived impact the vote choice had on the neighbour.  The 
analysis of TV game-shows served as an important indirect method to test theories in 
Psychology, discrimination and decision-making to investigate the endogenous and 
exogenous factors in voting behaviour.  
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Appendices 
 
The Appendices section comprises the materials used in the lecture studies for 
2013/2014 (Appendix A), 2014/2015 (Appendix C) and 2015/2016 (Appendix B) cohorts.   
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
SHEET 1  Ethics, Background and Instructions 
 
BACKGROUND AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. Ethics - ‘Credit points’ and ‘Lottery’:- Any research that gets carried out in the University 
has to be approved by the relevant ethics committee. I have to ensure that everybody here:- 
 i.) Is fully informed as to what the procedures are in advance.  
ii.) Has the right to confidentiality/anonymity. 
iii.) Gives their informed consent to take part. 
iv.) Has the right to withdraw, without losing rewards/benefits. 
 
 
Everybody here is entitled to one ‘Credit Point’* and everybody here will be entitled to a 
minimum of one ticket to a lottery*. (Some people might get more than one ticket but nobody 
will get less than one.) The lottery prize will be…… 
 
2. Background: - We have carried out a bit of research already that has looked at ‘voting’ 
behaviour where:- 
 I.) ‘voters’ have had ‘open’ information about whom to vote for and why, 
II.) and, the vote was ‘open’ (the ‘voter’ announced their ‘vote’ publicly), 
III.) and, the vote was POSITIVE or NEGATIVE. 
 
3. Aim for Today:- We want to collect some Control/Normative data today to use as a 
baseline for what we’ve done before, described in 1.) above, but 
 
 I.) ‘voters’ have ‘closed’ no information about whom to vote for and why, and 
 II.) the ‘vote’ is closed (the ‘voter’ makes their vote privately). 
 III.) and the vote will be POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, NEGATIVE**.  
 
 
4. Procedure:- We will ask you to make THREE votes that vary according to spatial scale.  
I.) Vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE by making a cross on the seating plan. 
II.) Vote for someone in your BLOCK by making a cross. 
III.) Vote for someone in your BLOCK and in your ROW by making a cross. 
VI.) MOST IMPORTANTLY, please indicate your seat number here and make a note of it:- 
 
I AM SAT IN BLOCK:-     
 
I AM SAT IN ROW:- 
 
I AM SAT IN SEAT:- 
 
 
RULES 
Please be quiet until everyone has made their votes and the experimenter  
The only rule is that you can’t vote for yourself!!!! 
 
5. Thank you!!!! Please make your judgements on the attached sheets and when you have 
finished just place your answer sheets in the envelope in which they came.  
 
       
About YOU! 
 
M/F 
 
Age 
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Your vote is NEGATIVE and removes ONE voucher 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
  
 
 
                                                          
238 
 
Appendix A2 
 
 
 
Your vote is NEGATIVE and removes ONE voucher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is NEGATIVE and removes FIVE vouchers 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is NEGATIVE and removes FIVE vouchers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is POSITIVE and adds ONE voucher 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is POSITIVE and adds ONE voucher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is POSITIVE and adds FIVE vouchers 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is POSITIVE and adds FIVE vouchers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is NEUTRAL and gives ZERO voucher 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is NEUTRAL and gives ZERO voucher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
  
 
 
                                                          
247 
Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
SHEET 1  Ethics, Background and Instructions 
 
BACKGROUND AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1. Ethics - ‘Credit points’ and ‘Lottery’:- Any research that gets carried out in the University 
has to be approved by the relevant ethics committee. I have to ensure that everybody here:- 
 i.) Is fully informed as to what the procedures are in advance.  
ii.) Has the right to confidentiality/anonymity. 
iii.) Gives their informed consent to take part. 
iv.) Has the right to withdraw, without losing rewards/benefits. 
 
 
Everybody here is entitled to one ‘Credit Point’* and everybody here will be entitled to a 
minimum of one ticket to a lottery*. (Some people might get more than one ticket but nobody 
will get less than one.) The lottery prize will be…… 
 
2. Background: - We have carried out a bit of research already that has looked at ‘voting’ 
behaviour where:- 
 I.) ‘voters’ have had ‘open’ information about whom to vote for and why, 
II.) and, the vote was ‘open’ (the ‘voter’ announced their ‘vote’ publicly), 
III.) and, the vote was POSITIVE or NEGATIVE. 
 
3. Aim for Today:- We want to collect some Control/Normative data today to use as a 
baseline for what we’ve done before, described in 1.) above, but 
 
 I.) ‘voters’ have ‘closed’ no information about whom to vote for and why, and 
 II.) the ‘vote’ is closed (the ‘voter’ makes their vote privately). 
 III.) and the vote will be POSITIVE, NEGATIVE**.  
 
 
4. Procedure:- We will ask you to make THREE votes that vary according to spatial scale.  
I.) Vote for someone in the BLOCK and in your ROW by making a cross on the seating plan. 
II.) Vote for someone in your BLOCK by making a cross. 
III.) Vote for someone in your LECTURE THEATRE by making a cross. 
VI.) MOST IMPORTANTLY, please indicate your seat number here and make a note of it:- 
 
I AM SAT IN BLOCK:-     
 
I AM SAT IN ROW:- 
 
I AM SAT IN SEAT:- 
 
 
RULES 
Please be quiet until everyone has made their votes and the experimenter  
The only rule is that you can’t vote for yourself!!!! 
 
5. Thank you!!!! Please make your judgements on the attached sheets and when you have 
finished just place your answer sheets in the envelope in which they came.  
 
       
About YOU! 
 
M/F 
 
Age 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
248 
Appendix B1 
 
 
 
 
Your vote is NEGATIVE and removes FIVE vouchers 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is NEGATIVE and removes FIVE vouchers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is POSITIVE and adds FIVE vouchers 
 
About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age). If you do not want to consent to take part in the study then 
simply do not make any votes. Even if you don’t make any votes though, you 
will still gain a ‘Credit Point’ and voucher for the raffle so please put in your 
seat number. When you have finished please place this sheet back in the 
envelope provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes. 
There are no ‘correct’ answers and the only real guidance is that you can not 
vote for yourself.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
 
 
 
Please vote for someone in the BLOCK & ROW by 
placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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Your vote is POSITIVE and adds FIVE vouchers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choice. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Please vote for someone in your BLOCK by placing 
‘X’ on a seat 
Please vote for someone in your LECTURE THEATRE 
by placing ‘X’ on a seat 
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v1 
 
A little bit About YOU! 
We would like to know a little bit about you so we can describe the 
demographics of our sample (please leave blank if you do not wish to disclose 
your gender/age).  
 
If you consent to taking part in the study then simply fill in this response sheet.  
If you don’t want to take part then leave it blank, but please still put in your 
seat number, below, because you will still be entered to win a prize and still 
get a ‘credit point’.  
 
When you have finished please place this sheet back in the envelope 
provided. The whole process should only take a couple of minutes.  
 
I am female/male and I am __________years old. 
 
 
I am in Seat number:- 
 
 
IMPORTANT: Keep a personal record of your seat number!!  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
We are going to ask you to play the ‘coin game’ 3 times. 
 
Each time you play, you will indicate how your play by circling ‘H’ or ‘T’ 
or entering it into a text box, on the other side of this ‘Response Sheet’. 
Your responses are secret and anonymous and other players will not 
see what you have done. You will never get to see how other players 
responded. 
 
Your aim is to try and score as many points as possible. We will work 
this out by adding up how many points you scored in the 3 games and 
dividing it by how many players there were that you played against. This 
will give us an average point score for each participant. 
 
When you have made your responses we will give you a verbal debrief 
about what the study is about, but in short there are no catches or tricks 
involved. Computer scientists have generated computer programs that 
have played these kinds of games before. We want to know if a group of 
people play the game the same way as the computer program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTO   
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v1 
 
 
you  them your 
score 
their 
score 
Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Please rate how well you feel you understand the game and instructions 
(please circle one):- 
 
Fairly well well OK Not very well Not at all  
 
If they play ‘H’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
If they play ‘T’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away 
from you, to your left and right (your direct neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away 
to your left and right (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Game 3:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with your neighbour(s) (one space 
away from you, to your left and right) and ‘somebody else’ somewhere in the 
lecture theatre. You must play ‘H’ with one and ‘T’ with the other.  
 
How will you play?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choices. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Put ‘H’ in one 
box and ‘T’ in 
the other. 
 
Neighbour(s) Somebody else  
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v1r 
 
 
you  them your 
score 
their 
score 
Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Please rate how well you feel you understand the game and instructions 
(please circle one):- 
 
Fairly well well OK Not very well Not at all  
 
If they play ‘H’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
If they play ‘T’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away 
to your left and right (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away 
from you, to your left and right (your direct neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Game 3:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with your neighbour(s) (one space 
away from you, to your left and right) and ‘somebody else’ somewhere in the 
lecture theatre. You must play ‘H’ with one and ‘T’ with the other.  
 
How will you play?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choices. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Put ‘H’ in one 
box and ‘T’ in 
the other. 
 
Neighbour(s) Somebody else  
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v2 
 
 
you  them your 
score 
their 
score 
Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Please rate how well you feel you understand the game and instructions 
(please circle one):- 
 
Fairly well well OK Not very well Not at all  
 
If they play ‘H’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
If they play ‘T’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away 
from you, to your left and right, front and back (your direct neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away 
to your left and right, front and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Game 3:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with your neighbour(s) (one space 
away from you, to your left and right) and ‘somebody else’ somewhere in the 
lecture theatre. You must play ‘H’ with one and ‘T’ with the other.  
 
How will you play?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choices. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Put ‘H’ in one 
box and ‘T’ in 
the other. 
 
Neighbour(s) Somebody else  
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v2r 
 
 
you  them your 
score 
their 
score 
Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Please rate how well you feel you understand the game and instructions 
(please circle one):- 
 
Fairly well well OK Not very well Not at all  
 
If they play ‘H’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
If they play ‘T’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away 
to your left and right, front and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away 
from you, to your left and right, front and back (your direct neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Game 3:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with your neighbour(s) (one space 
away from you, to your left and right) and ‘somebody else’ somewhere in the 
lecture theatre. You must play ‘H’ with one and ‘T’ with the other.  
 
How will you play?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choices. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Put ‘H’ in one 
box and ‘T’ in 
the other. 
 
Neighbour(s) Somebody else  
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v3 
 
 
you  them your 
score 
their 
score 
Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Please rate how well you feel you understand the game and instructions 
(please circle one):- 
 
Fairly well well OK Not very well Not at all  
 
If they play ‘H’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
If they play ‘T’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away 
from you, to your front and back (your direct neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away 
to your front and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Game 3:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with your neighbour(s) (one space 
away from you, to your left and right) and ‘somebody else’ somewhere in the 
lecture theatre. You must play ‘H’ with one and ‘T’ with the other.  
 
How will you play?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choices. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Put ‘H’ in one 
box and ‘T’ in 
the other. 
 
Neighbour(s) Somebody else  
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RESPONSE SHEET 
v3r 
 
 
you  them your 
score 
their 
score 
Total 
H H 3 3 6 
H T 0 5 5 
T H 5 0 5 
T T 1 1 2 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Please rate how well you feel you understand the game and instructions 
(please circle one):- 
 
Fairly well well OK Not very well Not at all  
 
If they play ‘H’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
If they play ‘T’ which response would give you the most points? 
CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 1:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with the people two spaces away 
to your front and back (your next-door-but-one neighbours)  
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
GAME 2:- You are playing the ‘coin game’ with the people one space away 
from you, to your front and back (your direct neighbour(s)). 
How will you play? CIRCLE ONE    H  T 
 
Game 3:- You are playing the ‘coin’ game with your neighbour(s) (one space 
away from you, to your left and right) and ‘somebody else’ somewhere in the 
lecture theatre. You must play ‘H’ with one and ‘T’ with the other.  
 
How will you play?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This final question is optional and open-ended about how you made your choices. I made my 
choices by:-  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………(optional) 
THANK YOU! Paul, Patrick, Adrian, Zamira, Chris. 
Put ‘H’ in one 
box and ‘T’ in 
the other. 
 
Neighbour(s) Somebody else  
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